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Language of Civil Rights Litigators
I. CRIES TO HEAVEN, A CRITIQUE
A friend of mine, a public interest lawyer, says, "Give me straw-
man plaintiffs. Real clients are such a pain." Yet that is how justice
comes in the world, not through you the lawyer, but through crazy
people, dybbuks, who briefly take possession of you.'
Thomas Geoghegan
The clearness of your statements, Mr. Lincoln; the unanswerable
style of your reasoning, and especially your illustrations ... were
romance and pathos, and fun and logic all welded together. That story
about the snakes, for example... was at once queer and comical, and
tragic and argumentative. It broke through all the barriers of a man's
previous opinions and prejudices at a crash, and blew up the very
citadel of his false theories before he could know what had hurt him.2
Rev. J.P. Gulliver
6leR^-PtI5 TooK, fib M
,,EZ. ooo ?EoLt'I 4 o
Art Spiegelman3
A. Hattie's Story
I once had a client named Hattie Kendrick. She was a woman and an
African-American, a school teacher and a civil rights warrior, spit upon,
arrested, and tossed out of restaurants and clothing stores that did not "cater
to the colored trade." She marched and spoke out for integration and against
oppression. Her school fired her, but not before she had taught generations of
black children in Cairo, Illinois, that participation in American democracy was
their right and their duty. In the 1940's, she sued to win equal pay for black
1. Thomas Geoghegan, Warren Court Children. NEW REPUBUC. May 19. 1986. at 17. 23
2. F.B. CARPENTER, SIX MONTHS AT THE WHITE HOUSE wmi ABRAHAM LINCOLN TIHE STORY OF
A PICTURE 311 (New York. Hurd & Houghton 1866) (quoting Rev. JP Guliaver) (citation omitted)
3. ART SPIEGELMAN, MAUS I: MY FATHER BLEEDS HISTORY 108 (1986)
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teachers, with Thurgood Marshall as her lawyer. And in the 1970's, she was
a named plaintiff in a class action asserting the voting rights of black citizens
in Cairo against a city electoral system rigged to reduce the value of their
votes to nothingness. All she wanted was to cast a meaningful vote in a
democratic election before she died-she was in her nineties, growing blind
and weak. Such a woman. Such a story. And such a voice. Listen to how she
discerns the problems of her town: "'Too long have the two races stood
grinning in each other's faces, while they carry the fires of resentment and hate
in their hearts, and with their hands hid behind their backs they carry the
unsheathed sword."' 4 Yet here is how the complaint filed in federal court
identifies the named plaintiffs, including Hattie Kendrick: "All plaintiffs are
Blacks, citizens of the United States and of the State of Illinois, and residents
of Cairo, Illinois registered to vote in Municipal Elections conducted in
Cairo."5
This Article springs from the recurring disappointment and frustration I
have felt after consultation with clients in cases presenting outrages that, in a
phrase loved by my mother, cried out to heaven. I have represented and
continue to represent these clients in civil rights cases, broadly defined. These
are my clients: a young woman, sexually abused as a child, forced to undergo
unjustified strip searches that aroused the nightmares of her childhood. A black
laborer finding his lunch in the toilet and racist threats in his locker. A gay
man staring death from AIDS in the face and denied the only available
treatment because of bureaucratic indifference and homophobia. A recovering
drug addict holding his addiction at bay with the support of a group home, yet
in jeopardy of losing that home when fearful neighbors complained to a
cowardly city government.
My frustration and disappointment began when I reviewed the pleadings
I drafted for them. I could barely see over the chasm separating what those
clients told me about their lives and what I wrote to the court as factual
allegations in the complaint-sterile recitations of dates and events that lost so
much in the translation. What is lost in a description that identifies a woman
like Hattie only as a registered voter? Details, of course. Passion, certainly, but
more than that. We lose the identity of the person harmed, the story of her life.
But even more is lost. This was a class action aimed at remedying a systemic
problem harming thousands, over generations. The complaint omits the social
chemistry underneath the events normally invisible to the law-events that
create the injury or compound it. In this complaint, we lose the fullness of the
harm done, the scale of the deprivations, the humiliation of the plaintiff class
members, the damage to greater society, the significance of it all.
4. PAUL GOOD, CAIRO, ILLINOIS: RACISM AT FLOODTIDE 12 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, 1973)
(quoting Hattie Kendrick).
5. First Amended Complaint at 3. Kendrick v. Moss (S.D. Ill. filed July 3, 1979) (No. 73-19C)
[hereinafter Kendrick].
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The complaint omits the frustration of the democratic process and the
powerful metaphors that claim an exception to the rules restricting the court's
involvement. The complaint leaves intact the walls between the clients and the
court, the clients and the lawyer. In a strange way, it even effaces the lawyer
by denying her the dynamic and creative role of responding to the tragedy
witnessed.
I wondered how we, as lawyers, could plead the horror of wrong done on
a mass scale. In reviewing the pleadings in other famous civil rights class
actions, I found similar failings. This Article explores why we fail and
wonders whether we can do better.
To begin with, this Article demonstrates our failure by comparing lawyers'
pleadings with the reality of clients' situations as described by journalists and
historians. Much is lost by words alone, by the words of journalists and
historians no less than those of lawyers.6 But with their losses and omissions,
these contrasting descriptions will prove useful in my analysis. As Stanley Fish
argues, all we have of "what really happened" is a collection of competing
descriptions.7 The descriptions make visible the extent to which law as a
language omits something significant from the reality it purports to portray.'
These contrasts are not merely academic. In this Article, we do not
observe the legal interpretations of distant or dead judges' precedent. 9 Rather,
we read the work of a lawyer speaking through a complaint to a judge who
will then, as part of the interpretive process, engage the lawyer in an ongoing
conversation that is begun and framed by the complaint. The conversation ends
with a decision, favorable or adverse.
The very high social stakes and moral imperative of civil rights cases
invite literary treatment, in order to present worlds in conflict."0 In a systemic
civil rights lawsuit brought by a class against a governmental or corporate
system, the surface of everydayness is ripped open and we inspect the layers
underneath. We then find the routine that grinds along, churning out the little
injustices, the grinning faces that conceal resentment. The civil rights plaintiff
6. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 207, 268 (abndged ed 1985) [herenafter WrrE.
IMAGINATION] (describing frustrations of legal language as "frustrations of language rtsclf"l. ee also JA.tES
BOYD WHrrE JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 217 (1990) (hereinafter WtTF. JtUSTICEI (discussing histonans*
use of language).
7. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY' CIIANGE. RIIE-oRIC. AD TIlE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 158 (1989).
8. See WHITE., IMAGINATION. supra note 6. at 4 (asking whether precision of legal language is all gain
with no loss).
9. This is the focus of much of the law-as-ltcrature debate FISH. supra note 7. at 378 (noting "the
almost exclusive focus of contemporary legal debate, judging"); see. e.g. WIrE. JUSTICE. supra note 6.
at 89 (critiquing judicial opinions).
10. James Boyd White tells us of one such world. Greece in the chaotic aftermath of the
Peloponnesian War. According to White. Thucydides found that "words themscl'es lost their meaning",
"prudent foresight" became "cowardice" and "'recklessness" became "loyalty " JAMES BOYD WHrrE. WHE.',
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 3 (1984).
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may stand in the courtroom as an equal to her adversary," but she did not
enter the courtroom in that condition and may leave with that inequality
deepened. An adverse verdict can mean continued oppression, even death.'
But this dramatic quality transcends the civil rights context. Every client
has a story that deserves to be told-from the corporate client trying to survive
in a harshly competitive climate, to a spouse embroiled in a bitter divorce.
While the need to tell a story is present in many different kinds of litigation,
the civil rights field is a good place to begin. In Section B of this Part, I
explore why the initial pleading before the judge is particularly important in
a civil rights lawsuit. In Section C, I examine pleadings in three civil rights
cases and identify the lost elements of the stories behind the complaints.
Section D offers explanations for the loss but finds none that precludes
reintroduction of those lost elements into the stories told by the pleadings.
Section E argues that we need to reintroduce them, to change the way we think
about pleading. In Part II, I explore the possibilities for change, and then I turn
to specific suggestions for that task-from old rhetorical devices to new ones.
I demonstrate my method for thicker pleading in Part III by revising a
traditional civil rights complaint.' 3 Part IV suggests the benefits we would
reap from a change in this direction. Finally, Part V proposes that we try.
B. Speaking Is What We Do: The Importance of Complaints
Liberty, lives, fortunes often are at stake, and appeals for assistance
and mercy rend the air for those who care to hear ... In all questions
men are frequently influenced by some statement which, spoken at the
eventful time, determines fate. 4
Clarence Darrow
What does it matter? What is wrong with a pleading that simply offers a
short and concise statement of the claim, as the rules expect? Why are
pleadings so important?
At one time in our history, these questions would have sounded odd to
most lawyers. Justice Story wrote that pleading "contains the quintessence of
the law, and no man ever mastered it, who was not by that means made a
11. See WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 24 (discussing equalizing power of legal discourse).
12. As we will see, these crises affect the lives of lawyers as well, driving some into the role of
renegade and others into the safety of traditional roles. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELP
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 165, 167, 169, 204 (1973).
13. The Appendix contains a traditional complaint for comparison.
14. CLARENCE DARROW, VERDICTS OUT OF CoURT 321-22 (Arthur Weinberg & Lila Weinberg eds.,
1963).
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profound lawyer."'15 Littleton called pleading "one of the most honourable,
laudable, and profitable things in our law." 6 Of course, Story and Littleton
were speaking of common law pleading, long since worn down by waves of
reform to simplicity and plainness.' 7 Still, the reforms do not lessen the
importance of the pleading.
Certainly, the persuasiveness of the stories lawyers tell for their clients
matters. "People, including judges and jurors," Michael Tigar writes,
"understand and restate events in terms of stories."'" Nevertheless, many
lawyers view the complaint simply as the mechanism by which they get the
case into a court and in front of a jury-irrelevant once defense motions
attacking the pleading have been overcome. Viewed from their angle, the
complaint only needs to meet legal sufficiencies; it need not tell a story. These
lawyers might think that the trial, specifically the closing arguments, serves as
a more appropriate vehicle for telling the tragic stories they seek to remedy.' 9
Even so, civil rights pleadings in particular should tell stories, for these
reasons: First, in civil rights cases seeking injunctions, there is no jury. The
judge is the person who must be persuaded. She is the trier of fact who will
then decide to issue an injunction or not.20 The complaint, while certainly not
the only opportunity for persuasion, is the first in time and the one that frames
the remaining discussion of the case. Second, not only will there be no jury,
it is likely that there will be no trial. Years will be spent managing a complex
discovery process, punctuated by scrimmages over various motions)' Often
the parties bypass trial by negotiating a consent decree, often with guidance
from the court.22 While the parties may negotiate the relief, the court must
15. Quoted in JONATHAN LANDERS Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 347 (2d ed. 1988).
16. LrrXLETON, TENURES, bk. 3. ch. 9. § 534 (London, Henry Butterworth 1825) (1481)
17. Common law pleading was reformed by code pleading for modem litigation so that a -person of
common understanding [could] know what is intended." N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 57(5) (1848). Code
pleading in turn was reformed such that its distinctions among fact. evidence, and law ,cre abolished and
"short and plain statement[s]" of the claim became the only requirement of a pleading. 2A JAMES W
MOORE & JO DESHA LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE '1 8.13. at 8-54 to -55 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
18. MICHAEL E. TIGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES 5 (1993); see also John C Shepard & Jordan B
Cherrick, Advocacy and Emotion, 138 F.R.D. 619, 622 (1991) (discussing benefits of storytelling).
19. Certainly civil rights litigation is not the only type of litigation that centers on human suffering.
Personal injury litigation is another. But in personal injury case'-and in ciil nghts cases for
damages-the audience is not the judge, but the jury-and so the medium of persuasion is the closing
argument, not the complaint or petition. And-whether in personal injury or civil rights damages
cases-transcripts of closing arguments to juries are more difficult to obtin than complaints, when they
are available at all, since fewer cases are appealed than commenced
20. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301. 305 n.4 (Olth Cir 1991) (noting that action for
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not triable by jury) (citation omited). See generally Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 197, 200 (1973) (noting that courts have broad discretion to grant injunctive relief).
II CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942. at 365
(1973) (same).
21. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Ltiganon. 89 HARV L. REv. 1281. 1298
(1976).
22. Id. at 1302.
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approve of the terms23 and maintain a "continuing involvement in
administration and implementation." 24 Abram Chayes has noted that "[a]ll
these factors thrust the trial judge into an active role in shaping, organizing and
facilitating the litigation." 25 When the decision maker shapes the development
of the case and grants the relief without a trial, the complaint grows in
significance. It is the first and perhaps the only means of communicating the
client's story.
Third, even where a trial results, it will take years to get there.26 Erving
Goffman has observed that in most personal encounters, one or the other of the
participants in an interaction will shape that interaction, at the outset.27 In
litigation, one participant-the judge-exercises much more power than the
others in deciding who speaks, at what length, and at what time. The
complaint-read by the judge, one would hope, before her first face-to-face
interaction with plaintiffs' counsel-may present the lawyer with the sole
means of shaping the continuing interaction "at the outset." The complaint may
color the judge's perception throughout the trial and beyond-from motions,
discovery disputes, and settlement conferences, through postdecree enforcement
proceedings.
Fourth, the court's construction of the "real" problem dictates how the
problem will be considered and addressed. For example, if a prison case is
defined as a problem of resources rather than as a dispute over particular
rights, the court may rule that it has no power to act. On the other hand, if the
case is defined as a dispute over rights, then the lack of resources provides no
defense.28
If the right is to an integrated classroom, then the transportation of
pupils to achieve that end is appropriate. Suppose, on the other hand,
a court asks why a school has become segregated. It may conclude
that residential patterns are responsible. If it does, then its order may
deal as much with housing as with the school. The definition of the
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
24. Chayes, supra note 21, at 1284; see also Judy Scales-Trent, A Judge Shapes and Manages
Institutional Reform: School Desegregation in Buffalo, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 119 (1989).
25. Chayes, supra note 21, at 1298. In systemic civil rights cases, "the judge is the dominant figure
in organizing and guiding the case." Id. at 1284 (remarking on "public law litigation").
26. See id. at 1298. In Hattie Kendrick's case, settlement negotiations began in earnest on the eve of
trial, six years after the initial complaint was filed. The case finally culminated in a consent decree six
months later. Consent Decree, Kendrick v. Moss (S.D. Ill. Mar. 1I, 1980) (No. 73-19-C). Even when clients
are allowed to testify on their experiences during a preliminary injunction hearing, the narrative of their
experiences may be lost once the court begins to focus more narrowly upon the more sterile legal issues
raised by the complaint. See Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and
Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 861, 929 (1992) (demonstrating how
this occurred in one such case).
27. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 10-12.
28. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public
Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1289.
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issue dictates the direction of the response and the scope of the
resulting remedy.
29
Since we criticize judges who reach adverse decisions by using labels that
misrepresent our client's reality, 30 we should pause to consider how our
complaints can educate the judge about that reality.
Fifth, federal judges who sit in isolation, economically and socially, from
the problems of poor blacks in Cairo or of felons in maximum security prisons,
need more vivid and complete pictures painted for them if they are to
understand the problems sufficiently, to care about them enough to guide the
litigation, and, ultimately, to remedy those problems.3' Beyond the personal
life experiences of the judge, other obstacles restrict the view of the judge,
e.g., the restraints of the role, limited resources,2- and even more limited
access to the facts of a case.
Civil rights lawyers have an opportunity and an obligation to expand that
view, starting with the complaint. Unavoidably, they will be reduced to
speaking of the case in shorthand-metaphors or clichds-that is cramped by
the claims made in the complaint. "Good morning, Judge. This is a Section
1983 prisoner case." They can advance their persuasion, or fail to: "Counsel,
is this that case where the prisoners were herded like cattle?"
One federal judge has candidly written that
[R]egardless of who appointed them, judges react negatively to the
"gotcha" lawsuit. By that I mean the lawsuit based on some technical
nonobservance of a law or regulation whose consequences are
undocumented, or at best vague. We judges want to know the facts,
the real-life conditions, the actual practices underlying a legal
challenge.... Judges search for meaning in what we do. You need
to convince us that the law or the regulation is important in poor
people's lives.33
29. Id. at 1291 (citation omitted).
30. E.g., Rand Rosenblatt, Social Duties and the Problem of Rights in the American Welfare State.
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 90. 100 (David Kairys ed . re cd 1990) lhereinafter
POLITICS OF LAW] ("[Tlhe quasi-empirical claim that the government has not 'done" an) thing to people
by withdrawing benefits or providing inadequate services. because it has not made their situation worse than
it would have been without any government program at all. denies the preempti'c or rehane effects of
actually providing services."): see also Rhonda Copelon. A Crime Not Fit To Be Named Set. Lies. and
the Constitution, in POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 177. 179 ("To compare homosexuality and contagious
disease, as the Chief Justice did in a 1978 opinion, is quintessential homophobia ")
31. See HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS. POLMCS. AND JUSTICE 244-54 (1983) (noting relationship between
judges' social backgrounds and their attitudes); Lynne W. Henderson. Legahtv and Empaths. 85 Miot L
REv. 1574 (1987) (explaining role of empathy in judicial decision making)
32. Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker Superntending Structural Change in Public
Institutions. 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 106 (1979).
33. Patricia M. Wald, Ten Admonitions for Legal SenvicesAdwcxates Contemplating Federal Litigation.
CLEARINGHOUSE REV.. May 1993, at II, 13 On appeal of a trial courns order granting a motion to dismiss.
the complaint becomes critical in persuading a panel of judges who are een farther remosed than the trial
judge from the real world of a civil rights client.
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Other judges-and their law clerks-have emphasized, in prisoner cases, that
it is the "compelling" story that moves them to act.3
Sixth, the complaint is even more important to lawyers who perceive
themselves as representatives of a cause or constituency beyond the immediate
client. Civil rights "litigation is itself an excellent constituency-building
device., 35 A lawyer can further her larger cause by drafting a pleading that
serves as a "dramatic and decisive gesture, stating a claim in its most extreme
and visible form-as a legal right. '36 Impact litigation can give poor clients
a chance to mobilize for change. 37 Robert Jerome Glennon even argues that
litigation contributed more to the success of the mid-1950's civil rights
movement in Montgomery, Alabama, than did the bus boycott. 38 The
complaint, filed with the court and disseminated to clients or "constituents"
and the media, communicates what the problem is all about.
Seventh, through the media, the complaint speaks to the greater
community. That community includes the defendants, the defendants'
superiors, and possibly their friends and colleagues. That community may
come to see hidden problems in a new light, consider change, and press for
settlement.39
Eighth, the complaint offers the litigator the only chance to tell the client's
story-a dramatic, compelling story-in a literary way. It is a rare chance for
creativity. Civil rights lawyers should not resist this opportunity.40 Civil rights
complaints, because they are of more recent vintage and so deeply fact
sensitive, are rooted less often in common law pleading rules and techniques
and written less frequently from formbooks. Civil rights lawyers find
themselves compelled to go beyond the boilerplates, which do not lend
themselves to portraying the unique position of their clients, who are socially
marginalized underdogs.41
All this is summarized in an aphorism, which echoes from Story's time as
well as from Littleton's: Pleading matters because it is what we do.42
34. See JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER 148-50
(1988) [hereinafter THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION]; Jim Thomas, Prisoner Cases as Narrative, in
NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW 237, 255, 257
(David Papke ed., 1991) [hereinafter Thomas, Prisoner Cases].
35. Diver, supra note 32, at 68.
36. Id.
37. Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients To Speak,
16 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1987-88). For the litigation to serve this purpose, the complaint
will have to be intelligible to the client audience. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 32 (arguing that professional
acts of service should be intelligible to clients, but often are not).
38. Robert J. Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott,
1955-1957. 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 59 (1991).
39. STEVE J. MARTIN & SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE WALLS COME TUMBLING
DOWN 206-14 (1987).
40. WHITE, IMAGINATION, supra note 6, at 209 (discussing potential for creativity in lawyering).
41. Cf. EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 161-62 (1986).
42. LANDERS, supra note 15, at 347 (quoting Littleton and other legal scholars).
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C. Dueling Descriptions
For the truth is, facts are not enough. It is a great sin to distort them.
and surely no good can come from that (I have never known a
modern historical instance where the truth was not superior to
distortion, by any standard and in every way); but facts can be done
without as readily as any of the other components which serve to
communicate an event. Stephen Crane's study of Chancellorsville, The
Red Badge of Courage, though it concentrates on a single soldier,
born in the writer's imagination, is at least as interesting-and even
as instructive-as, say, Bigelow's. And yet Crane cared so little for
facts, as facts, that he did not even give the battle's name."'
Shelby Foote
1. Cairo: Kendrick v. Moss
In 1973, Hattie Kendrick and other African-American leaders in Cairo,
Illinois, filed a federal class action lawsuit under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In their lawsuit, they challenged the
structure of municipal elections by arguing, in essence, that the at-large system
diluted the votes of black citizens. Although Cairo was forty percent black, city
officers were elected by citywide vote and racially polarized voting patterns
prevailed whenever a black candidate faced a white opponent. As a result, a
black citizen's vote for a black candidate would be rendered meaningless. In
order to prevail under existing law, the Cairo plaintiffs had to plead and prove
a history of segregation in the community, a lack of responsiveness to minority
constituents, and unequal access to the electoral process.'
A few years after the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
filed the Cairo lawsuit, I arrived in Cairo fresh out of law school and found
myself assigned to Hattie's case. Hattie became a grandmother to the little
outpost of civil rights lawyers in Cairo and her case came to matter to us as
the duty not only of lawyers but of grandchildren. We added a claim under the
Voting Rights Act,45 named another community activist, Preston Ewing, as
43. Shelby Foote, The Novelist's View of History. 17 Miss. Q. 219. 225 (1964)
44. See also White v. Regester. 412 U.S. 755. 766-67 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen. 485 F2d 1297.
1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff d on other grounds sub norm. East Catroll Parish Sch Bd % Marshall.
424 U.S. 636 (1976) ("[Wlhere a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating
candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests or that the existence of
past discrimination in general precludes the effective participation in the election system. a strong case is
made.").
45. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971. 1973 et seq (1988 & Supp V 1993)
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a plaintiff, and began to push the case toward trial. In other respects, I did not
alter the original complaint.
The factual allegations in the complaint can be compared to a 1972
account written by journalist Paul Good and published by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights after it held hearings in Cairo.46 The complaint
pleads "systematic" discrimination in employment, citing statistics of higher
unemployment and lower median income for blacks.47 The journalist's
account contains similar statistics but it also includes additional information.
When jobless blacks went on welfare, they were forced to pick cotton
in season at substandard wages or lose their welfare rights. Since local
plants-including governmental contractors-would not hire black
seamstresses, one welfare mother with five children had to travel 50
miles a day to work, arising at 3 a.m. to feed and dress the children
before carrying them to a sitter. When eventually she could find no
one to mind them, she lost her welfare allotments.
Mrs. Rosie Bryant, an 84-year-old welfare recipient so poor that
she and her husband had to mortgage their mule, has a more down-to-
earth summation of things. [She discussed] at the 1966 meeting [of
the Illinois Advisory Commission to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission] what civil rights laws had done for her. "Listen," she
says, "I don't see a bit of difference now than I did way back in '51
or '52 in the civil rights. It hasn't reached us. I reckon it's on its way,
but it ain't got here yet.",
48
The complaint plainly lacks colorful prose; but more than that, it misses the
poignant personal stories of the two women. Additionally, it loses the context
of their problems, which involve far more than the Voting Rights Act. "The
problem" encompasses even more than a poor economy in which the few
employers hire fewer blacks than they might. Employers, cotton growers, and
the local welfare office combined their power to control Cairo's black citizens.
Finally, the complaint fails to note that the purported racial progress of recent
decades had yet to reach Cairo. As lawyers, we failed to argue that racial
justice would only reach the town if the court brought it.
The complaint alleges the maintenance of segregation throughout the
history of Cairo, and cites examples:
46. GOOD, supra note 4.
47. The complaint alleges:
... The overall unemployment rate for Alexander County was 9 percent in 1970; 6.5 percent
for white males and 16.2 percent for Black males.... While the median income for a white
family residing in Alexander County in 1969 was $6,428, the median income for a Black family
was only $2,809 .... Three-quarters of the Black families of Alexander County earned less than
$3,000 in 1969, while only one-third of the white families earned less than this amount.
Kendrick, supra note 5, at 7.
48. GOOD, supra note 4, at 13-14.
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Public facilities owned by private individuals have been historically
operated on a racially segregated basis .... Entertainment facilities in
Cairo often have been closed to avoid court ordered integration. The
only public swimming pool was closed in the mid-1960's. "
Contrast this with the journalist's version:
[Anthony Patterson] was eight when Cairo's only swimming pool
closed rather than integrate; through quiet hot summers he watched
weeds grow until they choked the pool.... He says: "This town is
so far behind and backwards, it's really a shame. You don't think
about staying and looking for a job. You can't even work as a bagboy
in a supermarket. You just think about going away all the time. "'
There were small, sporadic boycotts by blacks trying to force
desegregation of public accommodations, and answering violence
from whites. In 1962, the city's only swimming pool, which had been
operated by the Rotary Club, integrated for two weeks after blacks
complained to state officials, then closed for good. From that day until
now, the young people of Cairo during the scorching southern Illinois
summers have had to drive 30 miles to swim in a pool or risk the
Mississippi currents where some have died. 1
On this issue, the complaint loses the personal perspective, here a story of
hopelessness. This hopelessness can only be contagious when those who would
otherwise be hopeful are confronted by a resistance to integration so fierce as
to deny all children the benefit of a pool in the near-tropical temperatures of
Cairo.
The complaint misses something else: the role blacks played in the racial
history of their town. They were more than numbers, more than passive
observers awaiting the intervention of the federal government. They demanded
equality and fought for it. Elsewhere in his account, the journalist turns to
another example of segregated public facilities:
At the roller skating rink, there was no bargaining. When blacks
in 1964 picketed to gain admission, vigilantes were waiting with clubs
and chains. Among those beaten was a 16-year-old named Charles
Koen who was destined to become a minister and leader among the
blacks, and a living symbol to whites of criminal anarchy seeking to
destroy the old order.1
2
49. Kendrick, supra note 5, at 7.
50. GOOD, supra note 4. at 6.
51. ld. at 12.
52. Id.
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This symbol is important to a court that will hear the defendants' worries
about black militants and criminal anarchists as an excuse for not involving
blacks in their own government.
The journalist reports his interview with John Holland, the City Attorney,
and Tom Madra, a leader of the White Hats, a white vigilante group:
"Listen," Holland says, "I told Preston Ewing [leader of the local
NAACP chapter] a dozen times I'm looking for a good colored leader
who can control his people. Everybody looks for a good black man
nowadays. You find one and you've got liquid gold."
"They put one on the Fire Department," Madra says, "Even
though he couldn't pass the test. He quit. Said he didn't like to sit
around."
Holland relaxes in a smile and adds, "He must have been a pretty
good kind of Negro," he says, "If he didn't like to sit around."
Madra... sits on the edge of his chair, feet drumming and says:
"There's no good black leadership in this community. There are some
good Negro undertakers and doctors. But that's all."
Do blacks have any legitimate complaints? Housing, for example?
"There's no doubt," Madra replies, "That blacks from other states
did gravitate here into Illinois because of the welfare programs and
did inherit bad housing. They came here for the largesse. They were
unemployed and unemployable. They live by preference in a shanty."
Attorney Holland explains that there are no blacks in government
because "there are very few to choose from. There's nothing better
than having a good black man on your city council. But the black
militants drive them out. We're thinking now of putting two on the
council.
53
The complaint pleads only the result of this matrix of attitudes:
Black residents of Cairo have been systematically excluded from
elective politics in the community. The political processes leading to
the nomination and election of partisan candidates for elective office
have not been open to Black residents of Cairo .... Only one Black,
Jacob Amos, has ever been elected to office in the Cairo city
government.., in 1894.... Black residents of Cairo have been
systematically denied appointment to and membership on various
boards, departments and agencies ....
Compare the following passages. Which justifies more compellingly a
court's intervention in the electoral politics of a city?
Option One:
53. Id. at 91-92.
54. Kendrick, supra note 5, at 8.
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The abolition of a ward system of election, and the adoption and
perpetuation of the present at-large system for electing City Council
members have resulted and will continue to result in immediate and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs herein, who have no adequate remedy
at law.55
Or, Option Two:
It is said by some veteran observers, white and black, that the Cairo
power structure ... discerned in this century that the city was never
going to make it big. Many of the vast warehouses along the Ohio
levee, once burgeoning with goods in transit among river, road or rail
lay empty, padlocked. The bulk of industry coming in was runaway,
lured by the promise of cheap, tractable, non-union labor that included
unskilled and impoverished men off broken-down farms on the far
side of both rivers. A 'desperate competition among whites for jobs
guaranteed their continuing solidarity against blacks who, in turn,
could be had for next-to-nothing to do whatever dirty or menial work
whites disdained .... All these elements, according to observers like
former Cairo newspaper publisher Martin Brown, persuaded white
men of authority to run the city as a limited fief, resisting change that
might challenge their entrenched position, reaping the fruits of
stagnation.56
Robert Lansden, a 62-year-old white attorney and banker whose
grandfather wrote Cairo's official history and has a park named in his
honor, says: "There are a lot of white people who would sooner see
Cairo float down the Mississippi than give a black man a break.""7
Given my lack of experience in law and life at that time, we might
conclude that I omitted these stories from the amended complaint because of
my inability to reconcile my two halves (lawyer and person) in a whole life.
Another young lawyer, cautious and unskilled. But even the most seasoned
attorneys have made similar omissions. In the next Subsection, let us examine
a pleading filed by the legendary criminal defense lawyer, William Kunstler.
2. Attica: Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller
In 1971, the inmates of Attica Correctional Facility in upstate New York
rioted, seized control of the prison, and held it for four days. At the end of the
four-day period, the prison was retaken by prison guards and state police at a
cost of forty-three lives, thirty-two of which were inmates." During that time,
a team of "observers" attempted to mediate a resolution of the conflict between
55. Id. at 14.
56. GOOD, supra note 4. at 1I.
57. Id. at 5.
58. TOM WICKER, A TIME TO DIE 301 (1975).
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the inmates' demands for reform and New York's obligation to run its prison.
Among those observers were Tom Wicker, a columnist for The New York
Times, and William Kunstler, a lawyer of some repute as an advocate for
radical activists and their causes.59 Tom Wicker wrote a book about the
events at Attica60 and William Kunstler filed a class action lawsuit on behalf
of the prisoners.6'
While the lawsuit complains of conditions in the prison giving rise to the
inmate uprising, the complaint principally targets the State's takeover, accusing
the State's officers as follows:
The assault began with a massive and indiscriminate hail of
bullets and buckshot. At the same time, about 10:00 A.M., on
Monday, September 13, 1971, a helicopter began dropping tear gas
into "D" Yard. Next, a force of armed State Police and Correction
Officers broke into "D" Yard indiscriminately firing their weapons
and another force fired weapons from the catwalk overlooking "D"
Yard.
Troopers and State Police knocked down tents in "D" Yard
where inmates were hiding and fired weapons into the fallen
canvas ....
Inmate Willie West was killed by a Trooper after he had
surrendered and had his hands over his head ....
Within a few minutes of the gassing, inmates Baines and
Fuller were picked up by Troopers from the ground and killed by the
firing of numerous shots into their bodies at close range .... "
The complaint alleges that the violence did not stop with the takeover:
Immediately after the assault, and for over a week thereafter,
inmates were severely beaten, tortured, threatened, harassed and
verbally abused by State Troopers and Correction Officers....
State Officers beat scores of inmates as they crawled or
walked into "A" Yard after the initial assault .... State Officers stuck
a gun barrel into inmate Sam Green's wound.
* After the inmates were in "A" Yard they were forced to run
naked through a gauntlet of about fifty Correction Officers, State
59. In representing his radical clients, Kunstler sometimes engages in radically spirited courtroom
behavior. During the trial of the Chicago Seven, he was held in contempt for the stridency and vigor of
his advocacy. See In re Dellinger, 357 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. III. 1973).
60. WICKER, supra note 58.
61. Class Action Complaint, Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller (E.D.N.Y. filed
Sept. 13, 1971) (No. 71 Civ. 7751) [hereinafter Attica Complaint].
62. Id. at 13-15.
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Police and Troopers who beat them with rubber truncheons, sticks,
straps and bats.
Wicker adds only a little to the story, dramatic descriptions such as: "It was
like driving cattle ' 64 and "A long snakelike line of naked inmates ... was
formed from A-yard ... to what had once been No Man's Land."' 5
One could debate which is the more terrifying version of the story. The
complaint competes in part because of our surprise at the straightforwardness
of its language. Yet once again, certain narrative elements found in Wicker's
account are missing from the complaint, such as the cruel irony of a helicopter
overhead announcing that inmates would not be hurt if they kept their hands
above their heads.66
Perhaps more important, the complaint's more graphic pleading may
weaken its own persuasiveness. We can see this effect through comparison of
the complaint with the journalist's purportedly more neutral account. Wicker
acknowledges the pent-up frustration of the guards-frustration released when
they recaptured the prison-which makes the brutality more awful since it
admits the only possible excuse for the violence, juxtaposed with a description
of brutality that no court could excuse. Wicker's narrative makes clear what
the complaint does not-the resistance was over, and there was no just cause
for the violence to continue. The complaint may assume the perspective of the
clients too fully to persuade a judge reading the complaint from a different
perspective.
Both the complaint and the book deal with the failure of state and local
prosecutors to charge any of the state troopers or correctional officers with
crimes, although charges were filed against inmates. The complaint
characterizes this failure as part of a cover-up of the crimes committed by state
actors during the prison takeover.67 Wicker does not assume, as the complaint
apparently does, that a neutral fact finder will credit this version of events.
Even more important, he calls upon the reader to admit a funda-
mental-but almost subterranean-presumption that cannot help but alter one's
view of the case, once exposed. It centers on the hostages taken by the inmates
when they took over the prison. On the fate of the correctional officers taken
by the prisoners as hostages, the complaint says only this: "Each hostage was
assigned a personal guard to protect him from possible harm. The hostages
were treated well .... At no time were any knives or other sharp instruments
placed at the throats of any of the hostages."68 And:
63. Id. at 16-17.
64. WICKER, supra note 58, at 287 (quoting Attica inmate).
65. Id at 289.
66. Id. at 285.
67. Attica Complaint. supra note 61. at 20-24; WICKER, supra note 58. at 309-10
68. Attica Complaint, supra note 61. at 11.
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Within an hour after the assault, [Executive Deputy Corrections
Commissioner] Dunbar falsely claimed that nine hostages had had
their throats cut. The fact was that all were killed by the state's own
bullets. Defendant Dunbar also related the story that a hostage had
been castrated-a story that was wholly false.69
Contradicting the complaint, Wicker notes that each hostage stood blindfolded
with a blade placed at his throat or chest, and photographs bear him out on this
point.
7°
But far more is happening here, as Wicker confesses:
On September 14, Dr. John Edland, the Monroe County Medical
Examiner, found the bodies of eight hostages and 19 inmates awaiting
his examination. True to prison custom, the dead guards were tagged
with their names, but the dead inmates were tagged "P-I," "P-2," and
so on. That afternoon, Dr. Edland-after what he later called "the
worst day of my life"-made public his findings. Not a single hostage
had been killed by knife wounds. None had been castrated or
mutilated. All had died on Monday morning, September 13. All had
been killed by bullets or buckshot-some hit as many as "five, ten,
twelve times."
When queried, Corrections Department officials said that no
firearms had been found among the "hundreds" of weapons taken
from the inmates when D-yard was recaptured....
Many in Attica town continued to believe that the inmates had
killed the hostages .... "
This belief is not unexpected, and not unique to the citizens of the town, who
live in fear of dangerous convicts behind those nearby walls.
Wicker also returned, again and again, to one essential
contradiction. All the state officials, all the observers-so far as he
knew-had believed explicitly that the inmates would kill the hostages
if D-yard was attacked. But the inmates had not done it.
Some of the black and Puerto Rican observers might have
expected the inmates to kill the hostages only because they believed
the inmates to be desperate enough to do anything. But Wicker, trying
to analyze his own attitudes, playing back scenes from Attica until
they formed a nightmare movie in his mind, saw finally that from the
start this had been a classic case of "we" and "they." Inmates were
vengeful blacks, the embittered poor. Inmates were from the underside
of life, the criminal side. So inmates would kill. "They" were that
kind of people. Whatever his sympathies, however he had
rationalized, his conditioned instinct, too, had been that the Attica
69. Id. at 17-18.
70. WICKER, supra note 58, at 280-81 (photographs).
71. Id. at 302-03 (citation omitted).
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brothers were killers, outlaws, different-something less than ..we"
are.
Why should he have supposed, then, that the state police, the
corrections officers, the state officials, Nelson Rockefeller would not
feel the same? ... In the long run, the power of the state had not
believed it possible that the men of D-yard could behave with decency
and humanity.
72
Wicker's narrative forces his readers, "us," to deal with "our" conditioned
instincts. It calls upon us to grapple with our own limitations as people in
order to understand the situation of others whom we would label "them." It
humanizes us as it humanizes the inmates. A complaint to a federal court,
asking it to protect these inmates, might do so as well.
The observers felt deeply affected by the prison's recapture, including
Kunstler, who later filed this lawsuit, and Wicker, who later wrote this
book.73 Kunstler's complaint reduces the tragedy to a legal problem, although
one with more graphic and gripping description than we might expect. Wicker
finds himself backing away from the reality of what happened. Attempting to
leave the prison in a police car, Wicker found a reporter named Pressman in
his way.
Pressman held a microphone near Wicker's face and asked for his
reaction to what had happened. It was a fair question, the usual
question. In other circumstances, Wicker had asked it himself of
dozens of shocked or dazed or bewildered people. It wrenched him
from the prison world into the ordinary cruelties of life. The one
reality began to fade, as reality does, into the next. He tried to order
his words professionally:
As an individual, speaking for myself ... I suppose
many other people ... I think any event in which 35 people
are dead is....
Several voices from the crowd of reporters around
Pressman informed him that there were 37 dead.
Is it 37? Whatever the figures are ... any event of that
kind can only be termed ... can only be termed a
tragedy ... ah ... any event of that kind, one is certain ...
you just feel that somehow all of us who were involved
should have avoided it. Some way we should have found
some way not.., not to have 37 people dead.
• . . As the police car pulled out of the parking lot and wound
down the hill ... he was not even angry. He was just tired, but not
too tired to be professional again. He calculated that if he could catch
72. Id. at 308-09.
73. Kunstler was not present for the recapture. however. becausc authonites barred him from the
prison. Id. at 274.
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a midafternoon plane to LaGuardia, he could make his first edition
deadline.
But he knew there would have to be a time for anger.74
Wicker, having bridged the gap between "us" and "them," needed to retreat to
his accustomed side, but he carried with him a new insight. The
advocate-unlike the reporter-may identify too closely with felons as clients,
such that she loses the audience. Such identification might not even be possible
where the clients are even farther away from the lawyer's life, as in the world
of the profoundly mentally retarded. An examination of a pleading in such a
case follows.
3. Willowbrook: New York State Association for Retarded Children
v. Rockefeller
The year after the Attica case, Bruce Ennis, a lawyer for the New York
Civil Liberties Union, filed a lawsuit challenging conditions in the
Willowbrook State School for mentally retarded persons, asserting a right to
treatment and decent care under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Ennis had left a Wall Street firm to work for the ACLU, and
began its mental health project. 76 His complaint charges that "Willowbrook
is not a therapeutic institution. It more closely resembles a prison . . .
Continuing the prison theme, the complaint further alleges:
The environment at Willowbrook is inhumane and psychologically
destructive. Examples of the anti-therapeutic environment include,
without limitation, the following:
a) ... Residents are forced to live and sleep in barn-like
structures, often 40, 50 or a hundred to a room, with six inches or less
between beds.
b) Residents have no privacy, and no place to keep personal
possessions.
e) The areas in which the residents live are sparsely furnished,
and are almost totally devoid of ... ac[c]outrements of normal living.
f) Residents are not properly clothed.... [They] are forced to
wear dirty clothes and clothes soiled with urine and feces.
g) Many of the living areas give off an overpowering stench of
sweat, urine and human excrement.
74. Id. at 297-98 (citation omitted).
75. Class Action Complaint, New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller (E.D.N.Y.
filed Mar. 17, 1972) (Nos. 72 Civ. 356, 72 Civ. 357) [hereinafter Willowbrook Complaint], The ease is
reported at New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
76. DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 50 (1984).
77. Willowbrook Complaint, supra note 75, at 20.
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j) Residents are not protected from frequent and continuing
physical assault and injury.
k) Approximately two to three residents die at Willowbrook each
week. Many of them-at least three or four a month-die aspirating
their own food or vomit because there are not enough employees to
care for them.7"
The complaint continues:
Because of the foregoing, the vast majority of residents at
Willowbrook have actually regressed and deteriorated since their
admission. Many of them exhibit stylized and stereotyped behavior,
such as constant bobbing, head-nodding, unusual body postures, etc..
which is not the result of mental retardation but instead is the result
of prolonged deprivation in a barren, prison-like environment.' "
Ennis tells a sad story, triggering legal rights and human pity.
In contrast to the Cairo and Attica cases, the complaint provides us with
the personal stories of the named plaintiffs.
Plaintiff Lara R. Schneps, aged four, has resided at Willowbrook,
Building 14, Ward B, since July 31, 1969. She is profoundly retarded,
as are most of the 45-50 children, aged 1-7, who reside in her ward.
In addition, she suffers from severe motor complications and physical
disabilities.80
The complaint pleads similar facts for each of the named plaintiffs, identifying
them as persons.8 These allegations also bring their parents into the
litigation, referring often to visits to the institution by the parents and their
inability to find alternative places for their children to live. For example:
Recently, Lara's mother visited and found only one attendant to care
for the children in Lara's ward. ...
... Her parents did not want to place Lara in Willowbrook, and
would like to take her out, but they have been unable to find any
private or community facilities to assist them in her care, and are
unable to care for her at home on a permanent basis. "
78. Id. at 20-22.
79. Id. at 35.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 3-13.
82. Id. at 3.
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Parents visit and "almost always discover new physical problems and injuries,
including fresh bruises, deep scratches, pulled out hair. '83 "Clothes delivered
by ... parents 'seem to disappear. ' '84
Contrast this with an account of these same conditions again by a
journalist, this time a television journalist. In 1972, New York television
station WABC broadcast a special report entitled Willowbrook: The Last Great
Disgrace. The television show actually triggered the lawsuit.8 5 The report
recounts how the station had been contacted by a doctor named Wilkins, fired
from Willowbrook for encouraging parents to organize for improved
conditions. 86 Sneaking onto the wards to film conditions, the cameras show
residents huddled and twisted like brambles in comers or wandering the
crowded dayrooms.87 The audience sees them like this both before and after
visits by high-echelon officials, however cleaner and safer they appeared
during those official "inspections." The reporter describes the residents he sees
lying on the floor naked and smeared with their own feces. They were
making a pitiful sound, a kind of mournful wail that is impossible for
me to forget. This is what it looked like. This is what is sounded like.
But how can I tell you about the way it smelled? It smelled of filth.
It smelled of disease. It smelled of death.88
The reporter interviews the discharged doctor who tells of residents sitting
and rocking with no one talking to them, staring at the floor for hour upon
hour. He describes residents "fighting for a small scrap of paper [on the floor
to play with]."89 Referring to residents who were curled up on the floor like
fetuses and others who were shaking their hands wildly for no apparent reason,
the doctor says, "[I]f you or I were left to sit on a ward surrounded by other
mentally retarded people, we would probably begin to look like this, too."'
As a result of understaffing, the doctor explains, residents were fed in two or
three minutes. When the reporter asks the doctor how long residents should
have to eat, the latter answers, "[Tihe time your or my children would want
to eat breakfast." 9'
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 6.
85. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 76, at 45-51.
86. Id. at 16-17.
87. GERALDO RIVERA, WILLOWBROOK (1972) (partial transcript of television broadcast).
88. Willowbrook: The Last Disgrace (WABC television broadcast, Jan. 6, 1972) [hereinafter The Last
Disgrace]; see RIVERA, supra note 87, at 22 (describing this scene). Pictures, as well as the written word,
have their own limitations, as was revealed by the different reactions of jurors and the public to the
videotape of the police beating of Rodney King. Hugh Davies, American Riots: Why Did the Jury Find
Police Innocent?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 2. 1992, at 3; The Jury's iew, WASH. POST, May 1. 1992, at
A33.
89. RIVERA, supra note 87, at 25.
90. The Last Disgrace, supra note 88.
91. Id.
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After the reporter visits California facilities that are better staffed and more
successful in habilitating mentally retarded people, he returns to Willowbrook
and characterizes it as a place of "degradation" that treats the mentally retarded
like "animals," a "real life horror story," a "dark corner," New York's "leper
colony. '92 He notes that no state officials would appear on the broadcast to
defend conditions. The reporter ends the broadcast with a quote he attributes
to the patron saint of broadcast journalism, Edward R. Murrow: "[For] some
stories, there is no other side." 93
Because the reporter, Geraldo Rivera, is now a notorious talk show host,
one might wonder whether he embellished upon what he saw and heard at
Willowbrook. His description, however, is confirmed by historians who have
written on the making of the documentary. David and Sheila Rothman have
written that
with cameras rolling, Wilkins [the fired doctor] unlocked first an outer
door and then a heavy metal inner door. Rivera entered, and breathing
in foul air, hearing wailing noises, and seeing distorted forms,
momentarily lost his bearings. As a floodlight pierced the darkened
space, he exclaimed, "My God, they're children." To which Wilkins
responded, "Welcome to Willowbrook."
They shot quickly .... The images had a jumpy and elusive
quality. This spindly and twisted limb was a leg; that grossly swollen
organ was a head. The blotches smeared across the wall were feces;
the white fabric covering the figure in the corner was a straitjacket.
That crouching child, back to the camera, was naked and so was the
one next to him. Both of them were on the floor; there was no
furniture in the room save for a wooden bench and chair. The camera
focused for a few seconds on an oddly smiling person, the only one
fully clothed. That had to be the single attendant.
Even as he stood there, Rivera thought of the Nazi concentration
camps. One could see similar scenes in the newsreels of American
soldiers freeing the inmates of Dachau: the bulging, vacant eyes in
emaciated faces, the giant heads and wasted bodies. Was Willowbrook
America's concentration camp? Did we have such horrors too?'
The Rothmans tell of one set of television viewers who watched the
broadcast and thought of their daughter at Willowbrook:
The scene that Raymond and Ethel Silvers saw on the screen that
evening was a familiar one, but they had never described it to
anyone .... Every Sunday morning they left their home ... to visit
their daughter, Paula, at the facility, a visit that they dreaded but
92. RIVERA, supra note 87. at 115.
93. The Last Disgrace. supra note 88.
94. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 76. at 17.
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would not skip. They never knew in what condition they would find
her....
They would pack a bag of freshly laundered clothes, include soap
and a towel, and set out for Willowbrook. Once there, they would sit
around for an hour in a barren waiting room until Paula arrived. They
were never allowed to see her ward .... When Paula finally came,
they took her to a nearby washroom, scrubbed her from head to toe,
and dressed her in clean clothing. In the washroom they learned about
life on the wards. Her bruises told them all they needed to know
about supervision and care.95
What do the journalist and historian tell us that the lawyer does not tell the
court? The complaint, while it artfully pleads horrible conditions, enforces the
"us/them" dichotomy similar to the one that worried Wicker at Attica. 96 At
the same time the complaint treats the plaintiff class members as victims of an
institutional regime, it also leaves them as foreigners, as different, as "them."
Perhaps the complaint assumes a familiarity with the institutionalized mentally
retarded person and with life in prison. If so, characterizing Willowbrook as
a prison might persuade the judge that action must be taken to rescue the
residents. Still, that familiarity may be absent. In cases where the judge holds
misconceptions about mentally ill people, she may conclude that little more
than warehousing can be done with such creatures. By reinforcing the
conception of the plaintiffs as "other," the complaint fails to educate the judge
about events and people she will see later in the case. When this happens, the
complaint may allow the judge to presume that the horrific sights evoked by
the complaint are the natural state of mentally retarded people.
In contrast, Rivera asks the listener to identify with the retarded by
broadcasting the doctor's insistence that we would look like this, too, if left on
these wards. Rivera broadcasts the doctor saying that these people should be
given the same time to eat breakfast as "your children or mine." 7 Similarly,
the Rothmans urge us to permit our eyes to focus for a moment before we
miss noticing that the bloated organs and twisted limbs are heads and limbs of
people. They invite us to guess with them about whether the one fully clothed
person is a resident or an attendant-one of "them" or one of "us."
The Rothmans also bridge the gap between "them" and "us" by telling of
parents who visit their institutionalized daughter on Sunday mornings.98 Like
us, they are not permitted onto the ward. Like them, we can surmise what life
is like on the wards from what we do see. Certainly, the complaint helps its
audience, the court, identify with the plaintiffs by mentioning more about the
95. Id. at 17. 19.
96. Willowbrook Complaint, supra note 75, at 20-22 (using spare and clinical language to describe
inhumane conditions).
97. The Last Disgrace, supra note 88.
98. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN. supra note 76, at 17.
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parents than their legal role as next friend for their children who cannot
themselves litigate. The complaint also refers to details such as scratches and
missing clothing. But it does not tell us--except in the case of Lara's
mother-whether or not the parents could visit the wards.9 If they frequently
visited the wards, the disappearance of clothing might seem ordinary, like the
missing clothing of a child gone away to live in a college dormitory. From this
limited perspective, one might even expect scratches in an institution so
regrettably large. But when the expected becomes evidence of things unseen,
small details take on a larger, more provocative significance.
Despite the possible similarities between us and them, stark differences
separate "our" world from the world of Willowbrook. Possession of a single
piece of paper is of slight importance in our world, unless the paper's contents
have some special significance. Compare the allegations of the Willowbrook
complaint protesting the "sparse[ness]" of furnishings and the absence of a
"place to keep private possessions,"'" with the television report of residents
fighting over a scrap of paper. Ask which tells you how "sparse" their lives
are. In the bare hallways of Willowbrook, to the naked and idle residents, a
scrap of paper has importance beyond our own retarded imagining. The
journalist's account accomplishes two important things with respect to that
scrap of paper. It educates us that things insignificant in our world are very
critical in that world.' ° ' Moreover, it measures the distance between our
world and theirs, illustrating how far from the Constitution they must now live.
It tells us that the distance must be narrowed.
The journalist and historian achieve still more. They involve their audience
in a conversation about Willowbrook by reporting how they and others react
to Willowbrook. Rivera is able to share with his viewers his feeling that it was
impossible to forget the moans of the children at Willowbrook, while he
simultaneously acknowledges his inability to convey the smells of the
institution. The Rothmans describe Rivera's reaction when his eyes focus in
the darkness and he realizes that the residents are only children. The Rothmans
also tell us how the Silvers watch Rivera's television report. Although the
Silvers dread their visits with their daughter, they make them because they
must. 102
The historian and journalist persuade us, while the complaint does not, that
we must make that trip, as well. While the complaint pleads facts that support
a claim for constitutional violations to which a court might respond, Rivera
and the Rothmans demand that we take notice. Rivera reports the failure of the
99. Willowbrook Complaint. supra note 75. at 3.
100. Id. at 21.
101. Much of the criticism of prisoner litigation stems, in part. from a perception that prisoners will
sue over any trivial matter. Law clerks and court-appointed lawyers can recite endless examples from cases
on which they have worked. E.g., THOMAS, PRISONER LMGATION. supra note 34. at 142. 150
102. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 76, at 17.
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system to remedy conditions by showing the cover-up of conditions when
officials visit and the discharge of a doctor who tried to change things.0 3
The court must make that trip to the wards on Willowbrook, because Dr.
Wilkins and the parents of Paula Silver cannot, because Rivera had to sneak
his cameras behind the locked doors.' 4 As Paula's parents had to make that
trip because they are parents, so must the court go there, because it is the
court.
Rivera and the Rothmans persuade us, as the complaint fails to do, that the
court must exercise its powers to change things because there is no alternative.
This is an exception to the usual rules of discretion and balancing interests that
might mitigate against the relief sought by the plaintiffs." Trhis is not just
a prison, it is Dachau. It is a case for which there is no other side.
4. The Point So Far
The three cases we have looked at so far all date from the 1970's. Yet the
pattern does not change in cases from the dawn of the civil rights era through
its more recent twilight." Why can't lawyers tell these stories? What stops
us from amplifying clients' voices so they are heard? Lawyers are not simply
dull writers. On the contrary, our profession produces some stirring and
beautiful prose; most of the famous examples are written by judges, not
lawyers, and explain a principle of law or morality, and rarely portray a point
of fact. 10 7 The issue is not just writing, but also analysis; not just what we
write, but what we see as important.
103. The Last Disgrace, supra note 88. Dr. Wilkins is mentioned in the complaint but no reference
is made to his role in exposing conditions or to his discharge. Willowbrook Complaint, supra note 75, at
7.
104. Ultimately, the judge did visit the institution, after a preliminary injunction hearing. ROTHMAN
& ROTHMAN, supra note 76, at 83-86 (quoting judge's notes from field trip to Willowbrook).
105. See Herbert A. Eastman, Metaphor and Madness. Law and Liberty, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 281,
309-11 (1991) (describing specific examples of judicial discretion in context of health care jurisprudence).
106. Compare Complaint, Briggs v. Elliott (E.D.S.C. filed Dec. 22, 1950) (No. 2657), reported at 98
F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (one of four cases consolidated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954)) with RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (providing rich historical account of Brown case
and surrounding civil rights struggle); compare Complaint, Coker v. Bowen (D.D.C. filed Sept. 2, 1986)
(No. 86-2448), in THE RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 305 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 331, 1987) (seeking to compel the United States Department of Health and Human Services to
enforce the state's statutory and regulatory obligations to provide emergency shelter) with JONATHAN
KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1988) (describing homelessness
crisis in United States through biographical accounts). This contrast is especially pointed where one writer
crafts documents in two different genres. Compare Complaint at 10, Prince v. Pittston Co. (S.D.W.V. filed
Sept. 3, 1972) (No. 3052) (seeking damages for massive pollution of West Virginia creek by coal mining
company) with GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976) (describing factual background
and litigation strategy of Prince case).
107. Read Justice Holmes' opinion in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653-55 (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), and listen to Clarence Darrow, pleading for the lives of Loeb and Leopold.
CLARENCE DARROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 86-87 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957).
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At this point, we need only acknowledge three propositions. First, there is
something in the language journalists and historians use to describe events and
people that is missing from the language lawyers use to describe and analyze
that same reality. Second, the missing element may have some significance.
Third, given the persuasive importance of complaints, it is unlikely that
lawyers omit that missing element through mere accident.
In Kendrick, we had no other chance to present the lost elements to the
court because the case settled."0 8 During the years of pretrial discovery and
motions, the court acted without the benefit of the stories that make judicial
intervention a moral imperative. After the entry of the consent decree, the court
enforced the decree. But even then, the court did not act because it truly had
been persuaded by force of the story. As one of the lawyers, I grasped some
of the elements omitted from our pleading that were present in Good's account
of Cairo's history. Hattie told me these stories. I had read Good's book, but
I never placed these stories in the complaint." 9 Instead, the complaint thinly
pleads the Cairo story, with omissions that are glaring only when we squint
past them to the story as told by others. Why do we write complaints so that
we must squint to see the stories behind them?
D. Partial Explanations: Constraints on Thicker Pleading
A language is like a map; it is not the territory represented, but it may
be a good map or a bad map."
0
Alfred Korzybski
In attempting to answer, I refer to "thicker pleading" to distinguish it from
the "thin" conceptual speech of most legal expression."'
108. The plaintiffs and other community representatives had only one opportunt to tell the judge a
portion of their story. This occurred when defense counsel tried to %%ithdra%, on the eve of trial and
plaintiffs opposed that withdrawal. To convey the importance of the issue. busloads of class members came
to court to watch and to be seen by the judge. Counsel was permttted to withdrau. new counsel appeared,
and negotiations started.
109. It is my signature at the end of the Kendnck complaint, but the original complaint was drafted
by other lawyers. I basically tracked much of the original complaint's substance in the amended complaint.
content that it did that which I asked of it.
110. ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO NON-ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEMS
AND GENERAL SEMANTICS 498 (4th ed. 1988).
Ill. See, e.g., WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 9 (lamenting thinness or lack of "life" in profesional
discourse). I will explain the concept of thin speech more fully in a later section As %%c shall sec. "thick"
does not necessarily entail longer pleadings.
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1. Signs, Signs, Everywhere Are Signs: The Constraints of
Pleading Rules
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide an excuse for failing
to plead more thickly. Rule 8 requires a short and plain statement of the
claim."2 It is designed to liberate lawyers from code pleading. It is not
intended to restrict how they may choose to plead." 3 Tom Wicker is hardly
verbose; there are no "heretofores" in his prose. He offends no "short and
plain" rule.
Rule 1l's threat of sanctions for pleading a case not based in fact" 4
might intimidate the creative lawyer, since the sanctions seem to be imposed
against civil rights lawyers more often than against lawyers practicing in other
areas." 5 Still, in the cases studied here, no hint of an improper purpose lurks
behind the filing of the pleadings; the reported facts existed and the law
colorably supported the claims for relief. Besides, Rule 11 did not have its
feared impact until after it was toughened by the 1983 amendments" 6 and
112. FED. R. CIv. P. 8.
113. The Advisory Committee Report of October 1955 says that the "short and plain" language of
Rule 8(a)(2) is designed "to discourage battles over mere form of statement and to sweep away the needless
controversies which the codes permitted." 2A MOORE & LUCAS, supra note 17, J 8.01[3]. Some courts
think that Rule 8 means more, and that evidence should not be pleaded. Id. 7 8.13, at 8-63 nn. 21-22. The
Supreme Court has recently made clear that Rule 8 overcomes any requirement of "heightened" pleading
of facts enforced by some courts for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
114. Rule II permits a court to impose sanctions when "reasonable inquiry" would show that a
complaint is not supported by the evidence and not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument" for a change in the law, and filed for an improper purpose, such as harassment. FED. R. Crv.
P. I1. The standard to be applied by the courts in Rule I I cases thus requires a determination as to whether
a lawyer made reasonable inquiry into the facts, whether she made reasonable inquiry into the law, whether
the action was taken to harass or delay the case, and whether the lawyer met her continuing obligation to
reevaluate the litigation position. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Ser., 812 F.2d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1987). To
determine whether there was reasonable inquiry into the facts, courts may look at the time available for
investigation, the extent to which the lawyer relied upon the client for factual support, the feasibility of a
prefiling investigation, the complexity of facts and law, and the extent to which factual development
requires discovery. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp.. 135 F.R.D. 139, 145-46 (M.D. La. 1991). In a
civil rights case-involving prison conditions, for example-all of these factors might operate to delay a
lawyer's opportunity to assess adequately the factual basis for the claims, with a client behind bars and a
defendant in control of most if not all of the information.
115. Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOwA L. REv. 1775,
1776-77 (1992). The reason for this phenomenon is unclear; however, two explanations have been
suggested. First, a civil rights lawyer reacting to a study in the Ninth Circuit attributed the disparate
application of Rule 11 to judicial hostility toward civil rights cases and the attorneys bringing them. Philip
Carrizosa, Rights Lawyers More Frequent Rule 11 Targets, 9th Circuit Study, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 25,
1992, at 1. On the other hand, the chairperson of the Ninth Circuit committee conducting the study
suggested that the civil rights bar might be more willing than their peers "to push the envelope." Id. Tobias
describes this point in a slightly different manner, arguing that it is the nature of civil rights cases to
"challenge conventional understandings of what is acceptable." Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights
Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 497 (1988-89).
116. Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REv. 105, 106 (1991).
1995] Language of Civil Rights Litigators 791
so did not affect pleadings in the 1970's. Under the more liberal 1993
amendments, it should not affect our pleading today."1
7
Rule 12(f) simply permits a court to strike any "impertinent or scandalous
matter.""'  The Rule could hardly be read to proscribe the elements that are
missing from civil rights pleadings." 9 Courts commonly limit "scandalous
pleading" to mean language that "'improperly casts a derogatory light on
someone, most typically on a party to the action,"'" or that "'reflect[s]
cruelly' upon the defendant's moral character, use[s] 'repulsive language, or
'detract[s] from the dignity of the court."" 2' No person's character is
impugned by the descriptions of Wicker, Good, Rivera, or the Rothmans, aside
from the negative associations an audience member or reader may infer from
government officials' actual conduct and statements.
Even where a court is persuaded by a defendant's motion to strike the
details of a story, the process of entertaining and deciding the motion informs
the court of the story behind the complaint. Nonetheless, some lawyers might
feel uncomfortable pleading more life into their cases for fear of peer criticism.
Other lawyers might feel that this is not good lawyering, without knowing
exactly why. '2
117. Even before the 1993 amendments-which loosen the strictures on plaintiffs' counscl
considerably by permitting them to make allegations that *'are likcly to hase csidentiar support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or disco% cry." FED R CtV P I I(b)(3)-courts had
loosened their scrutiny of civil rights pleadings. Tobitas. supra note 116. at 110-16 As one court has noted.
"Rule I I sanctions should not chill creative legal advocacy " Chris & Todd. Inc % Arkansas Dcp't of Fin
& Admin., 125 F.R.D. 491, 495 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).
119. It should be noted, however, that words less eye-catching than the Attica complaint's allegation
of murder by state police have earned sanction., where courts hase found that thc ssere uscd in a
hyperbolic fashion. Chris & Todd. Inc.. 125 F.R.D at 494-95 ("rape"). Robert, s Chesron L S A. 117
F.R.D. 581. 583 (M.D. La. 1987) ("fraudulent") Similarly. courts hase stricken words such a,
"concentration camp," "brainwash." "torture." and "Chinese communists in Korea" on the ground of
scandalousness. Alvarado-Morales v. Digital Equip. Corp. 843 F2d 613. 618 (st Cir 1988) The case
should not be read out of their contexts, however For instance, the Altvrado-.Morales court stated that
plaintiff's reference to concentration camps was "repugnant" and had "no place in the pleadings before the
court." But from the context of the case. it appears that the court reacted so strongl% because plaintiff's
allegations-regarding working conditions made worse when jobs w ere ph..sed out b% the cmployer-sere
inconsistent with the reality the court perceived Thus. the court found that thecs allegations scre not
substantive elements of the plaintiff's cause of action Id Where the court's undertanding of realit)
corresponds more closely to the reality portrayed by plaintiffs, the court may be less. offended
120. 5A CHARLES A. WRIGifT & ARTtILIR R. MILLER. FEDERA PRACTICT %D PRO(LDt Rt § 1"82.
at 682. 712 (2d ed. 1990).
121. Skadegaard v. Farrell. 578 F. Supp. 1209. 1221 (DNJ 1984) (quoting 2A JAI..S W MOORt
Er AL.. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTtCE ' 12.21. at 2429 (1983)) Examples might include the "concentration
camp" language in Alvarado-Morales. 843 F.2d at 618. and adjectives like "sniseling- and "' hining- when
used to refer to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, see Carone N' Whalen. 121 FR D 231. 234 (M D Pa 1988)
122. James Boyd White writes: "[Olne could say that lawyer, think and talk in distinct was wthich
we could hardly imagine being changed, for good or ill" im. I At(;%ATtO'. suprea note 6. at 6
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2. All the Other Guys Are Doing It: The Constraints of
Professional Standards of Practice
While nothing in the rules precludes thicker pleading, lawyers interpret the
Rule 8 requirement against a background of the way law is commonly
practiced. 123 Lawyers also interpret the rule by predicting the views of
"unseen" colleagues, including the lawyers for the opposing party. 24 These
other lawyers might argue that stories are fine for an argument to a jury, but
misplaced in a pleading. They think of a familiar context, jury trials. But they
must stop and ask: Are judges any less interested than juries in the larger
questions? And are juries more likely than judges to base their decisions on
empathy? The available evidence suggests that the answer to both questions is
in the negative.'25
Still, the instinct not to overplead is one shared by a number of lawyers,
probably arising from professional training and socialization.
3. My Parents Were Too Poor To Buy Us a Real Dog:
The Constraints of Legal Education
It is easy to criticize legal education, specifically for its tendency to
divorce law students from human context.126 As Professor Griswold
described it, legal education "sharpens the mind by narrowing it.,,1 27 Legal
123. See. e.g., FISH, supra note 7, at 125 ("[Ulpon hearing or remembering the rule, 'Take only good
shots,' a player will glance around a field already organized in terms of relevant pieces of possible
behavior."). Lawyers and judges attending a June 10, 1994, conference for adjunct faculty in the clinical
programs of the law schools of Washington University and Saint Louis University gave mixed reviews to
the literary pleading presented later in this Article. It didn't feel "right" to some, without reference to a rule.
Even one judge who liked its persuasiveness thought he might strike it. Another judge, however, thought
it permissible and persuasive.
124. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 81, 160 (noting that professionals will bend their behavior to suit
colleagues who might disagree with them).
125. In a recent review of studies of personal injury litigation, Michael Saks concludes both that "the
great majority of jury verdicts reach the same result that judges would reach in the same cases" and that
jury verdicts "on average undercompensate plaintiffs." Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior ofthe Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1287 (1992).
Based on their own study of the federal courts, Clermont and Eisenberg conclude that "virtually no
evidence exists to support the prevailing ingrained intuitions about juries. In fact, existing evidence is to
the contrary." Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1125-33, 1149-51 (1992).
126. See ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 2 (1981); FRANCES K. ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE
MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 200, 205 (1981); Curtis J. Berger, The Legal Profession's Need for a
Human Commitment. 3 COLUM. U. GEN. EDUC. SEMINAR REP. 13 (1975); Interview with Robert McCmte,
rn A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR & MCGEORGE SCH. OF LAW, A
DIALOGUE ABOUT LEGAL EDUCATION AS IT APPROACHES THE 21ST CENTURY (J. Clark Kelso ed., 1987)
[hereinafter McCrate Interview); John 0. Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performance-Referenced Legal
Education. 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 191 (1986).
127. Erwin N. Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 81 HARv. L. REV. 292, 299 (1967). Although Griswold
was criticizing the "unthoughtful" application of traditional methods, his point may be read more broadly.
No matter how thoughtful the application, the method cannot escape its context-discussion of appellate
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education may contribute to a lawyer's unease with thicker pleadings in two
contexts, the academic classroom and the law clinic. In the former, pedagogy
is strongly influenced by the maxim, "Think like a lawyer." In the clinical
setting, teachers focus on interpersonal skills.'2 Because of this more
personal focus, it may appear at first that clinical education would encourage
thicker pleading. But in fact, the clinic is as likely as the classroom to
discourage this method.
Many critics of legal education consider clinical programs to be an answer
to their complaints. 29 As a clinician, I believe in the value of clinical
courses, yet I suspect that they may reinforce the reduction of complex tales
of human tragedy to sterile legal claims because they teach lawyering skills by
treating the nonlegal dimension of a client's problem as a simple matter of
technique. The message is that you should know a bit about human psychology
to improve your interpersonal skills, which are the true heart of practice. 3"o
The message is true but incomplete, since it continues to stuff these human
considerations into the ill-fitting box of legal decision making. The method
helps us listen better, but does not expand the scope of what we listen for, or
propose a way to analyze what we hear. Specifically, the textbooks for clinical
courses advise the following for pleading:' 3' "You can find examples of how
to draft pleadings in form books .... You must tailor the form so that the
pleading you draft meets your client's needs"; 132 "A reasonable description
of an event that provides the opposing party with sufficient factual and legal
information will usually be sufficient"; 13' and, "Pleadings are not the place
to disclose the detailed facts on which you base your claims. . . . The official
Appendix of Forms gives excellent examples of complaints."'3 In short, they
encourage brevity and discourage creativity.
35
court decisions in a classroom.
128. Whatever the methodology, the result is the same. Fish argues thai "the initiated student who has
thoroughly internalized the distinctions. categories, and notions of relevance and irrelevance that compise
'thinking like a lawyer,' cannot see anything but the practice (nor can he remember what it was like to not
see it)." FISH, supra note 7, at 364.
129. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. & THE PROFESSION, LEGAL EDttLCATIO% AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 238 (1992); McCrate Interview, supra note 126. at 29
130. DAVID BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN. FACT INVESTIGATION FROMt HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF II
(1984); DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS" A CLIE.\T-CTEr.RED APPROACH 5 (1991),
131. In fact, many textbooks may not give an instruction on pleading at all, since they focus almost
exclusively on writing appellate briefs. See. e.g.. HENRY WEInOFEN. LEGAL WRITING STYLE (2d ed. 1980).
132. KAREN K. PORTER ET AL., IN'TRODUCTION TO LEGAL WRITING AD ORAL ADVOCACY 118
(1989).
133. ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL. FUNDAMEN'rALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 95 (1985)
134. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL TECHNIQUES Il (1988)
135. One author's advice, however, is not inconsistent with thicker pleading: "Avoid allegations such
as this: 'In perhaps the greatest outrage of all. defendant, in a frenzy of rage. sadistically beat the
plaintiff.' . . . Instead ... consider merely alleging: 'Defendant then hit Steven Smith at least seven times
in the face with the butt of his revolver.' R. LAWRENCE DESSE.m. PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW. POLIcy.
AND PRACTICE 136 (1991). Nethertheless. he advises caution. Id.
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One text dissents to some extent. Cooper's Writing in Law Practice'36
admits the legitimacy of pleading more than the facts technically necessary to
support a legal claim:
37
Thus, there is little, if any, danger involved in pleading a few
evidentiary details as to certain critical points of plaintiff's case. Many
draftsmen believe that, notwithstanding the practice books, evidence
should be pleaded when to do so adds color to the complaint, and
when such pleading can be utilized as a method of compelling
131defendant to make admissions ....
But Cooper's text precedes by four years the change worked by Conley v.
Gibson,139 in which the Supreme Court directed that courts tolerate pleadings
that simply provide notice of the claim to the defendant. t40 Since that time,
rather than becoming the analytic and persuasive document it could be, the
complaint has been used merely as the mechanism that starts the ball rolling.
Even more critically than the deficiencies of our textbooks, the ascendancy
of interpersonal skills-once woefully neglected by legal academicians and
now the all-important focus of clinical programs-also plays its part in
discouraging thicker pleading. Most schools permit only a limited number of
clinical teaching hours but expect that a wide range of skills will be taught,
with little room left for analysis of the kind called for here. Because clinics
choose factually simple cases to allow for greater student responsibility,
students have few opportunities to learn factual analysis. The economic
pressures to increase the number of students trained in clinical programs may
pressure law schools to offer more simulation courses, in which a fictional
client's reality is neatly packaged into fact patterns and handed out to students
role playing as witnesses or clients. As Jerome Frank observed over sixty years
ago, this is like teaching "prospective dog breeders who never see anything but
stuffed dogs."'
14 1
The teaching of factually sensitive analysis falls into the chasm between
the clinic and the classroom. 42 Unless students learn factual analysis, they
136. FRANK E. COOPER, WRITING IN LAW PRACTICE (1963).
137. Id. at 187.
138. Id. at 191.
139. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
140. Id. at 47-48.
141. Jerome Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 912 (1933).
142. Both clinical and nonclinical faculty criticized earlier drafts of this Article on this point. Clinical
professors argued that clinical scholarship and clinical education have moved past a narrow focus on
interpersonal skills. The nonclinical critics insisted that doctrinal courses require factual analysis as a
component of the general analysis of cases presented in the casebooks. My response is simple. Whatever
we aspire to in clinical education, the press of business requires that we ultimately fall back on the teaching
of interpersonal skills because students commonly lack sophistication in those skills. Some clinics attempt
more, such as teaching through client stories, but I suspect that we talk about it more often than we actually
do it. There is no time. Also, the kind of factual analysis I refer to encompasses more than simple scrutiny
of appellate decisions that contain a packaged set of 10 or so factual points, which are then whittled down
[Vol. 104: 763
Language of Civil Rights Litigators
are unlikely to learn advocacy skills. Until then, the ablest of lawyers may still
write the thinnest of pleadings. Law students may be socialized into believing
that thin pleading is part of their job.
4. It' Not Our Job: The Constraints of Professional Roles
Lawyers may protest: "It's not our job to plead more of a client's reality,
more thickly. We are just trying to solve a legal problem, perhaps a problem
with nonlegal dimensions, but a legal problem nonetheless." In part, this
response reflects a traditional model of lawyering: a lawyer with a client,
focused on winning, unconcerned with his own policy preferences and
"essentially indifferent about whom he represents."' 43 For the traditional
advocate, thicker and more creative pleading will be assessed strictly in terms
of its persuasive value. If it helps, fine. If its effect is uncertain, then perhaps
one should stick with the tried-and-true, peer-approved formbook pleading
styles-the ones more commonly used in the cases and more comfortably
handled by the advocate.' Given this risk-averse, traditional tendency, we
expect thin pleading from most lawyers.
In other areas of the law, we know of alternative models of lawyering that
might also be suitable for civil rights lawyers. Some lawyers represent only
particular interests, groups, or issues. 45 But public interest lawyers who have
such a limited clientele might be less inclined to adopt thicker pleadings
because they are less interested in the client than in what the client
represents. 1 6 It may be precisely because they feel so committed to their
client's cause that they ignore the client's reality. To quote one legal services
to the one or two points upon which the legal principle turns. Thc factual analysis that I find lacking in
legal education requires the analysis of thousands of facts that become material or immaterial as advocacy
for the litigants progresses. This analytic process begins with the lawyer's perception of those facts as
important.
143. Jonathan D. Casper. Supreme Court Lawyers. in COURTS. LAW, AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES 95.
96 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981). This model reflects a more traditional legal system that developed at a time
when we, or at least the courts, did not believe that a remedy existed for the mass social ills attacked by
civil rights litigation. Colonial-era Americans viewed problems such as mental illness, poncrty. and crime
as inevitable attributes of social life. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN. "ME DISCOVERY OF Ti' ASYLUM:M SOCIAL
ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (rev. ed. 1991). This attitude changed by the close of the
18th century. when courts in at least some colonies began to entertain occasional challenges to slavery See
PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY. FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 41 (1981). Still. courts
did not become so strategically and critically involved in the conquest of social problems until the
NAACP's Brown strategy succeeded. JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMEN'1S AND ThE LEGAL SYSiEM
1 (1978).
144. Such a conservative pleading style is typical in personal injury litigation.
145. See Casper. supra note 143. at 96.
146. See SPANGLER, supra note 41, at 168; Kenney Hegland. Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment.
12 ARIZ. L. REV. 805. 811-12. 813 (1971); Gabe Kaimowitz. Comment. Legal Services Marching to a
Different Drummer. A Response to Alan Houseman 's Thoughts on the Future of Legal Services. NLADA
BRIEFCASE, June 1978. at 66. The plaintiffs' lawyers in Wyatt v. Stickney. 325 F Supp 781 (M D Ala.
1971). never met their institutionalized clients and dealt with their clients' guardians only in a limited way
Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Political World of Federal Judges as Managers. 45 PUB. ADSIIN. REV 660. 661
(1985).
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lawyer: "We don't care about what happened, we only care about what is
going to happen."'
147
On the other hand, it could just as easily be true that these lawyers lean
toward thicker pleadings precisely because they identify with their clients,
whom they have selected because of the reality the clients present. Many a
radical lawyer during the 1960's might have said, "[T]he cause of my clients
is my own cause."'148 A more recent statement from a civil rights and labor
lawyer-more appropriate for our less radical times-expresses less fire but
more warmth:
After the trial, over a beer, there is some long, post-cathartic wrap-up.
Your client comes alive, after sitting in court for days, dazed, the
whole trial like a dream, everyone up there attacking him, defending
him. "Oh, I loved it when you asked.. ." And: "Did you see the
judge when he said . . ." For an hour or so, you may be the closest
friend he ever had. A retired teamster, a Vietnam vet-he and you
will never be this way again.... In 1981, an old truck driver came
and asked our firm's help for some 200 retirees. A Teamster pension
fund had cut their benefits by nearly two-thirds. The case was
hopeless, but he wore us out, so we took it. For the next four years
we lost, lost, lost, and lost, and then, home run, bottom of the ninth,
we won. Everything. Suddenly, after all that losing, the case was over,
and the men will now recover millions of dollars. For our client, the
shock has still not worn off. He keeps calling me up, and says in his
thick mountain drawl, "Well, now, the men are very well pleased."
Then, tickled to death, he starts to laugh. And laughs and laughs. And
in the great tradition of our profession, one that I find irresistible, I
start laughing too.'
49
This relationship exemplifies the "backstaging" described by Goffman,
where the professional admits the client into the inner sanctum of the
professional role. 50  Public interest lawyers may be more prone to
backstaging, desiring intimacy with clients and distance from colleagues to
147. Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going
To Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOC. PROBS. 599, 608 (1979). Speaking from his
own experience, Professor Alfieri might agree. See Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2122 (1991). This could operate as well in the
case of civil rights lawyers, even in a close lawyer-client relationship such as that between Thurgood
Marshall and his clients in Briggs. Derrick Bell has argued that Marshall and the other NAACP lawyers
pressed for integration-which was more consistent with their ideological commitments--rather than
improved education, which was closer to their clients' desires. Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-87
(1976) [hereinafter Bell, Serving Two Masters]; Derrick Bell, Law, Litigation and the Search for the
Promised Land. 76 GEO. Li. 229, 234-36 (1987) (reviewing MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP: LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION (1987)).
148. Beverly Axelrod, The Radical Lawyer, in RADICAL LAWYERS 69, 72 (Jonathan Black ed., 1971).
149. Geoghegan, supra note I, at 20, 23.
150. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 128 (discussing interpersonal interactions in general).
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maintain their renegade status.' 5' This possibility is perhaps too idiosyncratic
and personal to be studied in any dispositive way. We can only make guesses
from our own experience.
5. It's a Black Thing: The Constraints of Culture
A growing body of literature argues that minorities and women have a
distinct "voice," one shaped by different experiences, that cannot be funneled
by ventriloquism through white, male speakers. 52 The historical record
demonstrates that a political and legal system dominated by its white majority
culture cannot recognize outrages against minorities when they happen, but
only years later, as the cultural labels evolve into others.' From this, it
might follow that white lawyers, born into their culture, cannot understand the
realities experienced by minority clients and so cannot speak that reality to the
court.
Many public interest and civil rights lawyers may wish to believe that
"[b]y exposing ourselves to ennobling narratives, we broaden our experience,
deepen our empathy, and achieve new levels of sensitivity and fellow-feelings"
and enable ourselves to "think, talk, read, and write our way out of bigotry and
perspective."'" Richard Delgado admits the possibility but "only to a very
limited extent."' 5 This "very limited extent," even if it is all we can hope
151. Goffman notes that this type of behavior is typical of renegade members of a professional group
Id. at 165.
152. See generally CAROLGILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982): Mtlner S. Ball. Stores of Origin
and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 2280 (1989): Richard Delgado. The Imperial Scholar
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature. 132 U PA L. RE%' 561 (1984). Man MaLsuda.
Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground. I I HARV WoMIEN's Li
1 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Wlomens Lawtering
Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985).
153. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic. Images of the Outsider in American L..av and Culture
Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?. 77 CORNELL L REv t258. 1277-79 (1992) It is often
the case, however, that these new labels are just as false and pervasive as the ones they supplant
154. Id. at 1261.
155. Id. Delgado and Stefancic admit that occasionally someone breaks through to another culture by
creating "a work that recognizes and denounces the racism of the day." The) note. however, that those who
successfully transcend cultural barriers have no audience. Id. at 1281. The victories tn Brown, Wllowbrook.
and other cases suggest other possibilities. Also. I assume that Delgado ,,ould not argue that a member of
the oppressed group would necessarily express her reality in a pleading better than her lawyer could. Some
plaintiffs may indeed be more eloquent than their lawyers. For example, few pnoners could ntc as
eloquently of prison life as Jack Henry Abbott does in describing solitary confinement
The air in your cell vanishes. You are smothering Your eyes bulge out. you clutch at your
throat; you scream like a banshee. Your arms flail the air in your cell. You reel about the cell.
falling.
Then you suffer cramps. The walls press you from all directions with an invisible force
You struggle to push it back. The oxygen makes you giddy with anxiety You become hollow
and empty. There is a vacuum in the pit of your stomach. You retch
You are dying. Dying a hard death. One that lingers and toys with you
JACK HENRY ABBoTi', IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LE-IERS FROM PRISON 25 (1981) Most plaintiffs.
however, lack the training necessary to write a complaint. Prisoners litigating pro se often attempt a legal
writing style that amuses lawyers while unwittingly caricaturing the lawyers' lifeless style. See TtiOMA.S.
PRISONER LmGATtON, supra note 34, at 146. 1 recall one asserting "constitutionistical rights."
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for, remains critical because white lawyers like William Kunstler still represent
African-American prisoners. One must hope that the dynamic of the lawyer-
client relationship will provide the understanding of client reality that we fail
to secure through "linguistic means alone."'' 56 Yet this relationship could also
reinforce the misunderstanding. 57 Then again, this may happen with clients
regardless of their cultural roots. White lawyers may be less willing or able to
credit the stories of minority clients.
6. It's Lonely at the Top: The Constraints of Hierarchy
Another explanation for thin pleading comes from the proponents of
Critical Legal Studies ("Crits"): Law is only politics by other means; precedent
and principles simply mask the exercise of power, and our true natures have
been suppressed and distorted by the "facts" imposed by the prevailing
capitalist marketplace ideology.158 Peter Gabel puts it, "Legal reasoning is
an inherently repressive form of interpretive thought which limits our
comprehension of the social world and its possibilities."' 59 Lawyers, schooled
in legal reasoning, see a limited world in which problems between people are
discrete and legally defined-not social and politically defined."W
Furthermore, that political definition is authoritarian and designed to protect
the status quo. 16' As a result, liberal lawyers-members of the elite--cannot
see the reality and so they cannot write about it.
More important, lawyers are not innocent dupes, but rather act to maintain
their own status and power over clients. In the representation of clients,
[cilient narratives are tolerated only to the extent they do not rupture
the ordered system of meanings and relationships defined by lawyer
narratives. When rupture is threatened by client resistance, the lawyer
engages in a series of interpretive moves to restore hierarchy by
characterizing client story in the vocabulary of dependence. 62
The Crits also have a remedy. Their solution is to politicize discrete cases
and the lawyer-client relationship in general. 63 This is to be accomplished
156. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 153, at 1261 (using the phrase to discuss the difficulty of
communicating across cultural boundaries).
157. See generally Alfieri, supra note 147.
158. See generally CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan Hutchinson ed., 1989); POLITICS OF LAW, supra
note 30.
159. Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 17, 17 (James Boyle
ed., 1992).
160. Id. at 25.
161. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and
the Practice of Law. in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 159. at 363, 366 (arguing that people accept
status quo based upon "false consciousness").
162. Alfieri, supra note 147, at 2126.
163. Gabel & Harris, supra note 161, at 386, 401.
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through "[c]ountercommunicative language," which "resists the coercion" of
the given dogma. '6 Lawyers must use language that tells "Ithe truth," which
"is the sociopolitical truth which the court normally considers to be irrelevant
to the legal resolution of the dispute."'' 65 Can we tell "the truth"? Is such a
language possible?
7. One Word Is Worth a Thousand Pictures: The Constraints
of Language
Two prominent critics, James Boyd White and Stanley Fish, provide
elements of an answer in their analyses of language. They would claim that,
for the interpretive community of lawyers and judges, the meaning of the
pleading's language has little to do with the client's reality or the intent of the
pleader."6 It is the inclusion in the pleading, White would say, that gives the
words their meaning, since words derive their meaning from their context,'67
in which the "gesture' ' 68 or the "speech act"'" is made. A pleading in a
lawsuit is such a gesture or speech act. By this gesture, addressed to its
judicial audience, the other members of our interpretive community give the
words of the pleading their meaning. The lawyer's meaning and the judge's
meaning are not coterminous, but shared, and different from the meaning given
to the same words by journalists reading them in a colleague's newspaper
story.' These meanings differ, as well, from the reality each complains
about, since
[e]ach of us loads any expression with significances that derive from
our prior experience of language and of life, an experience that is
obviously different for each of us .... What is behind the shimmering
and fluid world of language is not a world of potentially clear and in
principle sharable ideas or understandings, as our talk about concepts
assumes, but a world of private meanings, radical silences,
incommunicable sensations, experience and images. Each of us is a
164. FISH. supra note 7. at 450.
165. Gabel & Harris, supra note 161. at 396-97
166. Fish and White start at opposite sides of the notion of interpretise communtics-- Fish says the
same text can be interpreted similarly within one set of persons. %, hich disagrees %; ith other such sets. or
communities. Nithin each community, members share "assumed disiinctions. categones of understanding.
and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance." Fisti. supra note 7. at 141 The members* agreement on an
interpretation arises, not from the text. but from their communit) See id White charactenrzs this process
as "look[ing] at it the other way round." as a "'text created bN i communit) of interpreters" WHITE.
JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 99. For White, the community of author and audience creates the text by its
interpretation, id., and yet on occasion he refers to "l[]he kind of communty a text creates." id at 100
167. WHrrE, JusncE, supra note 6. at 37 (analyzing meaning of "to deliberate" in context of first
sentence of Federalist Papers).
168. Id. at xii.
169. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 7. at 40 (quoting Richard Ohmann. Speech Acts and the Response to
Literature (Dec. 1976) (paper delivered at meeting of Modem Language Association)).
170. Cf. WHITE, JusTtCE, supra note 6. at xi ("10lur words gel much of their meaning from the
gesture of which they are a part .... ").
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circle of experiences and meaning that can occasionally, through
language, meet or overlap with others, at least at the edges.1
7 1
The lawyer's language of concepts has worse luck than most languages in
communicating across experience: "Talk about concepts seems to assume that
language can be pierced and some underlying reality exposed. I think it cannot
be done. What lies beyond language is real all right, but it is not
communicable, certainly not in a language of concepts."'' 7  When lawyers
focus on a surface reality of concepts, they lose another reality-one of voices,
a "world of people speaking to each other across their discourses, out of their
languages, out of their communities of knowledge and expertise, and speaking
as people seeking to be whole."'73 In the process, they lose what grasp they
once had on those realities "over time, by discarding possibilities for speech
and thought as well as by making them."'
7
Litigators' language surrenders the most power of all. This happens, in
part, because of what White calls the "thinness" of this speech of concepts, of
propositional, adversarial speech. 75 In our rush to counter the reality we
anticipate from the adverse party, pleadings lose the depth of reality
experienced by our clients. Ironically, litigation speech is also thinned by its
reduction to a form "equally congenial" to the lawyers' colleagues, judges, and
opposing counsel.
76
For White, the resulting loss is tragic. 177 In the world according to Fish,
there is no tragedy; things are just the way they are. 78 Fish also doubts that
"words have clear meanings" that compel an accurate perception of these
meanings-meanings that do not shift with changes in context and that remain
impervious to distortions attributable to the perspective of the one doing the
perceiving. 79 It is interpretation that provides meaning, 80  and our
membership in interpretive communities shapes our interpretation. 8'
Adversarial speech does not trouble Fish. Rather, he asserts that interpretation
turns on intent, that intent must "itself be interpretively established, and that
171. Id. at 35.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 20.
174. Id. at 262 (urging lawyers to confront and resist tendency to lose touch with realities).
175. Id. at 9 ("Part of the problem [with legal and other professional discourse) is what I have called
thinness-so little life; but part of it is too much life of a certain kind, an insistent assertiveness .... ),
176. Cf. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 85 (discussing team behavior and speech). Goffman says further:
"Instead of a rich definition of the situation, reality may become reduced to a thin party line, for one may
expect the line to be equally congenial to the members of the team." Id.
177. James Boyd White, Translation as a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388, 1396 (1992)
[hereinafter White, Translation].
178. FISH, supra note 7, at 26-27.
179. Id. at 6.
180. See id. at 4.
181. Id. at 152.
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it can be established only through persuasion."' 8 2 Whether we lose some of
reality or the chance for persuasion, the constraint of our language must be
acknowledged.
While lawyers live in a "rhetorical world,""'8 so do others-journalists.
historians, novelists. And yet our competing descriptions of these horrible
realities pale in comparison to theirs. What keeps us on our side of the fence'?
8. This Is a Hard Hat Area: The Constraints of Self-Preservation
All lawyers feel the tug of these constraints on the depth of their vision
and the creativity of their pleading. All lawyers are socialized by their legal
education and their peers. They try to conform to the rules and standards of
their profession-whether or not those forces would actually prohibit thicker.
more realistic pleading. All civil rights and public interest lawyers must work
to bridge the gap between "us" and "them." All must wrestle with the language
they would use to build that bridge, whether they believe their task to be
translation or rhetoric.
One can see Ennis struggling to portray the awfulness of institution-
alization so that the court could bridge the gap between "us," the legal
profession and "them," the mentally retarded. Given the enormity of the gap
between black and white in 1952, Thurgood Marshall may have chosen to
leave the "us" behind in order to convince "them" to order desegregation.
Perhaps Kunstler chose to remain with the "us," leaving the "them" to take it
or leave it. In Hattie Kendrick's case and in others, I felt, and continue to feel,
these constraints working on jne as I sat before sheets of paper completely
blank except for the caption at the top of the page, worried about the sanctions
of judges, the ridicule of peers, and the disapproval of teachers. Sometimes I
wondered who my client was-the person with the name, the class she
represented, or the issue behind her-and which of these induced me to endure
the stress of litigation.
But still more remains to be said-an idea that may be implicit in my
attempts at explanation thus far: Perhaps we write like lawyers to avoid
responding as people.' 4 In fulfilling our mission, we stand on the horns of
a dilemma: How should we speak truth about a social injustice to the powers
that can remedy that injustice? The truth is a terrible one-hard to
comprehend, hard to imagine. The truth not only implicates legal rights but
challenges the legitimacy of the social order. When a lawsuit is filed, we ask,
"What kind of society would permit such things to happen?" The lawyer who
182. Id. at 25.
183. Fish notes that we all do. Id.
184. I cannot, of course, speak for the lawyers whose pleadings I hac criticized But they appear to
be lawyers who feel less inhibited about "pushing the envelope." who care deeply about their clients, and
who have committed their careers to crossing the barriers of culture and class
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pledges to seek a remedy must acknowledge her privileged position in a social
order that allowed, encouraged, or even insisted upon the injustice. The lawyer
might feel shame inside the outrage-shame that blurs the lawyer's vision.
In the Kendrick case and the Attica litigation, white lawyers such as
myself trip over more than misperceptions of the black experience. We must
confront our own racism and the lingering stereotypes that rattle around in the
back of our consciousness. We must also face our guilt over the cruelty of
racist acts by members of our own race, as well as the suspicion that we have
yet to wash ourselves clean of the stain. Racism creeps all through the culture
in which we are socialized, often going unnoticed or just denied. 85 Lawyers
are not immune. It is the pain of confronting this reality that might lead us to
distance ourselves from our clients' stories.
Similarly, people commonly fear the mentally retarded and psychiatric
patients. 186 Once, while touring an institution for the retarded that was the
object of a lawsuit, and facing all manner of "twisted limbs" without blinking,
I was summoned by one resident to examine her new watch. She was
hydrocephalic, her head enlarged sixfold. I could hardly bear it. The Rothmans
report a similar reaction by Bruce Ennis, plaintiffs' counsel in the Willowbrook
case, upon entering another institution for the mentally retarded: "Hardened to
institutional sights and smells, he still gagged upon entering Partlow-even the
standard practice of taking short breaths inside the building and gulping air
outside did not work.'
'I87
Should we expect lawyers to be any freer than journalists like Tom Wicker
of unspoken assumptions about the threat posed by prisoners? While lawyers
may accept and translate accusations of racism or other prejudice directed
toward the defendant they sue, any suggestion that they themselves have dealt
with the client in a racist way-whether that suggestion is made by the client
or implied by the circumstances-will likely distress the lawyer.88 That
distress intensifies in direct proportion to the lawyer's commitment to equality
and revulsion toward racial prejudice. On some level, the lawyer may interpret
any discussion of the racial dimensions of the attorney-client relationship as
an accusation rather than an exploration of possible realities.
89
185. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987). Whether or not an individual has any reason to feel guilty
about racism, many white people feel such guilt. We react to it in different ways-resentfully insisting it
isn't there, submerging in it, or looking it squarely in the face and moving on.
186. See, e.g., Jordana Hart, Neighbors' Fears Stall New Homes for Mentally Ill, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
It, 1989, at 22; see also Amerigo Farina et al., Reactions of Workers to Male and Female Mental Patient
Job Applicants, 41 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 363, 370-71 (1972) (suggesting that one's sex
is important variable in one's reaction to mental patients).
187. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 76, at 57.
188. For a brave response by a lawyer to that very dilemma, see Clark D. Cunningham, Lawyer as
Translator Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1298 (1992).
189. Peter Shane, Why Are So Many People So Unhappy? Habits of Thought and Resistance to
Diversity in Legal Education, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1990). Blame is inferred even if not implied.
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The lawyer charged with seeking a remedy also knows that the court is
unlikely to solve the real problem, to correct the injustice at its roots and to
repair all the damage done. The lawyer must act, or nothing will be done. But
she knows the limits of her power, and may feel inadequate to meet her
clients' expectations of relief from their oppression. It is, in part, the
overwhelming enormity of the problem they are charged with remedying that
may narrow lawyers' vision and language. One finds hints of this in the
descriptions by public interest lawyers of their practice. A legal services lawyer
says:
When people come to us, they're in immediate crisis. They literally
come in, "My God, what is going to happen to me and my two-year-
old kid [who] has muscular dystrophy, my four-year-old [who] is lead
poisoned, and me, who has emphysema and 85 percent overweight
and can't walk up the stairs?" We're people who have a lot of our
clients die on us. There are all these questions and choices they have
to make, and they're crying during the whole time that you talk to
them and they just say, "Will you please do what you think is best?
You're the lawyer." ' 9°
By multiplying that client's troubles by the number of cases in a typical legal
services caseload, one gathers some sense of the enormous pressure on the
average legal services lawyer.' 9 In a civil rights class action, the lawyer
sweats over a pretrial motion all day and stays up half the night wondering
what kind of country she lives in where the problems of thousands of
institutionalized retarded children, more twisted into pretzels that day than the
day before-both of those days years from a trial date-could depend on her.
The lawyer bears an additional emotional burden when her case reminds her
of some personal tragedy: I doubt that I am alone among such lawyers in
seeing a relative-in my case, my eldest sister, profoundly disabled and
bedridden-in the faces of my clients.
Goffman notes that professionals occasionally use "cynicism as a means
of insulating their inner selves from contact with the audience."' 92 This self-
protective cynicism is particularly attractive for lawyers because they
perversely must use the client's suffering to advance the cause of the client's
legal rights. Listen to the search for an appropriate class representative in a
welfare rights case:
At one point, the lawyer turned to me and said, "I just talked with a
woman who'd be a great plaintiff; for years she has walked seven
miles to the nearest source of water, but she is finding it hard now
190. SPANGLER, supra note 41. at 167-68.
191. See id.; Hosticka, supra note 147, at 609.
192. GOFFMAN, supra note 12. at 20.
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because she just had one leg amputated. The department won't give
her extra money so she can install plumbing in her house." "Great,"
I said gleefully. But it wasn't great; it was part of the horror of
poverty in which I don't live, and it should have outraged me. It did
not because I was playing lawyer. The game had made it better for
me, the worse it was for her.
193
Worse yet, the lawyer still must speak these difficult truths to judges who
have power over their careers. To make matters worse, judges are often hostile
to cases of this kind and do not appreciate being asked to intervene. 94 In all
likelihood, the defendants-state officials, civic leaders, and corporate
executives-and their lawyers come from the same social and economic class
as the judge and the plaintiffs' lawyer. The civil rights lawyer is asked to risk
sanction and ostracism for clients she may not even understand or know.'
9 5
When one's cause may be perceived as radical, one may wisely appear
conservative and mainstream-to "pass."'
196
Even while passing as a member of the mainstream, some of us "do not
even feel like real lawyers."' 97 That fear of not authentically belonging to
one's profession can compromise the clarity of the lawyer's perspective:
At the start of every case, you are pumped up with noble outrage.
You fight some heartrending injustice, some crime against widows
and orphans. Then your facts start to fall apart. Then your theories
start to fall apart. Worst of all, you begin thinking, maybe this
housing agency, or this pension fund, was doing the best it could. The
other side says, "Look at the real world, look at the constraints, look
at what your clients do not see." They appeal to your education, your
profession, your common allegiance to the cult of complexity. To
your arguments, they have counter-arguments, some of them
devastating. Your clients only say "Oh." Somehow, you have to hang
on to your original sense of outrage. You sublimate it into some new
technical argument.' 98
You begin drafting short and plain statements of the claim. Given a desire to
identify with clients, a lawyer could easily adopt, like F. Scott Fitzgerald, a
tragic attitude toward tragedy by becoming the object of one's horror or
193. Stephen Wexler, The Poverty LawyerAs Radical, in RADICAL LAWYERS, supra note 148. at 225.
194. In granting a stay of a district court order requiring population reductions in a prison with
unconstitutionally inhumane conditions, Justice Rehnquist wrote that "nobody promised them a rose
garden." Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16 (1981).
195. See GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 85. The civil rights plaintiffs' team carries the additional burden
of garnering less respect, compared to the defense, from laypeople. Id. at 84.
196. In fact, it might have been even more important for Thurgood Marshall to frame his pleading to
resemble the most commonplace of pleadings because of his personal sense of exclusion. Cf infra note 367
and accompanying text.
197. Geoghegan, supra note I, at 17.
198. Id. at 22.
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compassion.' It is a small wonder, then, that lawyers leave their clients'
reality out of the pleading, shoving important pieces of themselves to the
margins of their pleading.200
E. The Need for Change
[T]he Constitution became for them a sort of abracadabra which
would cure all disease. 0
Thurman Arnold
The consequences of thin lawyer speech are twofold-they affect both the
problems we wish to remedy and ourselves. The language of individuals and
societies cannot help but influence the conduct of both, for '[olur behavior is
a function of words we use. More often than not, our thoughts do not select
the words we use; instead, words determine the thoughts we have. We can say
with some assurance that language develops out of social conditions and in
turn influences social behavior.' 2 2 The way in which lawyers describe the
problems of their clients-as legal concepts-can shape how the rest of our
community, including the courts and other citizens, understand those problems.
The words can serve as a filter that determines which features of a problem
pass through to common understanding. This in turn affects how we respond
to news of the problem-empathy and outrage, or complacency and
indifference.
199. Cf. infra note 462 and accompanying text.
200. Members of other disciplines have noticed that colleagues ssho face massie suffenng are caused
to suffer themselves. One study noted that stress causes hospital residents "to givc up humanistic beliefs.
and to increase emotional detachment." John NI. Colford & Stephen J. McPhee. The Ravelled Sleeve of
Care: Managing the Stresses of Residency Training. 261 JAMA 889. 890 (19891 This study also attibuted
this in part to physicians' belief system, which maintains that the residents should be all-knossing. that
technical expertise provides satisfaction, and that "uncertainty is a sign of s, eaknss - Id. see also BEVERLY
RAPHAEL. WHEN DISASTER STRIKES: How INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNMES COPE wVi. CATASTROPHE
224-34 (1986) (explaining that experiences of care givers and injured persons arc intcr%%oven so that no
distinction between their experiences is possible); RANDALL S. SWORD & JANET KELLER. TRAL MA CENTER
THREE DAYS IN THE LIFE OF AN EMERGENCY ROOM DOCTOR (1984) (descnbing ps%)chological and
physical suffering of doctors): Paula S. Butterfield. The Stress of Reilrncs A Re% ies of the Literuture.
148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED 1428. 1429 (1988) (reporting that sleep dcpnation is associated wsith
various antisocial attitudes); R. Andrew Schultz-Ross. Tlie Prisoner's Prisoner Th7e Thleme of Vlintar,
hnprisonment in the Staff of Correctional Facilities. 21 BULL AM ACAD PSYCHIATRY & L 101. 104
(1993) (describing shared sense of helplessness). While there is ample literature about depression and
alcoholism among lawyers, no studies have attempted to find links betssecn these problems and client
service. See Benjamin Sells, Attorne's Under Stress" A Few Facts About Depression in the Legal
Profession, 6 ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1992. at 24; see also Mike Snider. Eten Lav%)ers Get Blue3. USA
TODAY, Nov. 27, 1990. at AI (reporting Johns Hopkins study finding lawvers 3 6 times more likely to
suffer depression than people in other fields).
201. THURMAN W. ARNOLD. THE FOLKLORF OF CAPITAuSM 79 (1937)
202. Weller Embler. Metaphor and Soctal Belief. in LANGUAGE. MEANING. AND MATt RITY 125. 125
(S.I. Hayakawa ed., 1954).
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This is especially true in this country, where the language of lawyers has
infected or "legalized" the language of the society. Mary Ann Glendon
demonstrates that our legal discourse has become everyone's common language
and has also legalized our view of society.203 Glendon describes de
Tocqueville's observations of the infiltration of legal language into everyday
life:
Wherever he went, he found that lawyers' habits of mind, as well as
their modes of discourse, "infiltrate through society right down to the
lowest ranks." . . . Not only was legal language "pretty well adopted
into common speech," but a legalistic spirit seemed to pervade "the
whole of society, penetrating each component class and constantly
working in secret upon its unconscious patient, till in the end it has
molded it to its desire.
20 4
Glendon also cites Judge Learned Hand's warning against the "legalization"
of the United States, a warning delivered on the eve of the "rights revolution"
of the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's:205
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much on
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes;
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men
and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can
save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.
While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save
it.20
6
Glendon argues that the civil rights movement's entry into the courts
accelerated the work begun during de Tocqueville's time, that of legalizing the
society and its language.0 7
In the years following the civil rights era, the language revolution has
turned against us. Social injustice, now legalized in our language, is stuck with
its legality. Glendon suggests the harm done in her discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services. 20' The Court's holding that government had no legally enforceable
duty to protect vulnerable children209 seems to tell society-at-large that it had
203. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
204. Id. at 1-2 (citation omitted); see also id. at 3 ("In the phrase of legal historian Lawrence
Friedman, life in modem America has become 'a vast, diffuse school of law."') (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 143.
206. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (Irving Dilliard ed.,
1960).
207. GLENDON, supra note 203, at 2, 4.
208. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
209. Id. at 194.
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no politically enforceable obligation to those children .2  The progenitors of
the civil rights revolution desired no such result. Law was meant to empower,
not to enervate. This is the ironic consequence for civil rights lawyers who
shallowly frame social problems as narrowly conceived legal problems. Their
litigation, intended as a new and powerful remedy for change, becomes the
sole, or at least primary, remedy sought by the victims of civil rights
violations.211 Both Glendon and Derrick Bell agree that this faith in law led
civil rights advocates to choose litigation as the road to salvation-largely
ignoring other avenues, such as political activity,- - and diverting the scarce
resources of the client community.
211
More dangerous yet, when litigation over a "constitutionalized" social
problem then succeeds, i.e., with a favorable judgment or a settlement, the
client community tends to perceive the problem as solved. As Gerald
Rosenberg puts it,
symbolic victories may be mistaken for substantive ones, covering a
reality that is distasteful. Rather than working to change the reality,
reformers celebrate the illusion of change.2 4
Even when the legal victories appear more substantial, the reformers risk
complacency. Rosenberg quotes abortion rights advocates who saw the
negative consequences of Roe v. Wade:2t 5 "'Everyone assumed that when the
Supreme Court made its decision in 1973 that we'd got what we wanted and
the battle was over. The movement afterwards lost steam."'2- 6 For those on
the sidelines, the hope that the problem is solved becomes a belief that they
need no longer worry about it. 21 7 This hope among civil rights victims in the
courts should surprise us no more than the insight that the "rights talk"
210. GLENDON, supra note 203, at 95.
211. Glendon's concern is that this language of rights leaves out the language of responsibility and
has made political resolution through accommodation and compromise difficluh since rights are bcng
claimed as absolutes and at a growing rate. See id. at xi-xii. For a leftist criticism of rights. see Mortin I
Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988) (noting that rights talk tends to keep intact
artificial wall between private and public and to discount group claims). Mark Tushnet. 4n Essas on Rights.
62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984) (arguing that rights discourse impedes advances by progressie social forces)
212. GLENDON, supra note 203, at 6; see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NUT SAvwLL TIlE ELuSIsh
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 70 (1989).
213. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HotLow HOPE CAN COURTS BRIs,; ABOt-r SocIt CIIA%,GE' 313.
339 (1991). This is arguably true of both prisoners* rights and abortion rights adsuCatC Id
214. Id. at 340.
215. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
216. ROSENBERG. supra note 213. at 339 (quoting National Abortion Rights Action League member
Janet Beals) (citations omitted).
217. In And We Are Not Saved, Bell tells Geneva. his partner in dialogue, that "Much has changed
But a great many whites view black claims for justice in the voting area as elscw&here as unjustilied
bellyaching, and secretly harbor a deep-seated belief that the real cause of the blacks' plight is the
inferiority of the black race." BELL- supra note 212. at 73 Bell concludes that this belief in African-
Americans' inferiority has prevented any progress beyond formal equalit% Id. at 14
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transformation followed the civil rights revolution. For the victims, rights talk
is perhaps all there is."'
Yet the primary vehicle for talking rights fails them. Traditional pleading
in civil rights litigation covers the dramatic events that underlie the litigation
with a thin coat-leaving some spots untouched and missing other surfaces
altogether. The stories vanish, becoming almost unrecognizable when wrapped
inside the obtuseness of legal concepts. Along with those stories, other rich
elements disappear as well: graphic and powerful details, ironies, metaphors,
the impassioned voice of a narrator reacting to the horror witnessed, and other
possibilities for changing the way we think, and the way a judge thinks, of
these events. Without the stories, the complaint's paper wall between the court
and these clients stands like a concrete bunker.
If there is an alternative, it starts with the complaint. Our complaints do
not translate those stories in the fullness of their drama. Nor do they persuade
with the full force of their potential. We can do better.
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR THICKER PLEADING
The difference between the almost-right word and the right word is
really a large matter-it's the difference between the lightning bug
and the lightning.219
Mark Twain
A. The Possibilities for Change
Historically, pleading has evolved to shed any skin that interferes with
understanding the claims presented. Code pleading replaced common law
pleading so that a "person of common understanding [could] know what is
intended., ' 220 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call for a short and plain
statement to communicate the claim without code pleading's technical
obstacles that contributed nothing to the case.
221
We now find ourselves entering the era of plain writing.222 Plain writing
refers to "a level of language immune from contextual variation and therefore
resistant to interpretation '223 but, as Fish wryly observes, "nothing is more
218. See id. at 59.
219. BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 527 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (quoting Letter from
Mark Twain to George Bainton (Oct. 15. 1888)).
220. N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 57(5) (1848).
221. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
222. For a typical example of the "plain writing" school, see Richard R. Wydick, Plain English for
Lawyers. 66 CAL. L. REv. 727 (1978).
223. FISH, supra note 7, at 508.
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common than disputes concerning the meaning of supposedly plain or literal
language. ' 224 Perhaps the reason lies in the assumptions about reality that are
held by advocates of plain writing.
Believers in "artless" or "plain" speech think that rhetoric is added to
some prior natural thing, like cosmetics added to the unadorned face.
But human faces are bonz, like kitten faces. Words are not born in
that way .... Simple prose depends on a complex epistemology-it
depends on concepts like "objective fact." 2 -
These premises are assumptions about language and reality that we can no
longer accept as true. If plain means unadorned, then plain writing is artless.
The art of lawyering demands more.
Most problematic of all for the plain speakers, this pretense of objectivity
is not self-critical, and it assigns to itself an undeserved neutrality of belief and
values.226 In any case, plain writing must evolve in some direction since it
situates itself on untenable premises. While no one need defend the virtue of
abandoning nineteenth-century legalese, it does not follow that plain writing
is anything more than the twentieth century's version of legalese, greatly
improved but still improvable. More literary devices may creep into our
practice, as I propose here.
We need to consider alternative tools for our repertoire. We can use
literary techniques that allow us to communicate more elements of our clients'
realities and perhaps enhance the persuasiveness of our pleadings as well.
These are techniques other than the traditional argument by analogy, which
lawyers master.227 Analogizing is not enough by itself, since making our civil
rights case look like those with roots in common law fulfills only half of our
persuasive job, the half that comforts the court with traditional forms of legal
relief. The other half of persuasion is to present the compelling case for
transcending the real past. This Part considers means of doing that through
some new techniques and by using some standard rhetorical devices often
overlooked by lawyers but urged by rhetoricians like Chaim Perelman. 2s
224. l
225. GARRY WILLS. LINCOLN AT GETYSBURG" THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 148-49 (1992).
226. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative. 87 MICI L
REV. 2411,2440-41 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado. Storxtelng for Oppositonistsl. I would agree that plain
speech assumes an equality that does not exist, thus concealing the inequality that hen cannot be seen and
remedied.
227. And the active voice, which many have yet to master
228. See CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA. THE NEw RHETORIC A TREATISE ON
ARGUMENTATION 187-92 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans.. 1969)
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B. Dramedy
At the outset, we can borrow the voices of Wicker the journalist and
Rothman the historian. Here we consider the grafting of two voices into one
medium--journalism or history, and law. This combination is similar to the
technique of "dramedy," a term invented by the television industry to refer to
programs, such as Hill Street Blues, that portray serious subjects in a story that
alternates between light comedy and dark tragedy.229 This Section could also
be called docudrama or performance art, since all three forms share the
technique of blending different expressive forms into one gesture. Or we could
borrow the term "ambiguity" from James Boyd White and use it in the same
sense as he does in The Legal Imagination-mixing different kinds of language
so that the reader is asked to sustain a tension between them, to find the
meaning in the words somewhere between the languages, or above them,
through some integration.23  As White demonstrates in Justice as
Translation, the power of a poem derives from difference, the tension between
the sound of the words as they would be spoken in ordinary conversation or
prose, and the meter and rhythm of poetry.23 The stirring of two opposed
ways of speaking creates a third way with its own beauty, meaning, and force.
Another classic example is Shelby Foote's three-volume work, The Civil
War: A Narrative,32 in which the attitude of the novelist pervades the
writing of history such that the work product is neither novelistic nor
historical, but a new language. More recently, Art Spiegelman wrote and drew
Maus, 33 a cartoon account of the Holocaust in which Jews are mice and
Nazis are cats. Maus borrows cartoon devices to present the most terrible
events imaginable, to shake us from our half-conscious perception of these
familiar events into a wide-awake look at that horror.
Without announcing our technique, we can borrow from the styles of other
kinds of writing--e.g., literature, journalism, history-and graft them onto the
legal concepts of our pleading language. The effect of combining these
two-"the mind that tells a story and the mind that gives reasons""-is
something beyond mere legalese, beyond mere journalism or history.
229. Richard Zoglin, Nor Playing It for Laughs, TIME, Nov. 9, 1987, at 96; Richard Zoglin. Old
Comics, Boy Wonders, TIME. Sept. 18, 1989, at 69.
230. WHITE, IMAGINATION, supra note 6. at 57 (using example of Melville's inclusion in Moby Dick
of extracts from other writings about whales). White concludes that the tension between two kinds of
language ultimately is fraught with indeterminacy. Id. at 57-58.
231. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 4.
232. SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR, A NARRATIVE: FORT SUMTER TO PERRYVILLE (1958); SHELBY
FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR, A NARRATIVE: FREDERICKSBURG TO MERIDIAN (1963); SHELBY FOOTE, THE
CIVIL WAR, A NARRATIVE: RED RIVER TO APPOMATrOX (1974).
233. SPIEGELMAN, supra note 3; ART SPIEGELMAN, MAUS II: AND HERE MY TROUBLES BEGAN
(1991).
234. WHITE, IMAGINATION, supra note 6, at 243.
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The juxtaposition of facts (as Wicker the journalist reports them) 23" with
the invocation of the Constitution of the United States mirrors the distance of
the powerless prisoner from the federal judiciary. It does not attempt to mask
powerlessness in a language that pretends to conduct business as usual, that
pretends to offer the equality of voice hoped for by James Boyd White. Rather,
it admits to the tension and tries to resolve it.
The art-it is the art of "integration"-lies in writing two ways at
once. In this respect law is naturally literary, for the legal case as we
normally think of it can be neither an exercise in abstract analysis nor
the presentation of mere particulars, but requires the interaction of
both modes of discourse ... 236
As a lawyer, I could have achieved this integration by including Hattie
Kendrick's voice in the Cairo complaint. Lawyers can offer the voice of the
defendant-the city attorney in Kendrick who cannot find a "good black
man." '237 They can recount the unfolding of events at Attica as they
happened, discovering gradually, as Wicker did, how many died and how the
hostages were believed to have been killed by the prisoners but were, in fact,
killed by the state police and prison guards during the violent assault.2'
Lawyers might even experiment with the Willowbrook television reporter's
reference to Edward R. Murrow's journalistic aphorism that for some
stories-or cases-there can be no other side.2 39 Of course, in litigation, we
insist upon the legitimacy of two sides. But in borrowing Murrow's contrary
view from journalism, we remind the court of the unique territory it has
entered with this particular lawsuit-this isn't Kansas anymore. Looking
squarely at those cruelly, unnecessarily twisted limbs and wasted lives of
Willowbrook, the pretense of another side to this atrocity is easily revealed.
C. Client Narrative
Recently scholars have debated the power and legitimacy of narratives to
elucidate legal problems. 2' ° Narrative has unquestionable utility in pleading,
for many of the same reasons as its scholarly proponents expect.2 ' By telling
235. WICKER, supra note 58.
236. WHrrE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 40.
237. GOOD, supra note 4. at 92.
238. WICKER. supra note 58, at 287. 297-98. 308-09
239. RIVERA, supra note 87. at 26.
240. Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School. A Reply to Farber and Sherr. 46 VAND L. REv
665, 675-76 (1993); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry. Telling Stones out of School An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 854 (1993).
241. Joseph Singer argues that empathic narratives persuade by making readers 'aware of values they
already have," but worries that the narrative may be ineffective nonetheless Joseph Singcr. Persuasion. 87
MICH. L. REV. 2442. 2455-56 (1989). Thomas Ross is more optimistic. belieing that narrative can even
topple racist assumptions. Thomas Ross. The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race. White Innocence and Black
1995]
The Yale Law Journal
the stories of our clients, we concretize the abstract values the lawsuit turns
on-justice or equality-and permit the reconciliation of conflicting
abstractions. 242 In the Cairo case, for example, one can harmonize the respect
for democracy that would restrain a federal judge from restructuring a city
government with the demand for equality that calls for a leveling intervention.
The case is not about the right to vote, we can say. It is about the vote,
specifically, the vote of Hattie Kendrick and others like her,243 and so is
about both equality and democracy.
These narratives can do more than concretize; they can unearth. Richard
Delgado, who has argued that majority culture lawyers are unlikely to
comprehend their minority clients' realities,2" nonetheless advocates the
story as a way to understand, to persuade.
Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for
destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms,
and shared understandings against a background of which legal and
political discourse take place .... Ideology-the received
wisdom-makes current social arrangements seem fair and natural.
Those in power sleep well at night-their conduct does not seem to
them like oppression.
The cure is storytelling .... [S]tories can shatter complacency
and challenge the status quo. Stories told by underdogs are frequently
ironic or satiric; a root word for "humor" is humus-bringing low,
down to earth....
... Counterstories, which challenge the received wisdom.., can
open new windows into reality, showing us that there are possibilities
for life other than the ones we live .... Counterstories can quicken
and engage conscience. Their graphic quality can stir imagination in
ways in which more conventional discourse cannot.
• * * They can show that what we believe is ridiculous, self-
serving, or cruel. They can show us the way out of the trap of
unjustified exclusion. They can help us understand when it is time to
reallocate power.
245
Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. I, 40 (1990).
242. "[Cloncrete values can always be harmonized; the very existence of the concrete implies that it
is possible, that it achieves a certain harmony. Abstract values, on the other hand, when carried to extremes,
are irreconcilable: it is impossible to reconcile, in the abstract, such virtues as justice and love." PERELMAN
& OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 79.
243. The careful selection of a "good" class representative in a class action is a classic example of
argumentation by example, of persuading that what is true of the individual case is true of the class. Id.
at 350-56.
244. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 153, at 1284 ("[M]embers of the majority race forget how
to see and condemn racism.").
245. Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists, supra note 226, at 2413-15 (citations omitted). Others
who have written about socioeconomic differences between client and lawyer agree that while the lawyer
can only gain incomplete understanding of a client's reality, the narrative method can help the lawyer to
glean what can be had and to interpret as best she can. Alfieri, supra note 147, at 2131-32.
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White also believes stories to be persuasive because they are not
"propositional" and "coercive," but rather "experiential" and
"invitational"-"they offer an experience, not a message, and an experience
that will not merely add to one's stock of information but change one's way
of seeing and being and talking. ' '2 6 He hopes that, with stories, we could
reach even a Chief Justice Taney247 and reverse the process by which "Dred
Scott is converted before our eyes from a person into an object."2 "4
The defendants, too, are persons, not objects. Even in litigation, where the
objective is to challenge and to defeat, the defendants may be better described
in their own words; for example, the city attorney in the Kendrick case:
I told Preston Ewing [leader of the local NAACP chapter] a dozen
times I'm looking for a good colored leader who can control his
people. Everybody looks for a good black man nowadays. You find
one and you've got liquid gold.-"
As Shelby Foote suggests, "[t]he proper and effective way to accomplish the
destruction of a man is to show him sympathy, and in the course of showing
that sympathy, permit the man himself to show that it is undeserved."''
These client narratives must do more than bid for sympathy, segregated
from the legal argument. They must enliven the legal argument, drive it, and
shape it. 5 ' It is the dynamic role of the narrative within a legal
argument-rather than the narrative standing alone, perhaps unheard-that
gives it persuasive force. 2  At the outset of this Article, I quoted a
contemporary of Abraham Lincoln, who praised the lawyer and President for
his ability to accomplish with a story what a civil rights lawyer might strain
to do with a legal argument: to break "through all the barriers of a man's
previous opinions and prejudices at a crash."253 While we might envy
Lincoln's skill, we can aspire to do the same.
The complaint in the Cairo case could have gained persuasive power by
telling the story of how Cairo's African-American citizens had themselves
struggled for equal rights and faced despair, how the white majority's violent
determination to maintain a segregated roller rink transformed a boy into a
246. WHITE, JUSICE, supra note 6. at 42.
247. See id. at 139.
248. Id. at 133.
249. GOOD, supra note 4. at 92.
250. Foote, supra note 43, at 221. He adds that "[there is no danger that this sclf-condcmnation, this
self-damnation will not occur for in the clear light of truth, all things come clear, the only thing that can
muddy its depths is muddy writing." Id
251. Gilkerson describes a case in which client narrative failed to enliven the legal argument because
the two elements became disconnected from one another. Gilkerson. supra note 26. at 943.
252. See Calvin Morrill & Peter C. Facciola, The Power of Language in Adjudication and Medianon:
Institutional Contexts as Predictors of Social Evaluation. 17 LAw & SOc. INQUIRY 191. 210 (1992)
(comparing "powerful" and "powerless" forms of speech in legal settings).
253. CARPENTER, supra note 2, at 311 (quoting Rev. J.P. Gulliver).
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seemingly militant leader whom the city fathers would then malign.25 4 It
could have told the reader how Hattie Kendrick lost her career as a teacher as
the price paid by one who would not surrender her rights.as 5 So might the
Willowbrook complaint have responded to the story of Paula, one of the
institutionalized residents of Willowbrook, by recounting her parents' grim
Sunday trips to see her in the institution. 6 The complaint in the Attica case
could have told the story of the "faceless men" it identified only by name,
walking the gauntlet between two rows of guards who beat them as they
passed.z7
This may call for somewhat longer pleadings. The added length, however,
is justified by the complaint's greater value. Rhetoricians recognize that
amplitude, although perhaps inconsistent with short and plain statements, is the
essential difference between argumentation and mere demonstration, where
brevity is desired.
In a rigorous demonstration, only the links essential to the
development of the proof need be shown, but none of these can be
omitted. In argumentation, on the other hand, there is no absolute
limit to the accumulation of arguments, and it is also permissible not
to state all the premises essential to an argument.258
Perhaps amplitude can be reconciled with plain-if not short-statements if we
write carefully, not casually. In Twain's words, we would thus get the effect
of the lightning, not the lightning bug.
D. Metaphor
At the end of it all, the court and the lawyer will reduce the narrative
through the legal process, ending in a decision by the judge. Like all language,
client narratives will lose their full meaning when reduced to a paraphrase.259
Yet, the reduction to some shorter form becomes inevitable and even helpful
because we can then speak of the case intelligently yet efficiently. In the
context of civil rights litigation, this reduction creates danger given the
plenitude of petrifying legal labels and paste-on fact patterns, what White likes
to call "clich6s. ''260 So, the Cairo history of racial strife and struggle becomes
254. GOOD, supra note 4, at 12, 92.
255. See supra part I.A. Argument of the speaker's sacrifice is a classic rhetorical device. PERELMAN
& OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 248.
256. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 76, at 17-20.
257. WICKER, supra note 58, at 290-91. Perhaps referring to them as "faceless men," as I have here.
might deepen the court's perspective of the case.
258. PERELMAN & OLBRECHIs-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 474.
259. See WtITE, JusTicE, supra note 6, at 32-33.
260. WHrrE, IMAGINATION, supra note 6, at 257.
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another "civil rights case" and Attica's recapture, "cruel and unusual
punishment," or worse, "another prisoner case."
To combat the deadening effect of clich6s, one might try metaphors,
recasting the complex facts into a few words that quicken those facts with a
new meaning, free of the dangerous clich6. The classic role of metaphor is to
"enhance the standing of the analogy."' ' The question is, then, to what do
we wish to analogize? To "just another prisoner case," or to some
unacknowledged contradiction of a deeply held value of our society? For
examples drawn from the lawsuits I have examined, the metaphor of a
suicidally stagnant fiefdom, 262 and all that feudalism implies, might have
persuaded a federal judge of the need to intervene in Cairo, where
antidemocratic or predemocratic social structures and dynamics retarded the
democratic process. In the Attica case, the metaphor of numbers, as in the
numbers on the toe tags of the dead prisoners, 3 or the competing versions
of the casualty count Wicker heard,' or the image of cattle driven to
slaughter,2 5 might have started the judge thinking of these prisoners as
people instead of numbers or animals.
If the metaphor is new and fits, it can change the reality brought before
the judge:
Figures of speech, when they are fitting and felicitous, and especially
when they occur in print, give poetic sanction, as it were, to hitherto
dimly felt, inarticulated beliefs. When metaphor is new, and when the
reader does not enjoy the perspective vouchsafed by time, the
metaphor is taken literally, and its function is not that of rhetorical
device, but of statements of fact.'
Metaphors can achieve this because of two traits of the metaphor, each one
corresponding to its author and its reader. On the one hand, a metaphor, simple
in appearance, leaves "unused parts",267 of the concept unspoken, but still
available to the author. For example, the metaphor "family tree" uses certain
parts of the "tree" concept-e.g., roots, branches, growth-and not
others-e.g., certain species crowding out others, the absence of any planning
to the growth. Yet those parts remain and can be called upon to create new
understandings of old subjects through newly fashioned metaphors. -'
261. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA. supra note 228. at 400
262. See GOOD, supra note 4. at 1I.
263. WICKER, supra note 58, at 302-03.
264. Id. at 297.
265. See id. at 28546.
266. Embler. supra note 202, at 125. 128. Metaphors that have been used become 'dormant- and need
reactivation by some fresh application. PERELMAN & OLBREciTrrs-TYTECA. supra note 228. at 405-
267. See George Lakoff & Mark Johnson. Conceptual Metaphor mn Evrday Language. 77 J PI L.
453, 471 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. See id.
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On the other hand, from the reader's perspective, metaphors carry with
them, in the words of linguists Lakoff and Johnson, "a large and coherent
network of entailments. ' '269 In their example of "[l]ove as a [c]ollaborative
[w]ork of [a]rt, ' ' 270 love's entailments-patience, sacrifice, joy, pain-are
applied to art and then applied once more to love, based upon the reader's
experiences in life.271 These applications "reverberat[e] down through the
network of entailments which awakens and connects our memories of past love
experiences and serves as a possible guide for future ones.'272
Metaphors of this kind have formidable power. Historian James
McPherson argues that a factor essential to Lincoln's victory in the Civil War
was his ability to communicate effectively through his creative and skillful use
of figurative language, especially metaphor.273 It is important to note,
however, that old metaphors become clich6s and die. They are so frequently
used and casually misused that "we often do not realize that they are
metaphors. 274 We forget that they represent anything true, meaningful, or
relevant.
Even staler clichrs can be refreshed. In Willowbrook, the all-too-familiar
prison metaphor might have taken on new life if it had been recast, as by the
television reporter, as a concentration camp, suggesting all the horrors of the
Holocaust, or as a leper colony with its connotations of eliminating those who
are different through no fault of their own.275 Some might think this
metaphor needs a little reworking as well.
In his treatise on rhetoric, Perelman uses the example of the "wheel of
fortune," which has become a clich6 but can be reactivated as it was by Pascal:
"'The great and the humble have the same misfortunes, the same griefs, the
same passions; but the one is at the top of the wheel, and the other near the
centre and so less disturbed by the same revolutions."'276 The words
"wheel," "of," and "fortune" never appear next to each other, but the metaphor
is invoked in an exciting and persuasive way. Similarly, we could say
Willowbrook is "like a prison" or "like a concentration camp," or we could say
that the residents of Willowbrook, though innocent, have been "concentrated
in a camp" where most will die because they are different.
269. Id. at 482.
270. Id. at 481.
271. Id. at 481-82.
272. Id. at 482.
273. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 103
(1990) (titling chapter containing this argument, "How Lincoln Won the War with Metaphors"). As Garry
Wills, no cynic when it comes to the power of language, observes, to claim that Lincoln won the war with
metaphors would be an exaggeration. See WILLS, supra note 225, at 170.
274. MCPHERSON, supra note 273, at 95.
275. See The Last Disgrace, supra note 88.
276. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 406 (quoting BLAISE PASCAL, PENS9ES
§ 2, at 62 (W.F. Trotter trans., Random House 1941) (1670)).
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Sharp metaphors cut from a different angle. In Paul Good's account of
Cairo's troubles, he sharpens several dull metaphors. He gives "backwardness"
a new slant by describing how the all-white youth center called itself "Oriac"
or Cairo, backwards. 277 Reporting on how the police department refused
federal grants to increase professionalism, Good tells us about a flyer that
"achieves a bumper-sticker condensation of this philosophy: 'We need to
support our local police by turning down Federal grants.'"-271 Creating a new
metaphor not about the South but of the South. Good quotes a local black
minister as lamenting that discrimination is a national problem because
"'South' has moved all over the country."
279
In a town called Cairo, the temptation to invoke the people of Israel
struggling to free themselves from the rule of Pharaoh would strain the
integrity of most writers, and stretch the readers' patience as well. Good
follows Pascal's example and plants parts of the metaphor throughout the
book-a reference to "Little Egypt"2 and, a few pages later, to an exodus
of young black people; a recitation of troubles resembling plagues
befalling an unyielding power structure sprinkled throughout; ' 2 the ostracism
of one local prophet, a white lawyer;2" and a near-biblical description of
civil rights leader Charles Koen, "still not recovered from his long fast; his
body is wispy and his.eyes seem to stare at you from some far place he has
been. ,, s
The Rothmans also present a potent new version of the dustier metaphor
of an institution as a "hellhole." A few pages after referring to Willowbrook
as a "hellhole, 285 they subtly remind us of Dante while recounting the visit
of Dr. James Clements, a visiting expert who tells the story of
meeting a Catholic priest who was doing penance by working at the
institution. The priest was pacing around an enclosed pen for the
children at Building 16, "not verbalizing or making any attempt at
verbal communication, and the youngsters there were so eager for
human contact that there was a youngster holding onto each leg, being
dragged around and around this endless circle within this pen."
Clements could imagine the sins that brought the priest into the circle,
but what could the children have done to belong in it too'?''
277. GOOD, supra note 4, at 23.
278. Id. at 34.
279. Id. at 4.
280. Id. at 10.
281. Id. at 14.
282. Id. at 11, 86.
283. Id. at 89.
284. Id. at 92. Not all of Good's metaphors are new and po,,edrul lic has tits ,harc of "color incs."
id. at 12, 17, "psychic wounds," id. at 23, and "'nvcrs of time." id at 5
285. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN. supra note 76. at 66.
286. Id. at 76-77. The Rothmans also use stale metaphors like the "',hccl, of justice" Id at 66
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To open the prison doors and give his readers a peek inside, Wicker uses
metaphors more sparingly. Still, he uses them with great power, vaulting over
the gap between prisoner and citizen by quickly spinning the native-foreigner
metaphor so that we find ourselves on both sides of the gap:
[The prisoners] seemed far away, too, because they were on the
underside and he was not. That made a long distance between them,
a gap across which he wondered if he could ever reach-a gap not so
much between losers and winners, fortunate and ill-staffed, or even
rich and poor as between native and foreigner. Across that gap, they
eyed one another without hostility, but without much understanding,
either. Perhaps it could go either way. But Wicker had no more time
to think about that as he and Jones approached the brick facade of D-
block, or to reflect upon who-he or they-was native and who,
foreigner. 7
When the spinning stops-when he leaves the prisoner-held portion of the
prison-Wicker staggers, uncertain which side of the prison he should call
home:
When they passed through the iron gates that frowning guards
held open for them, back into the civilized world, Wicker was at once
conscious of the troopers and the guns .... He knew the troopers
were on "his side," the representatives of society, clad and armed for
society's work. He knew the guns were for his protection ....
Yet, the troopers and the guns did not reassure him. He could
sense (perhaps it was anticipation) the growing if controlled hostility
of the troopers-as if it was dawning on them that it was unseemly,
indecent for good Americans to deal as equals with thieves and rapists
and addicts, blacks at that. ...
"Funny thing," [another observer] said. "I get the feeling they
liked us better in there than they do out here. 288
By leading the judge to think of the lawsuits in new, compelling ways,
instead of the deadening clich6s of "Section 1983" or "cruel and unusual
punishment," we also take measured steps toward transforming the definition
of those terms as well, giving them new life. Cruel and unusual punishment,
for the judge, will mean something different after the Attica case than it did
before. As Perelman teaches, one of the functions of rhetoric in law is to find
"new examples react[ing] on earlier ones and modify[ing] their meaning '289
so that what was different is now alike:
287. WICKER, supra note 58, at 49-50.
288. Id. at 56.
289. PERELMAN & OLBREcrTS-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 357.
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Language is often one step ahead of the jurist. In turn, the jurist's
decision-for language does not impose a decision on him, but
facilitates his task-may react on the language. In particular, his
decision may have the result that two words which could, at a given
time, be regarded as homonyms will be interpreted as stemming from
a single concept.
290
This is especially likely in civil rights where the stories of the litigants have
transformed our concepts of equal protection and individual rights."'
If we start saying it in the complaint, it will become true. "As lawyers
know-to their cost-it is very difficult to say things habitually, even things
one doubts, without coming to believe them.,2 92 Once the judge begins to
think of the case in this new way and to talk about the case in this way, the
justification for remedial action by the court becomes stronger. "More often
than not, our thoughts do not select the words we use; instead, words
determine the thoughts we have. 293
E. Irony
Irony manipulates a text to facilitate the disappearance of one set of
meanings and its replacement with other meanings2 '-"saying one thing and
meaning, not just another, but its opposite. 295 The success of ironic
expression depends on the commonality of assumptions between author and
reader29--e.g., among lawyers and judges-regarding the imperatives of
equality, due process, fairness, and reasoned decision making. On more
controversial matters such as the greater society's relationship to the poor,
irony often fails. A reader who is committed to a New Deal or Great Society
view may find ironic the argument that "illegitimacy causes poverty," since she
sees illegitimacy less as a cause of welfare rolls and more as a consequence
of the limited options available to the poor. In contrast, a reader influenced by
Reaganomics finds not irony, but insight.
Where lawyer and court share assumptions-for example, the
inappropriateness of judicial meddling with democratic processes, the value of
racial equality, and the role of the court in guarding fundamental constitutional
rights-irony can persuade. The need for court intervention can be argued with
irony by pleading that despite our commonplace expectations, the system did
290. Id.
291. PATRICIA J. WILUAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGiS 163 (1991).
292. WHIrrE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 54.
293. Embler, supra note 202, at 125. For a consideration of the role socially common metaphors have
played in the law, see Eastman, supra note 105.
294. FISH, supra note 7. at 193.
295. WHITE, IMAGINATION. supra note 6, at 54.
296. See WAYNE C. BOOTH, A RHETORIC OF IRONY 33 (1974); PERELMAN & OLBRECirTs-TYTEcA.
supra note 228, at 208.
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not work. Democracy and the normal political process have failed. To call for
the extraordinary help of the court, the lawsuit must not appear
commonplace.297 It should seem ironic to a court that it must intervene to
guarantee rights that should inhere in the democratic process itself.
At its zenith, the subversive power of irony "undermines clarities, opens
up vistas of chaos, and either liberates by destroying all dogma or destroys by
revealing the inescapable canker of negation at the heart of every
affirmation" 298 -that is, if it works. Typically, irony succeeds by stating a
proposition that the author pretends to believe, in a manner that invites the
reader to peer through that statement and conclude that the author actually
believes its opposite. Booth offers one example of an ironic statement from a
solicitation for contributions to a relief fund: "Ignore the hungry and they'll go
away." The advertisement's audience is expected to understand that the author
actually means, "Give to our fund or the hungry will die. '299 They will go
away in the sense that they will die.
Irony presents its own challenge. The author intends that the audience
reject the argument on the surface, but not because of anything observable
about the "pretend" argument. The speaker could be absolutely serious, albeit
callous or indifferent. How does one make it clear that ironic statements are
intended to be ironic? The speaker-if observed, and not just read-could, of
course, wink. Or a picture of a starving child could appear next to the
argument. Where these sorts of clues are not available, the audience mistakes
the pretended argument for its intended opposite, because the audience
refuse[s] to dwell with anyone who holds this whole set of beliefs.
And then, because [the reader] cannot believe that the author of the
statement can be that kind of person, [she is] forced (through
psychological and intellectual pressures which [she] will not even
pretend to understand or explain) to make sense out of the statement
by concluding that it is ironic.
Given the adversarial nature of the legal profession, the clarity of an ironic
message cannot depend solely on the shared assumptions of our interpretive
community. Ironic clues may prove necessary. For instance, in the Cairo case,
plaintiffs' counsel might plead something like, "The city leadership has
committed itself to serving all of its citizens." Without other indications of
irony, the judge might only assume a typographical error. Similarly, an
allegation that "Cairo's Black citizens have gained access to all city agencies
and offices" may seem simply quirky unless it is accompanied by clues such
297. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 468.
298. BOoTH, supra note 296, at ix.
299. Id. at 35.
300. Id.
[Vol. 104: 763
Language of Civil Rights Litigators
as a companion sentence about the racial demographics of the city's personnel;
e.g., "Blacks are hired only as janitors to sweep out those agencies and
offices." This kind of signal highlights what Wayne Booth describes as an
incongruity between the pretended statement and known historical fact,
conventional judgment, or other statements of fact within the same writing?0'
A clash of styles may also suggest irony by juxtaposing formal pleading
style with something, well, "funkier." For example, "Blacks in Cairo--40% of
the voting age population-have never elected one of their race to the City
Council. Guess that's all they deserve, right?" Cuteness and sarcasm, however,
should not be confused with irony. They raise eyebrows, but not
consciousness. A more persuasive clash arises from following the first
statement with a quotation from the city attorney: "There are very few to
choose from. There's nothing better than having a good black man on your
city council .... We're thinking now of putting two on the council.
' "-
If, as argued elsewhere in this Article, the pleading includes the lawyer's
own voice, then the readers of an ironic allegation "may be alerted whenever
[they] notice an unmistakable conflict between the beliefs expressed and the
beliefs [they] hold and suspect the author of holding." 3 This is risky
business, and the lawyer may wish to use irony only with clues or, absent
clues, only when the judge knows the lawyer sufficiently that she can mutter
to herself, "This lawyer could not have meant what she just said." Even so, the
judge may pass over the real meaning intended by others, instead constructing
other meanings and rendering the iiony unstable, and if not dangerous, then
useless. 3
The case studies offer several examples of discernable, more stable ironies.
In the Cairo case, one can ironically demonstrate the point by pleading white
city officials' claim that blacks come to Cairo for the welfare benefits,3 and
then relating the story of the welfare mother leaving Cairo each morning at
3:00 to work in another city, fifty miles away.30 The complaint could quote
the city attorney on the difficulties of finding good black leaders3' and then
quote the despairing voice of a young man who cannot find a job or a
future,0 8 or offer Hattie Kendrick's eloquence.
In the Attica case, one could report what the helicopter announced to the
prisoners in the yard: "Put your hands above your head... you will not be
301. Id. at 58-67.
302. GOOD, supra note 4, at 92. This also has the benefit of making the city attorney the speaker As
Booth notes, the "author of the original irony is himself an ironic victim." Booni. 5upra note 296. at 37
By attributing the quotation to the city attorney, the lawyer signals to the reader that it is the city attorney.
not the lawyer. who is the victim of the irony.
303. BOOTH. supra note 296, at 73.
304. Id. at 6.
305. GOOD. supra note 4, at 92.
306. Id. at 13.
307. Id. at 92.
308. Id. at 6.
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harmed," and follow it with the death toll even among those who did." 9 One
could plead that the local and state law enforcement authorities began
prosecution of those they believed guilty of violations of the law, then cite the
one-sided statistics of indictment, 310 to show why these authorities cannot be
trusted with the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Lawyers could invoke Willowbrook's mission to care for and treat the
mentally retarded children of the state's families and then state that Paula's
parents were barred from the ward.3" ' They could characterize the institution
as a place where professionals were charged with the care of these vulnerable
persons and then report a doctor's discharge for trying to do just that.
311
F. Poetry
Through the use of poetic elements, lawyers may enhance the persuasive
power of their pleadings. Pleadings may properly borrow rhythm and meter
from poetry since, like poetry, pleadings are often read aloud. Once again,
Abraham Lincoln provides the best examples of poetic techniques applied to
persuasive speech. As Edwards and Hankins discovered in their study, Lincoln
the Writer,3'3 Lincoln often wrote lines that were "metrically regular" and
had "more pronounced rhythm than is common in prose."3"4 Among many
examples, they analyze the Gettysburg Address, accentuating syllables to show
the meter:
1. Fore-scoreland sev-/en yearsla-go.
2. Now we/are en-gagedlin a great/civ-il war.
3. Can long/en-dure.
4. We are metlon a greatlbat-tle field/of that war.
5. For thoselwho herelgave their lives/that that na-/tion might live.
6. It islal-to-/ge-therlfit-ing.
7. We can/not ded-li-cate,
We can/not con-/se-crate
We can/not hal-low/this ground.
8. The world/will lit-/tle noteJnor longlre-mem-ber.
9. Have thus farlso no-blylad-vanced.
10. That from/these hon-/ored dead
We take/in-creasedlde-vo-tion
To that causelfor which/they gave
The last/full mea-/sure of/de-vo-tion.
11. These dead/shall not/have died/in vain.
12. Of thelpeo-ple,
309. WICKER, supra note 58, at 285-86.
310. Id. at 309-10.
311. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 76, at 17, 19.
312. The Last Disgrace, supra note 88.
313. HERBERT EDWARDS & JOHN E. HANKINS, LINCOLN THE WRITER (1962).
314. Id. at 93.
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The rhythm, which pushes the words along, advances their power as well,
since we more easily memorize and recall verse than prose."' Similarly,
Lincoln used repetition ("of the people, by the people"), assonance
("whether/ever"), rhyme,317 and alliteration ("lives/live" and "world/will") to
promote the ideas embodied in these techniques."'
Like poets, who write with an ear to the sound of their writing spoken
aloud, lawyers should listen, as they write, to how their pleadings sound.
Indeed, a law clerk might read our pleadings to a judge, "summing up a wide
area of emotional experience in a single telling phrase.""q For example,
prisons are dark, ugly places. True enough, we knew that already. But listen
to the way Wicker expresses this commonplace thought: "The great world goes
about its business, but the prison is a dark pocket of mystery and silence-'the
black flower of civilized society,' Hawthorne called it."i'-
G. Homilies
Like lawyers, preachers must choose the words that best translate their
message and arrange them in the most persuasive order. Homilies do differ
from pleadings in the manner of their reception-they are heard, not read by
the audience. But to the extent that the judge hears in her own mind the words
she reads, or hears the words read to her by a law clerk, homilies have
something to teach us.
Preachers choose words that "imitate," that "match cadence and the sounds
of words to what we are speaking about."' 2' Repetitive things are repeated.
Quick things are said quickly; long processes are described with a long series
of phrases. David Buttrick provides a vivid sample. To describe death, we
could write: "We all die. Though life-support systems may keep our bodies
going, sooner or later, by accident or heart failure or merely growing old, we
315. Id. at 95. For a brilliant consideration of the Gettysburg Addrcss and its pcrsua.sic poscr to
transform our concept of equality, see generally WILLS. supra note 225
316. EDWARDS & HANKINS, supra note 313. at 93
317. From the Second Inaugural Address: "Fondly do we hope-fercntl, do we pray-that this
mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away." ABRAHAM LINCOLN. Second Inaugural Address (Mar 4.
1865) [hereinafter Second Inaugural Addressl. in SPEECHES AND WRMNGS 1859-1865. at 687 (Don E
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter SPEECHES AND WRITINGS].
318. See EDWARDS & HANKINS, supra note 313. at 96-97 (discussing Lincoln's use of literary
techniques).
319. Id. at 98.
320. WICKER. supra note 58. at 33.
321. DAVID BUTTRICK. HOMtLETIC: MOVES AND STRUCTtRES 190 (1987)
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will die." 322 Or, we could write: "We all die. Oh, medical science can keep
us going, pump the pump of the heart, or measure the slow ooze of
intravenous feeding, drop by drop; we will live, but without aliveness. Sooner
or later, we'll stop. '323 "Pump the pump" sounds like a heart. "Drop by
drop" recalls an intravenous tube. The long process of prolonging life is
prolonged in words, only to end abruptly with "we'll stop."
Preachers might use harsh, guttural sounds to describe cruelty, "s" or "f'
sounds to speak of gentleness, polysyllabic Latin words for profundity, and fast
words for action.324 So can we. For the Attica case, read this aloud:
Hands behind their necks, single file. The inmates made their way
down D-tunnel, through the mud and the debris of the uprising and
the attack, through A-yard, with bodies lying all about and the
remnants of the gas clinging in the damp air. To the A-block door. No
trial, but only judgment, res ipsa loquitur. No presentence
investigation, but sentencing. The same for each, res judicata. Kicked
and clubbed and punched and stabbed.
In this effort I dare to take some of Wicker's prose32' and emphasize its
homiletic potential.
Lawyers might also borrow the combination of opposites from homiletic
technique. Among the great preachers whose lectures on theology and morality
are remembered, we think of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. One of his
techniques for making a lasting impression on his audience was a cadence of
opposites: "the sons of former slaves and sons of former slave-owners," and
"not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their
character.
326
One great lawyer, Abraham Lincoln, employed this technique with great
effect. 327 In his posing of opposites, Lincoln drew upon the power between
them; for example, "malice" and "charity" in the Second Inaugural
Address. 28 Much of the power of remembered quotations flows from the
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 205.
325. WICKER, supra note 58. at 287-88.
326. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at the Civil Rights March on Washington (Aug.
28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217, 219
(James M. Washington ed., 1986).
327. Lincoln liked to mimic preachers in his youth and apparently borrowed from them as an adult.
According to his stepmother, Lincoln "would hear sermons [by the] preacher, come home, take the children
out, get on a stump or log, and almost repeat it word for word." PHILIP B. KUNHARDT, JR. Er AL..
LINCOLN: AN ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHY 42 (1992) (alteration in original).
328. Second Inaugural Address, supra note 317, at 687. ("With malice toward none; with charity for
all ...."). Lincoln demonstrated as well the "ladder method" or "chain method" of building to a point by
linking phrases to ones preceding them. DONALD L. HAMILTON, HOMILETICAL HANDBOOK 70 (1992). Look
again at the Gettysburg Address: "We are engaged in a great civil war .... We are met on a great battle-
field of that war."
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tension between two things in opposition or at least in distinction; for example,
between the lightning and the lightning bug, in Twain's remark quoted at the
beginning of this Part. No one knew this better or used its insight more
effectively than Lincoln, for whom language was a fascination.) -9 Read the
First Inaugural Address:
We are not enemies, but friends. . . . Though passion may have
strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords
of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave, to
every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet
swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will
be, by the better angels of our nature.
3
3
The persuasive power of tension between opposites is available in
litigation pleadings as well. In the Willowbrook case, we could recite the
contrast between what we see in entering the institution-twisted limbs and
swollen heads (again a set of two)3 t1-and who these people are. In the
Attica case, the tension between opposites is embodied in the difference
between our expectations as to what the killer-prisoners did to the hostages,
and the fact that the guardians of law and order were the actual killers." 2 In
Cairo, the hopelessness of young men contrasts with the determination of
Hattie Kendrick.33 3 The tension created between these contrasting points of
expectation and actuality can enable us to "displac[e] the dulling sense of
familiarity' 33 with a new vision of things.
335
H. Oxymorons
'[T]is better to be lowly born
And range with humble lives in content
Than to be perked up in a glist'ring grief
And wear a golden sorrow. 36
329. See WILLS, supra note 225. at 153-54 (descnbing Lincoln's earl) cxpcnmcnts with languagcj
Lincoln often affirmed his interest in language. Id ("[Tlo it we owe eser, thing .hich distinguishes us from
savages."): see also F.B. CARPENTER. SiX MONTHS AT THE WHITE HOtS: % mt LICOLN% 24-29 (John C
Freeman ed., Century House 1961) (1866) (recounting Lincoln's eloquent moments)
330. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address (Mar 4. 1861). in SPEECHES AD WRmGS. supra
note 317, at 224 (italics added).
331. ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 76. at 17
332. See WICKER, supra note 58. at 302-03 (indicating that police, not prisoners. shot hostages)
333. See GOOD, supra note 4. at 6 (quoting 19-year-old Anthony Patterson)
334. Cunningham, supra note 188. at 1342 (quoting CUFFORD GEERTZ. Thick Description. in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3. 19 (1973)).
335. For an example. see WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 138 (discussing Dred Scott and how the
Constitution's silence on slavery could have been presented differently)
336. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE THE LIFE or KING HE.NRY THE VIll act 2. sc 3
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The "golden sorrow" is an example of a oxymoron, a favorite of literature,
transforming the expected meanings of both "golden" and "sorrow." Perelman,
the rhetorician, proposes that we can transform meaning and "dissociate
notions" by recognizing the many meanings of words as we use them.337 As
an example, he quotes Schiller's couplet, which distinguishes between apparent
and true religion:
What religion do I profess? None of all those That you mention.
-and why none? -For religion's sake!
338
In law, we can also use this technique fruitfully. Fish notes the persuasive
power emanating from Catharine MacKinnon's use of oxymoronic phrases in
her essays on pornography and rape:
What she does is employ a vocabulary that departs from ordinary (or
as she might say "ideologically frozen") usage in ways that cannot be
ignored. Often she will drop in a provocative phrase without
announcing or even appearing to notice its provocativeness; and then
she will surround the "oddness" of the phrase with neighboring
oddnesses until at a certain point (presumably a different point for
different readers) what was once odd is suddenly ordinary. One such
phrase is "rape in ordinary circumstances." . . . If rape is reconceived
as a constitutive ingredient of everyday heterosexual intercourse,
including intercourse in marriage, an entire legal structure (and much
else) will have to be dismantled and replaced by another.339
One can think of examples for our Cairo litigation, referring to the stranglehold
whites had on Cairo's blacks, and to the entire community's future as
"plantation democracy."
Prisoner advocates sometimes use the phrase "free world" to refer to,
among other things, medical care that would be available in the outside
community. The phrase's Cold War meanings are hard to duck. One might
refer to the prosecutions that followed the Attica takeover and retakeover as
"free world justice," or juxtapose the guards' need to maintain order and their
frustration at losing control of their prison with the inexcusable violence that
followed the takeover, linking them with a phrase such as "routine brutality."
Another possibility, "lawful brutality," is suggested by Wicker's revealingly
redundant reference to "the corrections officers, public employees of the state
337. PERELMAN & OLBREcHTs-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 442.
338. Id. at 442-43.
339. FISH, supra note 7, at 17-18 (analyzing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983) and Catharine A. MacKinnon.
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982)); see also
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 3-12, 171-83 (1989) (revised
versions of foregoing essays).
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of New York, agents of law enforcement" who beat inmates in the
gauntlet."'
I. The Free Word
Deconstructionists have observed that we often say much more than we
mean; that is, that our words carry unintended meanings. Derrida called this
"the 'free play' of text."'" Examples include puns as well as phrases in
statutes or constitutions that have, for the reader, a meaning unimagined by the
drafter.32 White thinks it possible to harness the power of these unintended
meanings. 34 3 A more expert view simply recognizes the explosive power of
the unpremeditated word. Clarence Darrow wrote:
The courts may be unavailing, lawyers stupid, and both as dry as dust.
but the combination makes for something interesting and exciting, and
it opens avenues that seem to lead somewhere. Liberty, lives, fortunes
often are at stake, and appeals for assistance and mercy rend the air
for those who care to hear. In an effort to help, often a casual remark
may determine a seemingly vital situation, when perhaps the remark,
of all the palaver, was the least important one breathed forth. In all
questions, men are frequently influenced by some statement which,
spoken at the eventful time, determines fate.4
This phenomenon seems to operate in the pleadings of prisoner cases. One
law clerk says of pro se prisoner pleadings that
[i]t may not be the merit that the plaintiff intended when he or she
filed the law suit. We might see something in it that they did not see.
The Sears catalogue-he may just want the catalogue, and he may
want to win, and that's all. But we might go back to a different
viewpoint, you know, First Amendment or due process or
whatever.4
5
The phenomenon also operates when lawyers draft their pleadings. One famous
example is lawyer George Dean's request for a temporary restraining order
enjoining implementation of a new "team" approach to staffing in a mental
hospital, in order to protect the jobs of hospital staff:
340. WICKER, supra note 58. at 289-90.
341. J.M. Balkin, Deconstnrctive Practice and Legal Trnr-, 96 YAU Li 743. 777 (1987) (quoting
JACQUES DERRIDA. WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 292 (1978)) In his article. Balkin exphcates Dcmda's sork
and explores its applications in the law,
342. Id. at 777-78.
343- WHITE, IMAGINATION. supra note 6. at 249 Goffman calls this task the "maintenance of
expressive control" over the incidental meaning. GOFFMA'N. supra note 12. at 51
344. DARROW. supra note 14. at 321-22.
345. THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION. supra note 34. at 149 (quoting federal lay clerk 1 1986))
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"Judge Johnson listened to George give his impassioned plea
about the livelihood of these people and their families....
He looked at George and said, 'I don't mean in anyway to
minimize the impact that this new team approach is going to have on
the professionals ... but there is something that really does concern
me even more so, and that will be the effect of these dismissals on
the rights and the mental well-being of the patients of the hospital.'
All of a sudden, George-one of the smartest, most astute lawyers
around-saw which way the wind was blowing and said, 'That's my
real concern, too, Judge.'
' '3 6
George Dean was not only smart, he was lucky that he was present to notice
the different spin the judge was giving to this case so that he could deal with
that spin.
347
In this post-civil rights revolution era, and in a language as concept-bound
as law, any unintended meanings of phrases such as "cruel and unusual" or
"discrimination" reverberate against the interests of civil rights plaintiffs and
their lawyers. For example, phrases that, for civil rights lawyers, sound in
images of emancipation or the rationalization of injustice carry different
meanings to the audience-meanings connected to disfavored judicial activism
and unpopular people. To others, judges among them, these concepts will be
silenced quickly if expressed through a dull clich6 that permits the court to file
the case into its ordinary categories-diversity, torts on federal lands, civil
rights-rather than capturing the imagination and triggering outrage.
If free play is to help the civil rights plaintiff, it will happen with more
concrete words, words that may "crystallize or condense""8 the author's
message, words that will, as Derrida imagined, be liberated more easily from
the author's intentions and take on varied meanings in different settings while
remaining syntactically the same.349 Graffiti has this quality; its words are
abandoned by their authors and conjure up different images for each passerby.
We cannot predict how the meaning of the words "swimming pool" in the
Cairo lawsuit 350 will resonate with a judge's memory of childhood. We
cannot control what else a judge, also a citizen and perhaps a parent, will see
when asked to imagine two mentally retarded children wrestling over the only
346. JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND
THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 281 (1993) (quoting Howard Mandell, law clerk to Judge
Johnson). This case became the famous Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). the first
decision declaring a constitutional right to treatment for involuntarily committed individuals. The plaintiffs
in Willowbrook tried to follow Wyart.
347. Judge Johnson, not unlike many judges, did not easily reveal his feelings on most matters, see
BASS, supra note 346, at 239, and like many judges, rarely heard oral arguments from lawyers, preferring
to "hear" their arguments in writing. ROBERT FRANCIS KENNEDY, JR., JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.: A
BIOGRAPHY 70 (1978).
348. Balkin. supra note 341, at 777 (discussing discovery of unintended connections between words).
349. Id. at 780.
350. GooD, supra note 4, at 12.
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toy available, a scrap of paper. 5 ' No one can know how the judge's own
exposure to death or war will interact with the numbered toe tags affixed to
the dead inmates of Attica, or to the intriguing "No Man's Land" separating
the prison under state control from that portion held by the inmates.' "
Because the judge, like the lawyer, belongs to several interpretive
communities, she will interpret the pleading as more than just a lawyer; she
will read it as a judge, a citizen, perhaps also as a parent, a taxpayer, a
veteran, a churchgoer. The free play of a pleading's "graffiti" might help
integrate those communities within the judge, in and for the moment that she
reads it.
35 3
J. The Lawyer's Own Voice
White's ambition for the lawyer is that she write in a way that integrates
the segmented parts of the world and of ourselves. While a purely personal
voice in our writing would be "as empty" as the purely professional, he asks
hopefully, "Can we find ways to talk that will reflect more fully what we
actually know to be true of ourselves and our minds, of our languages and our
cultures? '354 This may run afoul of the admonition that, before the jury, the
lawyer is not to argue her personal convictions concerning the case's merits
or the truth of a particular witness' testimony?" Yet that admonition, by its
terms, does not preclude such statements in a pleading. Is it good for us to find
in our pleadings a place for the expression of our own voice? If a lawyer is
well regarded, her voice can be persuasive, as both Aristotle' and the
Supreme Court357 acknowledge. Certainly, it is inevitable. An identity
between speaker and speech is implied, and even if not implied, inferred.
Counterarguments will be mustered to oppose the argument based on the
identity of the speaker.358 Judges look at arguments differently, depending
on whether they are made by a major law firm, a legal services office, a
favored federal agency such as the Justice Department, or a disfavored one
351. RIVERA, supra note 87, at 17 (stating that \Nillowbrook had not one toy) Altcrnatt'cly. the judge
might think of the lawyers in the case fighting over the scrap of paper entitled "Complaint" and think of
what that paper means to the two sets of combatants
352. WICKER, supra note 58. at 24. 302-03.
353. See WHrrE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 12 (discussirg "double segregation of the culture and mind"
in professional discourse, which stems from boundary between professional speech and other forms of
communication).
354. Id.
355. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106,c)(4) (1980)
356. ARISTOTLE, R"HEORIC, reprinted in THE RHETORIC AND POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 25 (W Rhys
Roberts trans., Random House 1954).
357. Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
358. See PERE.MAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA. supra note 228. at 318 (discussing ad hornem attacks)
I can say from personal experience that opposing counsel often have dismissed my case before a judge in
pretrial conference by calling it "another Lawyers' Committee case." making a reference to the Layycr','
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which founded the office in Cairo where I norked
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such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Since the
identification is inevitable, then let it be an advantage. So we must ask, who
are we that our speech becomes a representative of ourselves? Are we hired
guns, indifferent to the cause we represent, and technicians in gray flannel
suits? Or are we passionate advocates for persons oppressed, values denied,
justice delayed?
Speaking in our personal voices can be persuasive for precisely the reasons
the historian and journalist are more persuasive, with speech that is invitational
and not coercive. Such speech invites the judge to experience the tragedies as
the authors have. It involves the judge in a conversation about that tragedy.
I think of Wicker describing how the town still feared the prisoners
because they assumed, as did Wicker, that the prisoners killed the
hostages. 359 Did the inmates' lawyer, William Kunstler, think that as well?
If so, how might he have improved the power of his argument if he had
admitted that he himself had believed it and then found it to be untrue? Might
it have disarmed the judge's prejudices about the prisoners and about Kunstler?
Similarly, would a recitation of the sickened reaction of the plaintiff's counsel,
similar to the reporter' S,36 to his first view of an institution for the mentally
retarded 361 help take the judge there? Wicker invites us to share his response
to Attica from inattention 362 to curiosity,363 through the fear364 and finally
to concern for the fate of the prisoners about to die.365 Might a similar
invitation in the lawyer's complaint have been as effective?
Would mention of the bullet hole in the Cairo Lawyers' Committee
photocopy machine366 or of Thurgood Marshall's experience of using
segregated washrooms and restaurants while he was representing clients before
the courts of the United States367 trigger some impulse in the judge to see the
bridges and canyons between members of the same profession and citizens of
the same country in a different light?368 Could I have told the judge that, for
359. WICKER, supra note 58, at 303, 308-09.
360. Id. at 294.
361. ROTHMAN, supra note 143, at 57.
362. WICKER, supra note 58, at 4.
363. Id. at 6.
364. Id. at 36.
365. Id. at 56.
366. GOOD, supra note 4. at 21.
367. KLUGER, supra note 106, at 324.
368. Marshall clearly could identify with his client. He was himself the victim of discrimination by
the University of Maryland Law School, which would not admit him because of his race. ROGER GOLDMAN
& DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 25 (1992). Yet, he kept his role as lawyer
separate, kept himself behind his prose, kept his "[r]ights wrapped in cellophane." JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 134 (1994).
That ability to absorb such psychological punishment kept Thurgood Marshall in one
piece. "I ride in the for-colored-only cabs and in the back of the street-cars--quiet as a mouse."
he told interviewers. "I eat in Negro cafes and don't use white washrooms. I don't challenge
the customs personally because I figure I'm down South representing a client-the
NAACP-and not myself."
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the plaintiffs' lawyers, the most important thing in the Cairo case was that
ninety-year-old Hattie Kendrick vote before she died?
We need not replace legal argument with such personal appeals, nor with
any of the techniques and voices discussed in this Section. These techniques
and voices can simply begin the legal argument, move it forward and. if not
end it, linger in the mind of the judge as the decision is made.
K. Jazz
The discussion under this heading does not suggest that civil rights lawyers
play their complaints rather than write them. 369 Instead, I borrow a particular
meaning of the term "jazz" from Cornel West:
I use the term "jazz" here not so much as a term for a musical art
form, as for a mode of being in the world, an improvisational mode
of protean, fluid, and flexible dispositions toward reality suspicious of
"either/or" viewpoints, dogmatic pronouncements, or supremacist
ideologies. To be a jazz freedom fighter is to attempt to galvanize and
energize world-weary people into forms of organization with
accountable leadership that promote critical exchange and broad
310reflection.
37
To be a jazz civil rights lawyer, then, is to open oneself to new paradigms for
civil rights problems and new strategies to address, if not resolve, them-to
lead the law, not follow it.
37'
Those paradigms may come from committed intellectuals such as West and
Derrick Bell. They may come from clients, and appropriately so, since the
mobilization of the client community is among the civil rights lawyer's
KLUGER, supra note 106. at 324-25. Through the cellophane. wc can see him drafting his picading to
appeal as much as possible to the "them." the white court, perhaps leaving some of the "'u%" behind
369. Still, as art historian Walter Pater wrote. "In music is to be found the true type or measure
of perfected art." WALTER PATER. THE RENAISSANCE 114 (Random House 1919) (1873) Trac> Chapman's
song about homelessness. Fast Car, certainly tells us much about that lifc and moscs us to undcrstand
more:
You got a fast car
I want a ticket to anywhere
Maybe we make a deal
Maybe together we can get somewhere
Anyplace is better
Starting from zero got nothing to lose
Maybe we'll make something
But me myself I got nothing to prove.
TRACY CHAPMAN, Fast Car, on TRACY CHAPMAN (Elektra/Asylum Records 19881
370. CORNEL WEs-r, RACE MATTERS 105 (1993)
371. In another article, I argue that the courts have followed, not led. reform in mental patrns' rights
Eastman, supra note 105, at 360. In a similar vetn. Alan Freeman points out the conscr'atle effect of the
Supreme Court's refusal to shift from a "perpetrator perspective,'" which focuses on abstract norms, to a
"victim perspective," which focuses on social reality. Alan Freeman. Antid scrinunatin Lit, 77te Vien.
from 1989. in POLMCS OF LAW. supra note 30. at 121. 123-26
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objectives. These paradigms differ from the metaphors discussed earlier since
they are intended less to communicate the problem to others than to understand
the problem anew in the first instance. They are yet another way for the lawyer
to incorporate her voice and her client's voice into the case.
Our strategic thinking needs the retooling that new paradigms can
spur.372 In this age of blaming the victim, new paradigms that refocus on the
causes of homelessness 373 or humanize the frightening underclass374 can
lead to strategies that might actually work. But we may finally reject these
retooled strategies as too futile, dangerous, or ultimately counterproductive in
this more conservative era.375 The paradigms antecedent to these strategies
may not even be amenable to litigation.376 Yet other paradigms, such as
Cornel West's politics of conversion, designed to combat nihilism in the
African-American community,377  may help reshape the lawyer-client
relationship in a direction that empowers clients. 378 His call to move beyond
372. Derrick Bell has long argued that civil rights organizations' attachment to racial balance has
harmed African-American schoolchildren and undercut the original goals of improving their education. Bell,
Serving Two Masters, supra note 147, at 487-88. While the successful legal strategy underlying Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a work of originality and genius, its integrationist paradigm
dates back at least as far as 1849, when Charles Sumner made a not dissimilar, though unsuccessful,
argument in Roberts v. City of Boston. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849). See KLUGER, supra note 106, at
75-76. Similarly, basing an argument for mental patients' rights on an analogy to prisoners' rights may
leave us with no meaningful right to treatment, but only with the convict's right to safety.
373. KOZOL, supra note 106, at 11-14.
374. Id. at 20.
375. For example, consider the controversy over Lani Guinier's ideas for furthering the political power
of minorities through the Voting Rights Act. For an exposition of her ideas, see Lani Guinier, Voting Rights
and Democratic Theory: Where Do We Go from Here?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: TIlE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 283 (Bernard Grofman & Charles Davidson eds., 1992); Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1077 (199 1). For a critique of Guinier's ideas, see Abigail Thernstrom, Guinier Miss, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 14, 1993, at 16; Withdraw Guinier, NEW REPUBLIC, June 14, 1993, at 7; cf Lani Guinier,
What I Would Have Told the Senate, WASH. POST, June 13, 1993, at C7 (responding to critics).
A second example: For a time mental health advocates urged a paradigm of anti-institutionalization
and a community imperative instead of the more traditional deinstitutionalization remedies, arguing that the
institution itself was the unconstitutional evil-almost independent of its particular conditions. David
Ferleger & Penelope A. Boyd, Anti-institutionalization and the Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 717, 721-23 (1979). It is telling that plaintiffs sued the institution itself, and not just its
administrators. This strategy worked only for a while in the famous Pennhurst litigation, Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The trial court was convinced, see Ferleger & Boyd, supra,
at 733-49, but its remedies were later cut back as the litigation survived into a more conservative era.
376. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OP RAcISM
47-49 (1992) (illustrating depth of society's racial animus by creating imaginary legislative act).
377. WEST, supra note 370, at 18.
378. Ruth Buchanan and Louise Trubek describe how collaboration with a client can lead to a new
conception of a client's problem and a strategy that entails both gains and losses. Ruth Buchanan & Louise
Trubek, Resistance and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Practice: Seven Weeks in the
Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 687, 700 (1992), This is not all
that new. As long ago as 1827, free African-Americans in the abolitionist press insisted:
We wish to plead our own cause. Too long have others spoken for us. Too long has the public
been deceived by misrepresentations in things which concern us dearly .... The civil rights
of a people being of the greatest value, it shall ever be our duty to vindicate our brethren, when
oppressed; to lay our case before the public.
FREEDOM'S J., Mar. 18, 1827, at I, reprinted in ROBERT C. DICK, BLACK PROTEST: ISSUES AND TACTICS
3 (1974).
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traditional liberal/conservative arguments and racial reasoning'"' may yield
even more potent arguments to overcome conservative resistance to civil rights
demands.
In any case, the exploration of new paradigms for civil rights can onl)
enrich our strategic thinking. Perhaps we yet can dare to hope for the
transforming effect worked by Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address, leading his
audience and its descendants to read a commitment to equality into the
Constitution, where it had not previously been discovered."'
III. RHETORIC IF NOT TRANSLATION: A NEW CAIRO COMPLAIN'I
Law alone is not enough.""
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
In this Part, I demonstrate the method of thicker pleading through a more
literary revision of the amended complaint we actually filed in the Cairo case.
The revised complaint is shorter than the more traditional complaint, which Is
appended to this Article. Certainly, one could write a more concise statement
of the claim than is presented in either complaint.
There are three possible ways to introduce thicker pleadings. One is imnplN
to attach to a traditional pleading a competing description from the historian
or journalist. This method preserves the integrity and apparent authority of the
competing description. By "apparent authority." I mean that if the audience
were inclined to credit a nonlegal account, that would be possible with this
option. On the other hand, it maintains the distance between legal and nonlegal
language and may strip the nonlegal description of its authority.
Another option is to incorporate and quote directly from the competing
description by a journalist or historian. For instance, a pleading might recite
a fact, then follow that recitation with something along the lines of "According
to historian David Rothman. ... This option may enhance the authority ol
the nonlegal description, and should maintain its integrity. But %% ith either ol
these two techniques, the two languages still remain apart.
The third option attempts the fullest integration, b% % riting the pleading"
as a journalist or historian would, even borrowing at times from the st) le of
a novelist. Using this method, the lawyer intert\m ines legal and nonlegal
language. This is the option I have selected, although Im) artistry remains
suspect and invites further critique. By integrating the nonlegal language in a
379. WEST, supra note 370. at 12.
380. Cf. WILLS, supra note 225. at 38 (describing transformation sorked b) Lincolnt
381. A common slogan when the committee operated an office in Cairo
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legal pleading, it calls upon the persuasive authority of both. It tests the
insights of this Article to the fullest.
In this literary pleading, I try to employ the techniques suggested in the
Article. By pleading in the language of journalists and clients-and by quoting
clients and others in the pleading-the complaint attempts to make the most
powerful use of ambiguity. While the pleading begins and ends with language
more recognizable and acceptable to a traditional audience-and retains the
customary numbered paragraphs-the client stories dominate the pleading. In
particular, Hattie's story is kept central, to draw upon the compelling
attractiveness of her story. The story is allowed to develop, inviting and not
coercing. At one point, the complaint mentions that the meaning of a fact-the
employment of blacks as precinct committeemen-will be understood later.
The pleading offers the language of voices rather than of concepts.
Sometimes these voices jar against the rest of the pleading; for example,
Hattie's reference to "Negroes"--not unexpected from a person of her age-is
incongruous with the term "African-Americans" in the complaint. All the
required legal concepts are present, but they are secondary to the voices. The
logic of the concepts flows from the voices. Consistent with Shelby Foote's
advice, the defendants and their associates are quoted without any explicit
characterizations.
382
As argued in this Article, the feudal metaphor and the juxtaposition of
"plantation" with "democracy" argue for the court's intervention. The pleading
makes some effort at poetic meter and tension (e.g., "in denying a future to
one race in order to control the future of the other"). The irony of the
defendants' claims of inadequate leadership in the black community should be
apparent in a lawsuit brought by people like Hattie Kendrick and Preston
Ewing. Hattie herself ironically asks why segregation prevails in Illinois, a
Northern state and the land of Lincoln, the Great Emancipator.
The lawyer's voice is included, as well. Although I have not done it here,
one might make the lawyer's voice appear less foreign in a class action
pleading by slipping it into a discussion of the adequacy of representation, i.e.,
stating that the lawyers will vigorously prosecute the case because of their
commitments.
In the hopes of practicing as a jazz civil rights lawyer and trying on a
different paradigm for racial discrimination, the pleading tries to speak in terms
of an entire community harmed by racism, rather than of a black people
oppressed by a white people. In this sense, I emulate Hattie, who referred to
white people as "brother" even as she talked about subjugation. To further
explore this paradigm, the complaint refers to European-Americans and
African-Americans. This may help us to think in terms of a common
382. Foote, supra note 43, at 222-23 ("[l]t might be well ... to warn against 'character' sketches and
the use of brief invective to characterize a man.").
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immigrant history and also remind us of the diversity of persons with roots in
those continents. Borrowing Cornel West's suggestion that we step beyond the
structural-cultural debate of liberals and conservativesi ' the complaint is
forthright about the vote-buying yet places it in a context. The pleading hopes
for the power of free play in the concrete words "swimming pool."
This graffitilike effect may work through photographs as well. Perhaps the
most unconventional aspect of the pleading is the use of photographs. In this
complaint, the photographs are part of an effort to include the client's voice,
since Preston is a photographer and uses photography to express his view of
the world. They are placed in the pleading at his suggestion. But in any case,
photographs can express aspects of a problem beyond the power of words.
Sometimes the full significance of the photographs is not explained but left to
the audience's perceptive powers, as in the words "racial integrity" on the
white citizens' council sign.
As technology develops-from faxed pleadings, computer artistry, and
desktop publishing-more innovations may be possible. Aside from "scratch
and sniff' patches on a pleading, I know of no way to capture, as the
television reporter wished to, the smells of Willowbrook." My own
imagination is more limited. I assume the continued power of the printed word.
In some respects, this pleading closely resembles traditional ones, as in the
style of its beginning and ending and the numbering of paragraphs. Yet a
further step away from traditional pleading would involve a more novelistic
approach: "When Hattie Kendrick arrived from New Orleans, she stepped
down from the train and squinted in the hot Cairo sun toward the train station
restrooms. Whites Only, read the handpainted rectangle weaving lazily in the
breeze above the door. She wondered if she had indeed caught a northbound
train." I think this approach strains the audience's tolerance for the new and
focuses more attention on the style than on the content of the story. Besides,
I'm not sure anything like that happened, and I agree with Shelby Foote that
nothing good comes from distorting facts.'"5 The appropriate question is,
always, what facts are important, and why.
This complaint may not "crash through" the prejudices of a hostile
audience with the power and skill of Abraham Lincoln. But it sure beats notice
pleading.
386
383. WEsT, supra note 370. at 12.
384. The Last Disgrace, supra note 88.
385. Foote, supra note 43, at 225.
386. This pleading drops some of the class representatives ssho'.e stones arc not so swell knosn to me
It pleads the case of Hattie Kendrick. who has since died. and of Preston Ews-ing. Jr Hattie's quotations are
from her testimony before the Illinois Advisory Council to the United States Cisal Rights Commission.
which held hearings in Cairo in the late 1960's. GOOD. supra note 4. In our conversations. Preston often
repeated the words I have quoted. He consents to the use of his photographs and of his father's story The
other photographs are by unknown photographers. Quotations from defendants and persons identified sstth
them are taken either from Paul Good's book or from Lost in the Past. an article published by the Chicago
Tribune magazine. Brian Kelly. Lost in the Past. CHICAGO TRIB. July 21. 1985. § 10 (Magazine,. at II
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HATTIE KENDRICK, PRESTON
EWING, JR., individually and
on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
-vs- ) CIVIL ACTION
NO. 73-19C
ALLEN MOSS, individually and
as Mayor of the City of Cairo,
Illinois; the CAIRO CITY
COUNCIL; and the CITY OF 3 EQUITABLE




1. This is a class action brought before this Court by Hattie
Kendrick and Preston Ewing, Jr. for the benefit of a class of all
African-American citizens who are residents of Cairo, Illinois,
and who are or will be entitled to vote in Cairo City Council
elections. This action challenges, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
at-large election basis for conducting City Council elections in
Cairo as a violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973.
2. Hattie Kendrick is an African-American, born in
Mississippi, who moved to Cairo in the early 1920's. She has
taught for decades in the racially segregated Cairo public
schools, teaching generations of African-American children that
participation in American democracy is their right and their
duty. To set an example, she has worked throughout her life to
better her community through neighborhood organization, peaceful
demonstration, political activity, and litigation. She has paid a
price for her dedication: She has been forced out of segregated
business establishments, arrested by the police during peaceful
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marches, and fired by the school system. W'hile many African-
American leaders have advocated racial separatism. Ms. Kendrick
has remained a fervent believer in peaceful integration with
European-Americans living in Cairo.
3. Preston Ewing Jr., a former student of Ms. Kendrick, is
an African-American whose family has lived in Cairo for
generations. Mr. Ewing's father worked to make his family
economically secure through great personal sacrifice. W'hen he
worked as a postal deliverer, his supervisors forbade him from
using the post office men's room. Mr. Ewing, Sr. therefore
suffered the humiliation of asking people on his route to allow
him to use their bathrooms, keeping this secret from his wife and
children for years to spare them the embarrassment. Mr. Ewing.
Jr. has followed his father's example and dedicated his career to
his community, organizing the local NAACP chapter and advocating
for the educational needs of all children, both African-American
and European-American. W.hen he heard of racial conflict breaking
out in his hometown, he immediately left school in California and
returned to Cairo to see what he could do to solve the town's
problems. Most of the photographs appearing in this complaint
were taken by Mr. Ewing, Jr.
4. Hattie Kendrick, Preston Ewing, and the class they
represent challenge the at-large form of voting for City Council
because it denies them the right to vote. It does so through this
formula: An at-large voting scheme for city council; racial!y
polarized voting so extreme that European-American vcters never
vote for African-American candidates; a sixty-percent ma~or:ty
for European-American voters in the electorate: and a political
system that excludes African-American citizens from
participating. These factors together dilute the African-American
vote to nothingness.
5. WThen she moved to Cairo from M:ssissippi. Ms. Kendrck
found that Cairo government operates as a plantation democracy,
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nominally extending the vote to all citizens of age. yet
enforcing an antidemocratic feudal system that keeps African-
Americans, forty percent of the city population, in a state of
poverty, dependence, and despair. It has been so for generations,
E_ The median income for African-American families in Cairo
is less txan half that of European-,American families and
uaemployment is much higher for African-Americans. As Preston
Pwing says, "There is a job in Cairo for everyone who wants to
work. But take a walk through the parking lots of the major
employers, You'll see they are alled with license platee from
Missouri and Kentucky. Cairo businesses would rather hire whites
from across the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers than hire blacks who
live here in the same town,, Unions exclude African-Americans
from membershp. Predictably, this forces African-Americans onto
welfare ro ls. The welfare office has conspired with the local
cotton growers so that while they are on welfare, African-
Americans are forced to choose between picking cotton at
substandard wages or forteiting their welfare payments.
A
.,V,
African-Americans picking cotton near Cairo
7, Atrican-American leaders in Cairo believe education is the
straightest road to equality. Ms. Kendrick recalls that, "As far
back as 183 the Negro in Cairo tried to break up segregated
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schools, only to find the doors locked in their faces. Why has
this been? How did this happen in Illinois. the -and of Lincoln "
Yet despite the repeated demands of Hattie Kendrick and others
for equal and integrated schooling, schools were segregated until
the late 1960's. 'When the federal government forced the
inevitable desegregation upon the schools. European-Americans
withdrew their children from the public schools and formed the
private and racially pure Camelot Academy.
8. In virtually every aspect of life in Cairo. African-
Americans have been told they have no place but down. Public
housing is segregated. Until recently, only European-Amer:cans
were permitted to use the public library. certa:n public pazks,
the National Guard Armory and other public facilities.
9. In the mid-1960°s, the Rotary Club closed the town's only
swimming pool rather than integrate. Now all children of toth
races, out of school during Cairo's near-tropical summers. risk
drowning in the treacherous currents of the Mississippi River
Restaurants, hotels, movie theaters-all were segregated until
African-Americans demanded an equal seat at the counter, roorn a:
the inn, ticket for a movie. Some desegregated, some closed. s,7e
remain racially separate.
10. The City Council and Mayor iointly execute. under
Illinois law, all legislative, administrative. and execu.. e
powers, controlling city finances. streets and publ:c properly.
and public health and safety.
11. Although nominally nonpartisan. c-ty e,-c .:.
dominated by the Democratic and Republican pdries T.ese partes
have historically excluded African-Americans. The Ptphblicdn
Party did not open its membership until the !96C's. Wh*'e the
Democratic Party permitted African-American members in the
1940's, no African-American-in either party-has e-'er :-.id '
leadership position. The only role the wc parties ha'.%- per:'it~e
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to African-Americans has been that of precinct-committeeman,
which, as we shall see later, has served only to solidify the
racial monopoly on political power.
12. Successive city administrations have yet to appoint an
African-American to almost all city boards. A few other public
agencies have appointed only a few African-Americans who have
been willing to submit to direction by the European-American
majorities or those boards. One notable exception is the Reverend
John Cobb, a leader of the African-American community, who was
appointed to the police board, but was never told when or where
meetings were to be held.
13. In recent citywide elections, African-American candidates
have confronted newspaper advertisements urging the European-
American majority to 'vote for the white candidates, and to "save
Cairo," Not surprisingly, the African-American candidates have
lost. Mayor Moss and his City Council were elected as a slate
openly organized and campaigned for by the United Citizens for
Community Action (UCCA), a white supremacist group.
- N.
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14, As Ms. Kendrick has said, 'many times has the Negro tried
to emerge from his position of servitude, only to be pushed back
into submission by his white brother., Believing that they have a
right to participate in their own community, and pushed out of
the democratic process, Cairo's African-American citizens have
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15. Police and vigilantes have beaten the demonstrators.
Pictured below is the current mayor of Cairo swinging a movie
camera at a picketer and a member of the City Council armed with
a rifle and eyeing a march.
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16, Vigilantes-known as White Hats because of their white
helmets-have launched sniper attacks against African-American
eighborhoods. They have used clubs and chains to beat young
African-Americans who wanted to skate in the Cairo roller rink in
1964. Among those beaten was 16-year-old Charles Koen, another of
Ms. Kendrick's students who would later train for the Christian
ministry and lead the United Front, an organization coordinating
civil rights efforts in Cairo. He would become a lightning rod
for the resistance of European-Americans to change. They would
label him a criminal and anarchist.
Charles Hoen with Hattie Kendrick today
17. The Cairo police have done nothing to stop them. Not only
have the Cairo police failed to protect African-American
citizens, they have themselves laid siege to a Catholic Church in
which African-Americans worshipped. African-American community
leaders organized civil rights activities, shooting bullets into
the church until the Illinois State Police rescued the priests
and others inside the church. The City Council passed an
ordinance making it illegal to picket or for two or more
19951
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individuals to congregate. The Cairo Police Department organized
the White Hats, and deputized them to help control the city.
18. Little has changed in Cairo since Ms. Kendrick arrived
here in the 1920's. The at-large form of government was adopted
in the early years of this century as a response to a public
perception of widespread city corruption-connected by the
contemporary press to the "criminal Negro element" in the
community. Before the at-large system, African-Americans were
elected to the City Council. Since its adoption, none has been
elected. This at-large system has been maintained and used since
its inception with the intent of discriminating against African-
Americans in Cairo and denying them the vote.
19. Some African-Americans have despaired of change. Yet
another of Ms. Kendrick's students, Anthony Patterson-and a
member of this'plaintiff class-was eight years old when the
Rotary Club filled in the swimming pool. He survived the river
and, now a man, he says, "This town is so far behind and
backwards, it's really a shame. You don't think about staying and
looking for a job. You can't even work as a bagboy in a
supermarket. You just think about going away all the time."
Change has seemed impossible.
20. With no chance to cast a vote for an electable candidate
of their choice, some African-American voters have resorted to
selling their votes on election day to whichever of the
candidates standing some chance of victory-all European-
American-pays the most. Ms. Kendrick, who has seen this go on for
generations, election after election, says, "Sometimes he sells
himself so often he forgets for whom he is going to vote and he
ends up with this pitiful statement, although it is true, 'This
little money is all I'm going to get anyway.'" The going rate is
three to five dollars per vote, collected by the precinct
committee chairmen. In the plantation democracy of Cairo, the
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fundamental American right, the right to vote, has been diluted
to almost nothing, reduced in value to a few dollars.
21. This state of affairs suits the European-American men in
power just fine. When asked if African-Americans in Cairo have
any legitimate complaints, Tom Nadra, the leader of the White
Hats, has replied that "blacks from other states did gravitate
here into Illinois because of the welfare programs . .. . They
came here for the largesse." Presumably, the largesse he speaks
of includes the privilege of picking cotton for slave wages to
protect their benefits. This leader insists that '[tjhey were
unemployed and unemployable. They live by preference in a
shanty." Pictured below is Riverlore, the home of William
Wolters, a businessman owning one of Cairo's major employers, and
next to that is a photograph of those shanties, which Mr, Wolters
described to a Chicago Tribune reporter as "those nigger shacks.,
22. Madra and the White Hats believe that [tlhere's no good
black leadership in this community, Public officials claim to
agree and maintain a purported willingness to welcome African-
American participation. But City Attorney John Holland has
defended the absence of African-Americans from city government
because "there are very few to choose from. There's nothing
better than having a good black man on your city council. But the
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black militants drive them out. We're thinking now of putting two
on the council."
23. Who are those two African-Americans they are thinking of?
Not Charles Koen, Hattie Kendrick, or Preston Ewing. They would
not meet the minimum qualification the city administration
expects of any African-American permitted into the inner sanctum
of city government. Holland defines that criterion: "I've told
Preston Ewing a dozen times I'm looking for a good colored leader
who can control his people. Everybody looks for a good black man
nowadays. You find one and you've got liquid gold.,
24. There are European-Americans in Cairo who see things
differently. Newspaper publisher Martin Brown has concluded that
the declining river-and farm economy along the river banks-left
those employers who remained in Cairo with the power to ration
jobs and to pit European-American and African-American workers
against each other. This permitted "white men of authority to run
the city as a limited fief, resisting change that might challenge
their entrenched position, reaping the fruits of stagnation."
Other businesses have left and new businesses have passed over
Cairo due to its shortage of skilled labor and decent housing and
its bounty of racial strife and suicidal leadership-a leadership
that refuses to cooperate with those prospective new industries
and returns federal funds to the government rather than dispense
them for the benefit of its African-American citizens. As
European-American Cairo lawyer, Robert Lansden, says, "There are
a lot of white people who would sooner see Cairo float down the
Mississippi than give a black man a break."
25. This suicidal leadership can only lead all of Cairo's
citizens to ultimate disaster. The African-American community has
struggled to save Cairo from the inevitable fate of all feudal
societies throughout history-extinction. Their struggle has
included marches to call attention to injustices, boycotts of
businesses that discriminate, development of alternative
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economies, applications for federal grants, and litigaron to
desegregate public housing, win appointments to city Loards and
stop mistreatment by local police and prosecutors. This began in
the mid-1940's when Ms. Kendrick and other African-American
teachers sued for equal pay, with Thurgood Marshall as their
lawyer.
26. But after decades of struggle, in the words ot
classmember Rosie O'Bryant, an 84-year-old welfare recipient who
had to mortgage her mule in order to survive. -1 don't see a bit
of difference now than I did way back in "51 or '52 in the civil
rights. It hasn't reached us. I reckon it's on its way. but it
ain't got here yet.'
27. This Court possesses the authority to bring civi rights
and the Constitution to Cairo. Congress has authorized actions
such as this one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and bestowed l'Jzisd:c' on
on this Court to hear them under 28 U.S.C. §§ 133: and 1343 Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure author:zes class
actions where, as here: (a) the class of thousands of African-
Americans of voting age in Cairo is so numerous that )oinder is
impracticable; (b) there are common questlons of law or fact in
their challenge to the lawfulness of a citywide electoral systen.
(c) the claims of the class representatives are typical of the
claims of the other class members; (d) Ms. Kendrick and Mr. Ewing
will adequately represent those class interests: and te) these
two plaintiffs seek injunctive relief with respect to the class
as a whole by a change in the electoral system that wil' benefit
the entire class.
28. In the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Congress has
further provided for litigation challenging at-large forms of
government that dilute the votes of racial minorities. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments make it unlawful for local
governments to deny equal protection of the laws or deny or
abridge the right to vote on account of race.
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29. The plaintiff class has suffered and continues to suffer
irreparable harm. Its members have no adequate remedy at law. As
Plaintiff Hattie Kendrick says, "Too long have the two races
stood grinning in each other's faces, while they carry the fires
of resentment and hate in their hearts, and with their hands hid
behind their backs they carry the unsheathed sword."
30. With one hand, Cairo's plantation democrats pay three
dollars for a vote and, in the other, they wield that unsheathed
sword against those who cannot be bought. Their fiefdom hurts
black and white alike, denying a future to one race-the European-
Americans-in order to control the future of the other race, just
as it drives the children of both races into the muddy eddies of
the Mississippi for a swim. The pretense of plantation democracy
is that it is a democracy. The truth is that it is a plantation.
Plaintiffs Hattie Kendrick and Preston Ewing come to this Court
to ask it to protect their right to vote and to replace Cairo's
plantation democracy with a real one.
31. Specifically, they ask the Court to declare that the at-
large city council system in Cairo violates the Constitution and
the Voting Rights Act and to enter an order dividing Cairo into
aldermanic wards so that neighborhoods where African-Americans
live have some chance of electing candidates of their choice.
32. Plaintiffs have retained lawyers from legal services and
civil rights organizations who, in turn, are expending scarce
resources in this litigation. These lawyers live in Cairo and are
committed to the representation of this cause. To the la%.ryers, it
is critical that the Court order relief that will, at the
earliest possible time, provide for a democratic election in
which Hattie Kendrick, who is over ninety years old and in poor
health, may cast an equal, undiluted vote for a candidate of her
choice.
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs ask that this Court:
(A) Declare that Cairo's at-large fcrm of goverr..... .
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendents tc the 7n:tvd Ytao
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act: and
(B) Enter a preliminary and permanent :n;wnct~on en-.ining
the operation of the at-large system and dividing the c.ty inic,
wards in a manner that does not again dilute the votes of the
plaintiff class; and
(C) Order a new City Council election: and
(D) Award plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's f!es and
expenses; and
(E) Grant such further equitable and additional relief is ;h
Court may deem equitable, just, and proper.
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IV. THE FRUITS OF CHANGE
A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer, because such a grocer
is not wholly a grocer.
387
While civil rights realities lose much in the translation to civil rights
pleadings, they also stand to gain. They gain the possibility of changing those
realities. They gain the possibility of changing civil rights law as well. The
demand by civil rights plaintiffs that the Constitution and laws apply to them
has remade those laws and those constitutional rights. The result was the rights
revolution. Patricia Williams describes the process beautifully:
[Bilacks believed in [rights] so much and so hard that we gave them
life where there was none before; we held onto them, put the hope of
them into our wombs, mothered them and not the notion of them. And
this was not the dry process of reification, from which life is drained
and reality fades as the cement of conceptual determinism hardens
round-but its opposite. This was the resurrection of life from ashes
four hundred years old. The making of something out of nothing took
immense alchemical fire-the fusion of a whole nation and the
kindling of several generations.
388
In the civil rights lawsuit, they find a place where their "unheard voices
can be heard."'3 89 Once these voices were heard, the Equal Protection Clause,
which had supported school segregation, began to outlaw it. And over time,
this renewed law became the basis for a court's holding that the segregation
of mentally retarded children is also unlawful. 390 And so on. And so on.
Yet civil rights plaintiffs hope for more immediate change. In the lawsuits
examined, would the outcomes have differed if the pleadings reflected less of
the law and more of the clients? Of course we can only speculate, but a review
of the cases is illuminating. The district court dismissed the initial complaint
in Kendrick, a decision later reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.39' Could the trial court have been brought to see the case differently?
The Willowbrook court declined to dismiss the complaint, but instead of
declaring a right to treatment sought by plaintiffs, it found a more limited right
to protection from harm.392 The court found a right akin to the right of
387. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 76.
388. WILLIAMS, supra note 291, at 163.
389. WHITE, JusTIcE, supra note 6, at 267.
390. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
391. Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975).
392. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
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prisoners, following a metaphor offered by the complaint. Could a metaphor
suggesting isolation and abandonment of people who are part of our society
have been more persuasive?393
Similarly, the trial court dismissed that portion of the Attica complaint
asking the court to enjoin the prosecutions against the inmates and to mandate
prosecutions against state actors." While explaining its reluctance to
interfere with the state's prosecutions, the Second Circuit stated, "'The serious
charge that the state's investigation is proceeding against inmates but not
against state officers, if shown to be accurate, might lead the Governor to
supplement or replace those presently in charge of the investigation or the state
legislature to act."'395 Could any judge who had read Wicker's account of the
or
governor's involvement in the brutal retaking of the prison have spoken
seriously of trusting this question to the governor?
Civil rights plaintiffs are not alone in yearning for change. Their lawyers
do so as well. 396 A thin, sterile complaint reflects the thin, sterile
professional who slices away her fully human role. Written differently, the
complaint can serve as a way of integrating the two parts of the lawyer-the
personal and the professional.39 7
The lawyers' motivation to change is not simply personal. It is also
professional, consistent with their mission to advocate. For Fish, unlike White,
the task is not translation of truths, but rather persuasion *'by the litigant
having at the time being the greater power of persuading the trier of fact
This is not cynical because rhetoric still offers a possibility of meaningful
discourse, however constrained:
393. Indeed, the court did not find the pnson metaphor persuasic. in pan bc.,aue ol the nominall
voluntary nature of the Villowbrook residents' confinement ROTItMAN. supra note 143. at 70 Throughout
the early days of the case, the judge womed about the propriety of judicial intersention and urged the
parties to negotiate, in the hope of avoiding the necessity of deciding Id at 71. 74
394. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller. 477 F2d 375. 382-83 t2d Cir 1973)
395. Id. at 382.
396. See Alfieri, supra note 147; Cunningham. supra note 188 A fess commentator% propose a new
form of "rebellious," or "collaborative." lawyering See Buchanan & Trubek. supra note 178, at 690-91.
Gerald Lopez, Reconceivng Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks n tie Life of it Rebellious Collaboration.
77 GEO. LJ. 1603 (1989). To humanize the legal problem and to empo.,er the client are not espc..:ally
radical ideas, at least from a political perspective See DO'ALA A SCIIo,. Tin. R it .i t(-t, I- PR - ,'FTTIOsLR
How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTIoN 21-69 (1983); see also DO \%I .X S(cto%. Eot CAI%;G "lE
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACIIING AD [L- NRI% I. "ill PROfVAtsIIONS
(1987).
397. See WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 12. White urges that %%e "v, nte that %% a, las people seeking
to be whole] ourselves." Id. at 20.
398. FISH, supra note 7, at 25. Fish thus adopts a less grandiose %ision of the la,%) er's function. and
also dismisses the equality of voices in the courtroom, sshich White 'alues. in fasor of differing possers
of persuasion. There is no cause for despair, however, because that is the %%as things are
ITihat is to make the mistake of thinking that by telling people that there is something that they
have never been able to do-leave the realm of practice for a realm more general and
abstract-you take something away from them; but of course you can't take asay a capacity
no one has ever had ....
ld. at 26-27.
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[I]f the highest truth for any man is what he believes it to be . . . , the
skill which produces belief and therefore establishes what, in a
particular time and particular place, is true, is the skill essential to the
building and maintaining of a civilized society. In the absence of a
revealed truth, rhetoric is that skill .. .
Can we translate? Can we persuade? Can we change?
Quite possibly, we cannot alter our pleading practices to report more truly
the realities of our clients simply by achieving a clearer understanding of what
we've been doing and then reflecting on how to change from a distance. We
practice as fully licensed members of a particular interpretive community."'0
An objective point for reflection cannot be located on our map. According to
Stanley Fish, the Critical Legal Studies movement makes this error, by
assuming that one can shake the interpretive dust of the past off one's sandals
and go to another town, see injustice there objectively, and change that town.
The Crits forget that if reality must be interpreted-as they would concede
about ideological givens-one cannot cease to interpret, one simply alters the
interpretation. °I
From Fish's response, one might read him to argue that we cannot change
the way we write since all meaning derives from interpretation and our vision
of our mission as lawyers cannot grow through the offer of new evidence or
arguments external to our community.0 2 Certainly, these arguments and this
evidence will not make it through to us from their yet-to-be-interpreted world
without our interpretation sticking to them. Yet change becomes probable, for
Fish, because the possibility of change already forms part of our interpretive
posture: "[N]either interpretive communities nor the minds of community
members are stable and fixed, but are, rather, moving projects-engines of
change-whose work is at the same time assimilative and self-
transforming. 40 3 For different reasons, James Boyd White also thinks change
likely. Legal speech cannot help but change since it contrasts one narrative of
reality with another and maintains a tension between them.4" Certainly, we
accelerate the change when we attempt to graft some of the language of other
competing voices from journalism or history.
So, in what direction do we change? Pause to consider the object of our
persuasion. As an unrepresentative sample, White cites several famous
opinions by illustrious judges-Supreme Court Justices far removed from the
facts at hand, not trial judges. He suggests that judges have also tired of the
399. Id. at 480.
400. See FISH, supra note 7, at 141; WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 99.
401. See FISH, supra note 7, at 157.
402. Indeed, Fish explicitly suggests this possibility. Id. at 152.
403. Id. at 152.
404. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 24.
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strictly "legal" argument. For example, in Rochin v. California,4 6 Felix
Frankfurter "plainly seeks to discourage arguments of some kinds, most
notably of the mechanically 'legal' variety, and to encourage others," ones
sounding in decency and fairness, invoking the "conscience of the
community. ''4°'
Nonetheless, we must move slowly. Our profession's commitment to
change means change within the parameters of the interpretive community, i.e.,
as lawyers."' Our membership in a particular interpretive community
restrains us from stepping too far from the boundaries of that community. We
should not, and cannot, see and write as journalists or historians. We cannot
be other than who we are-lawyers educated in a technique, an approach to
rules, and an insistence upon reasoned criteria for decision.
When words become part of a pleading filed by a lawyer, their meaning
changes. The gesture is no longer a history, but a legal argument. As one
cannot separate the dancer from the dance, one cannot separate the argument
from the history.4 9 How far should we step toward change? We must keep
in mind our audience, the judge. A poet-lawyer can be as useless as Goffman's
dreaming grocer.4 0 Aside from whatever allegiance we have to client truths
and to our own self-expression, our function and mission is to persuade.
Through our persuasive translation of Hattie Kendrick's reality into a cause of
action, lawyers can replace the swords of the two races in Cairo in their
sheaths.
Even when faced with thicker pleadings, some judges will feel confined
by the law, as Justice Harlan did in many of his opinions."' And even when
the law does not dictate a direction, the judge is still confined by legal
traditions. 12 Trial judges, although closer to the facts, are particularly
405. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
406. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 110.
407. See id. at Ill. White continues the litany of opinions Justice Story. who decided Pngg
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). required lawsycrs to "engage in the appearance of legal
argument ... but to expect to win or lose on the basis of unarticulatcd or barely articulated assumptions
of fact (or value)." See WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 122. In Olmstead v United States. 177 U S 438
(1928), Chief Justice Taft demonstrated that his method of persuading a reader was to "relly) more than
anything else upon the very power of characterization" of the issue in the case WiirT. JLSTIT'E. supra note
6, at 145. White notes that Taft's "opinion invites a conversation of countering characterizations. conclusory
in form, between which the judge will choose, or which he will resolve h% making characterizations of his
own." Id. at 148. Judging from his Olmstead dissent. Justice Brandei%. on the other hand. would hae found
persuasive the argument that we must look at history and values, rather than literal readings, in order to
decipher the meaning of constitutional passages. See id at 150 In his dissent in United States v White.
401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971). Justice Douglas writes of the majority opinion "The issue in this case is clouded
and concealed by the very discussion of it in legalistic terms " See WiiiTE JLSTICE. supra note 6. at 165
(quoting White, 401 U.S. at 756 (Douglas. J.. dissenting)). All of these judges seem open to persuasion by
a pleading that goes beyond the sterile recitation of fact and citation to law-supporting claims
408. See FISH, supra note 7, at 157.
409. See WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at xi-xii.
410. See GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 76.
411. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 167-75
412. Id. at 171.
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restrained in their judging. The reality we attempt to understand and
manipulate is not simply the client's, for the client wins or loses redress within
a legal system. Part of the pertinent reality for the judge-and therefore, for
the lawyer-is the law. And arguments sounding too unfamiliar might not be
credited at all.4 3 Arguments invoking legal traditions and values permit the
judge to decide in the direction in which she is persuaded.' 14 Because our
legal traditions admit to the possibility of change, the judge can see the law
and realities in a new light through language that translates the law and
translates the realities in ways that give the judge occasion to reinterpret and
to change both.4 5
Such an occasion is illustrated by Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 416 where
the majority found no constitutional violation and no cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the failure of a child protection agency to protect a child
named Joshua DeShaney from abuse. He wrote:
Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the
law, unmoved by "natural sympathy."... But, in this pretense, the
Court itself retreats to a sterile formalism which prevents it from
recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms
that should apply to those facts.
Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves,
the Court today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled
by existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by
this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents
may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one
chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a
"sympathetic" reading, one which comports with dictates of
fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled
from the province of judging.
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by
respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who
knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing,
except, as the Court revealingly observes, "dutifully recorded these
incidents in [their] files."
4 17
Of course, it was Justice Blackmun and it was a dissent.4 8 Yet, as Clarence
413. See FISH, supra note 7, at 460-61. Even the judge wanting to rule out of bias or passion must
find legal basis for a decision. Id. at 366.
414. Id. at 366; see also PERELMAN & OLBREcHTS-TYTECA, supra note 228, at 75.
415. See FISH, supra note 7, at 146-47; WHrrE, JuSTICE, supra note 6, at 81.
416. 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
417. Id. at 212-13 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
418. It is Justice Blackmun who, in a dissent in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), called upon the
other Justices to remember that "[t]here is another world 'out there-'-a world of poverty and injustice
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Darrow often observed, in these agonizing cases where courts can hide behind
law, there is always one judge or juror who will not.4"9
There may be more than one who will listen to things left out of the
complaints we reviewed-the social context of the problems facing our clients.
the identity of our clients and their stories, the wall of "us/them" separating
our clients from the court and from us. and our own voices-our own response
to the tragedies we witness.
Writing in this new way presents a host of risks for a multitude of players.
Not surprisingly, I think the risks are worth running.
A. Art
We might write badly. This would not be a real change since, at present,
our analytic writing misses important truths and our persuasive writing passes
up rhetorical opportunities. Still, we might see a lot of poorly written
pleadings. This is unavoidable, as any pro se clerk in a federal court or patron
of chain bookstores can testify. We should avoid the purple, muddy prose of
both the poor novelist and the bad pleader. Recalling the counsel of
rhetoricians that restraint in writing suggests balance and sincerity,"-2' we can
write with the clear and modern, less floral prose of Lincoln 2' or
Twain. 2
B. Integrity
We need to remember who we are-lawyers, not journalists or historians.
To abandon writing as lawyers would be to abandon law. We must speak to
each other, to other lawyers and to judges, in a vocabulary intelligible to our
profession. We must do this if we are to persuade other lawyers, including
those who wear robes. To the extent that we borrow the language of journalists
and historians, we should also heed their ethics. C. Vann Woodward writes
that the historian risks "betraying his calling" if he mixes fact with
imagination.423 One journalist contrasts the power of words "to confront us
with the vivid, the frightening or the unaccustomed," with their power "to
muffle any such alarms" and concludes that "[a] distinguishing feature of good
toward the poor. Id. at 463 (Blackmun. J. dissenting)
419. IRVING STONE. CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE 134. 306 (1970)
420. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA. supra note 228. at 466
421. Garry Wills says of Lincoln that "Itlhe spare quahI) of Lincoln's prose did not come naturally
but was worked at." WILLS. supra note 225. at 161 Wills further argue'. that "all modern political prose
descends from the Gettysburg Address." Id. at 148
422. No less an authority on modem, lean prose style than Ernest Hcmingsay 'aid (through one of
his characters) that modem American literature began with Twain's RIuckleberrn Finn ER'Lsr
HEMINGWAY. GREEN HILLS OF AFRICA 22 (1935)
423. C. VANN WOODWARD. TIE FtrrtRE OF TIHE PAST 236 (1989)
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reportage is that it combats the inevitable and planned retreat of language from
the real."'4 24 This is an appropriate mission for good lawyering as well.
C. Fidelity
We must avoid distorting our clients' stories. As translators for those
voices, we have a responsibility to translate as truly as we can. We must adopt
the ethics of the translator, to listen and translate with respect for the original
voice.4 -5 If language proves incapable of capturing the truth, if we cannot
translate reality accurately, we can nonetheless translate meaningfully. Our
language will be "judged by its coherence, by the kinds of fidelity it
establishes with the original, and by the ethical and cultural meaning it
performs as a gesture of its own."426
Our writing must negotiate a true course between discounting aspects of
the clients' stories that we find objectionable or foreign to our experience and
romanticizing the clients into people they are not. Jonathan Kozol's moving
and enlightening report of the lives of homeless families gives sound advice
for avoiding both problems. First, he advises that "if we listen to some of these
parents carefully we may be no less concerned by their impaired abilities, but
we may be less judgmental or, if we remain compelled to judge, we may
redirect our energies in more appropriate directions. ' 27 Kozol also observes:
"I have been cautioned by some of the shelter organizers in New York not to
romanticize these people. Have I observed this warning? Not enough perhaps.
It is very hard to strike a balance. '428 The result of the balancing for Kozol?
He "end[s] up with a crazy quilt of details that have stirred [him]. '429 It is
the details, not the romance, which should stir us. Not a bad place to end up,
even for a lawyer, or a judge.
D. Honesty
Creative writing tempts exaggeration, that is, lying to the court and to the
defendants. In the Cairo complaint, I resisted the temptation to create a
424. John Carey. From Eyewitness to History. ET CETERA, Spring 1989, at 35, 36. Et Cetera is a
journal of general semantics. I don't mean to suggest that the writing of journalists is free from bias or
agenda. I only suggest that contrasting their writing with our own, we can see more clearly the biases and
agendas inside ours.
425. WHITE. JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 258; see also Gilkerson, supra note 26, at 918-19 ("Preserving
and advancing the integrity of the client's story and voice requires providing the legal forum with a
contextualized presentation of the client, her situation and her experience.").
426. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 256.
427. KOZOL, supra note 106, at 62.
428. Id. at 185. Wicker also worries about romanticizing the Attica brothers who, "whatever the
conditions in the prison and the world ... by any recognized definition, were not political prisoners but
hardened criminals." WICKER, supra note 58, at 52.
429. KOZOL, supra note 106, at 185.
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scene-Hattie's arrival in Cairo-which, however consistent with the story as
I know it happened, may not have happened. There is a difference between
Stephen Oates' biography of Lincoln4' and Gore Vidal's novel,
Lincohla 3 t-a difference, beyond style, that is worth remembering. We
should not invent dialogue. The use of photographs-which do lie, and do so
readily432-offers no protection. I recall a photograph of Nazis in swastikas
who had come from Chicago to march in Cairo. The photographer had snapped
the picture just as the Nazis were moving past a store sign that read "Cairo
News and Music" and a placard emblazoned with the words, "Save Cairo."
The Nazis were there: it would not be a lie to put the photograph in the
pleading. But it wouldn't be the truth either. The white Cairoites, however
similar to these Chicago Nazis in the moral offensiveness of their racism, were
not Nazis.
We can only hope that other licensed lawyers would worry about this issue
as much as this jailhouse lawyer:
Once in a while you run into a jailhouse lawyer who will [file
"bullshit" suits] to be a real bastard, but it gets old. Even to them
guys, it gets old. You keep filing stuff like that, and you're just
wasting your time. There's enough real stuff around to do it, to really
fight the system on real issues where they're really doing wrong to
people.433
For those licensed lawyers capable of worry, there is the admonition of the
father of rhetoric, Aristotle, who warns against rhetoric that forgets what is
true.4" For the rest, there is the mother of all rules, Rule 11.
E. Competence
We can comfort ourselves that even if our clients do not prevail, their
story has been heard. Law calls for stories from the two sides of a dispute. No
matter what the outcome, all participants know there were at least two sides
to the story, even if one of those stories sounds foreign to the judge. The
telling of the stories at a minimum "creatfes] a world in which differences can
coexist.' " The court is one place where "unheard voices can be heard."''
430. STEPHEN B. OATES, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE MAN BEHIND THE MYTIS (1984)
431. GORE VIDAL, LINCOLN (1984).
432. E.g., FORREST GUMP (Paramount 1994) (creating fictional interactions bct%%cen protagonist and
U.S. Presidents via special effects); ZELIG (Orion Pictures/Warner Brothers 1984) (creating fictional
newsreels).
433. THOMAS, PRISONER LMGATION. supra note 34. at 144 (quoting interview with jailhousc law4ycr)
434. See FISH, supra note 7. at 479 (discussing Anstotle's underlying assumption that there is a *true"
to forget).
435. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 225.
436. Id. at 267.
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Tell that to the client, after he loses. We have a dual ethical role as well. Our
translation is not just for the purpose of truthfully telling the story of the
present and past, but also for changing the future for our clients. The language
of the law empowers us to do that; it gives the story of our clients a new
meaning. It loses much in the translation, of course, as we have seen. But it
also gains; it gains the possibility of change. 37
To change the story through a happy ending, we need to win. 438 That
means omitting from our thicker pleadings facts we may not be able to prove.
It also means omitting facts we prefer to conceal until the most strategic time.
It may even mean leaving out whole areas pertinent to the cause. This is less
troublesome in the new Cairo complaint since the cases make the entire racial
history of the town relevant.439 The inclusion of "disputed facts alleged with
particularity" triggers the mandatory disclosure provisions of the newly
amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)4 0 -at least where the court
has not opted out. On the other hand, the particularized allegations contained
in a thicker complaint impose the full disclosure of facts, witnesses, and
documents known to the defendant as well.
We may sacrifice creativity in situations where translation matters less than
persuasion, and persuasion may demand resort to plainer language. For some
audiences (in some cases, on some occasions), we aim more to comfort than
to alarm, to persuade by ordinariness instead of outrage. Some conservative
judges might not like being alarmed. Lincoln's prose in the Emancipation
Proclamation does not resemble the Second Inaugural or the Gettysburg
Addresses, a difference noted by Civil War correspondent Karl Marx, who
described the Proclamation as the "mean pettifogging conditions which one
lawyer puts to his opposing lawyer."' Lincoln wrote it as a war measure
much as we might draft a motion-important, but not the place for a lawyer
to "unleash the full powers of his language.'2
F Professionalism
Thicker pleading that includes the lawyer's voice may run afoul of our
traditional admonition to not vouch for.clients." 3 As suggested above, the
437. White, Translation, supra note 177, at 1395 (quoting divorce lawyer).
438. The new Cairo complaint otherwise satisfies the requirements of pleading a cause of action,
Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975), and jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P. app. form 2.
439. See cases cited supra note 43.
440. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
441. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES (Richard Enmale
ed., 1937). quoted in MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
PROMISE OF AMERICA 113 (1993).
442. NEELY, supra note 441, at 116 (explaining that Lincoln's purpose in using dry, stale language
was to "calm fears, anticipate critics, and frustrate those who might doubt its constitutionality").
443. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Prfession's Rule Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy and
"the Manner That Is the Man Himself', 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 145, 158 (1993)
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identity of lawyer and client's cause is hard to avoid. The usual trick is to
persuade by appearing convinced yourself, yet never expressing your opinion
on the merits of the cause or the character of your client. " The challenge
here slips onto a somewhat different plane-to persuade by including yourself
within the client's story. It is a more difficult trick, with greater risks. In the
Cairo case, it can be finessed by explicitly stating the lawyer's motivation-to
give Hattie a chance to vote before she dies, without labeling this statement as
the lawyer's motivation. It could be finessed by inserting it into a statement of
the lawyer's intent to prosecute the action vigorously, in satisfaction of
Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement of adequate representation." 5
To avoid alienation from our peers, to have our pleading read seriously by
our precedent-bound profession, change must be seen as change yoked to
continuity, as an evolution in legal writing." 6
G. Civility
We need not make civil rights conflicts worse. Storytelling as argument
could have the same effect Glendon diagnoses in rights talk-polarizing
antagonists through a competition of foreign voices such that no settlement is
possible. Storytelling, then, must travel inside legal argument. We must do this
if we are to resolve these disputes, by providing a "rhetorical coherence to
public life by compelling those who disagree about one thing to speak a
language which expresses their actual or pretended agreement about everything
else." '7 This coherence is in our own interest, as lawyers for civil rights
complainants. Legal reasoning accommodates one set of rights and interests to
other interests with less nonlegal power, such as the interests of civil rights
plaintiffs."8 It facilitates the decision that would protect the less powerful.
White is correct when he states that the insistence on reasoned decisions is the
source of equality under the law." 9 It may be all that oppressed people have.
This process could lead to peace as well as justice. Our clients could
become reconciled to a system in which they feel themselves to be
participants. They, and we, and the powers-that-be may see these tragedies as
(discussing rule against both honest and deceptive vouching for clients)
444. Id. at 146. 163.
445. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that counsel adequately represent the absent class members).
see Serritella v. Engelman, 339 F. Supp. 738, 748 (D.N.J. 1972) ("Plaintiffs %kill doubtless fairly and
adequately represent class members. They are represented by Legal Services attomes ss kho ha% e both the
expertise and the dedication necessary to press their claims.").
446. FISH. supra note 7, at 157 ("In short, the very point of the legal enterprise requires that its
practitioners see continuity where others ... might feel free to see change.-). see also id at 95 (discussing
invented history among jurists).
447. WHrrE, JusTtcE, supra note 6, at 179.
448. Id. at 166 (criticizing Justice Douglas for ignoring legal distinction in reaching decision in United
States v. White and losing authority because of that failure).
449. Id. at 202.
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real problems, not just as legal problems that can only be fixed by law. Clients
might mobilize to attack these problems, and governments and societies might
respond. And we might attack these problems as more than just lawyers, but
as ourselves.
Still, -let's not get carried away. As Fish sagely notes, society changes
because of changes in the conditions under which people live, not because of
the musings of philosophers or lawyers. What he says about philosophers
applies doubly to lawyers and law professors: "[A]II that will tremble when the




Writing in this way could subvert legal education, but not in any effective
way. This possibility is not simply due to the intense resistance to change in
law school faculties that was diagnosed by Dean Mudd,45' but also to the
admittedly difficult necessity of teaching the new vocabulary of the law.
452
While some change is possible,453 we can hardly expect the law school to
450. FISH, supra note 7, at 28.
451. Mudd, supra note 126, at 190.
452. Susan U. Philips, The Language Socialization of Lawyers: Acquiring the "Cant", in DOING TIlE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF SCHOOLING 177 (George Spindler ed., 1982).
453. First, we can stop smugly assuming that the plain writing school of legal writing is the only
modem way to write about legal issues. Second, we can learn from Clark Cunningham's efforts to teach
students that they are habitually framing problems and excluding important elements by the frame. See
Cunningham, supra note 188, at 1334. Third, we can cite to journalism, history, and literature in law-and-
literature courses and in clinical courses, to remind students that they are learning a new language, one of
many possible languages, and that others may more fully translate the reality of clients and persuasively
advance the legal argument for change. See generally Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium. 40 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1 (1990). Fourth, we can continue to urge the integration of clinical courses with the overall
curriculum so that the students' educational experience will not be so fractured between a careful legal
analysis that is nonetheless factually impoverished and clinical education, rich in facts but shallow in
analysis. See, e.g., Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School
Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context ofAmy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 243, 251 (1988).
The drafting of a pleading offers an excellent occasion for merging factual and legal analysis, learning
persuasive skills, and telling the client's story. Only through the clinic's experiential method can students
internalize the imperative to continue to learn from practice by reflecting on that practice. See James S.
Coleman, Differences Between Experiential and Classroom Learning, in EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 49, 54
(Morris T. Keeton ed., 1976) (discussing experiential learning in general). Only an educationally guided
practice in live-client clinics will introduce the richness of reality with all its unpredictability and
undiscovered, uninterpreted meanings. In particular, clinics that serve the poor present middle-class students
with the ethnographer's opportunity to study different worlds and voices.
In my courses, I have experimented with a number of devices. In the introductory lecture to a large
simulation course on pretrial practice, I ask my students to read and brief in class the edition of Walker
v. City of Birmingham. 388 U.S. 307 (1967), that is reprinted in PAUL D. CARRINGTON & BARBARA A.
BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE 52 (3d ed. 1983). Then, after a discussion of the facts and legal issues, none
of which refers to Martin Luther King's campaign to desegregate Birmingham, I show them a portion of
the documentary Eyes on the Prize (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 21, 1987). I got the idea from David
B. Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of Birmingham. and the Letterfrom Birmingham Jail,
26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791 (1993). In that course, I also compare different ways of writing about an age
discrimination case, using sterile pleadings, plain statements of fact in affidavits, and the clients' simulated
stories, borrowing from two plays, Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman and Jerry Sterner's Other People s
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teach successfully this vocabulary and its concomitant mode of thinking while
the school simultaneously undermines both at every turn. "
I. Peace of Mind
This pleading puts our safety at risk. It will be tougher to retreat into a
role to protect ourselves from these risks, as well as from the court, from our
peers, and from our clients' terrible truths. Stripped of the armor of our
professional role and divested of the only sword that our profession permits
us,45 these awful problems become merely legal problems. Once we reduce
the problems to legal problems, narrowly defined, we will respond to them as
people (perhaps) and as lawyers (certainly), but not as people who are lawyers.
We will respond to them in a prescribed way. a safe way.
But I doubt that we will feel safe. Even while we insist upon writing in
this thin, lifeless way, we can sense the bifurcation, the segmentation of
ourselves.456 We still will remember that legal language is not the only
language and that other tongues are translated into our own." 7 We can yet
see something of that larger reality and understand it in another vocabulary,
one more personal and human. This memory is inescapable, since we belong
to interpretive communities other than our professional association. We are
parents and children, citizens and bystanders, victims and offenders. As White
says, our lives are richer than our professional writing would indicate."" So
are the lives of our clients, obviously. We will still see something of the client
"truths," still feel inadequate in the power of our traditional advocacy to
translate, to persuade.
We would suspect that there is an alternative way, as White hopes, to live
our lives and practice our profession in a fuller sense, as both "performers"
and "characters"4 9 and, simply, as people. Perhaps we could, through
practice, overcome the constraints of rule, custom, and socialization. Perhaps
integrating our own voices into the real stories of our clients would help us to
Money. In both a simulation course on client counseling and the live-client clinic. I have assigned for
discussion Clark Cunningham's article. Finally, in the clinic. I ask students to cntique as pleading using
Delgado's plea for narrative.
454. White's description of learning to think "like a law~cr" 'uggetsi the dilemma WiIr-
IMAGINATION, supra note 6. at 7; see also Farber & Sherry. supra note 240. at 807 (describing task of
learning traditional legal language and narrative); Sandra C. McKenzie. StorYt elihg A Different Voice for
Legal Education, 41 KAN. L. REV. 251 (1992) (same).
455. As I have already noted, Goffman says the "grocer who dreams is offensvc to the buyer, because
such a grocer is not wholly a grocer." GOFIFMAN, supra note 12, at 76. Civil rights clients, even when
backstaged, may prefer a more "lawyerly" approach, a preference their lawyers can scnse.
456. To protect against this feeling, we may be tempted into collusion with our colleagues to preserve
our solidarity with them. Id. at 177, 184. Goffman warns that "an individual may be taken in by his o%, n
act or be cynical about it." Id. at 19.
457. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 81.
458. Id. at II.
459. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 252.
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see complaints of racism and oppression less as accusations aimed in part at
us and more as descriptions of realities in which we live, realities we can help
transform."6 Perhaps we would find some therapeutic benefit to writing
about the tragedy we see and cannot change, allowing us to look at that
tragedy with greater courage. 6'
Perhaps we can negotiate a course that avoids the fate of F. Scott
Fitzgerald, who wrote: "I had developed a sad attitude toward sadness, a
melancholy attitude toward melancholy and a tragic attitude toward




[We] should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a
question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do
both (for one should not persuade what is debased) but in order that
it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is.463
Aristotle
When I sat down to redraft the original Kendrick complaint, I was three
years out of law school. I checked the voting rights case law and the forms
used in other cases, careful not to invite a motion to dismiss or criticism from
the bench. I found little reason to alter the complaint other than adding the
Voting Rights Act provisions and Preston Ewing as a class representative.
Before filing it in the federal court in Benton, Illinois, about an hour and one-
half north of Cairo, I showed it to Hattie and Preston. Hattie read it over
quickly, trusting my judgment in such matters. Preston scrutinized it more
carefully, but said nothing.
Only years later, as I started work on this Article and discussed the
complaint with him, did Preston say to me, "I always wondered why you
lawyers wrote about Cairo the way you did." Rummaging through my file of
Cairo memorabilia after that conversation, I rediscovered a newspaper article
460. See Shane, supra note 189, at 1053. The curative power of such integration may be particularly
strong since we are telling the stories of other people. See Letter from Richard Delgado to Kevin Kennedy,
Editor-in-Chief, Michigan Law Review (June 1, 1988), in Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2075 (1989) (presenting storytelling and narrative method for analysis and critique
of dominant paradigm).
461. Some therapists report a benefit to having their patients write in journals as "denial busters." Bo
Emerson, The Journal Keepers, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. I, 1993, at Cl. Listening to our clients' stories,
naked of theory, can help us better to understand them and ourselves, and how we might help them. See.
e.g., ROBERT COLES, THE CALL OF STORIES 7 (1989).
462. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, The Crack Up, in TilE CRACK UP 69, 80-81 (1945).
463. 1 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC § 1355, at 34 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).
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quoting me on Cairo: "'The point of Cairo to me was always the swimming
pool,' says Eastman bitterly. 'When they filled it in, it said to me, "Now little
black kids and little white kids can drown in the Mississippi.' '  I don't
recall feeling bitter, only sad. 6 5 I also remember the sad faces of the
pallbearers, black and white, at Hattie's funeral, escorting her casket down the
church steps.
Preston's remark echoed as I fingered a photograph of Cairo's Ohio River
levee. On the concrete wall that kept the Ohio and most things north and east
out of Cairo, someone had painted in letters a foot high: "Preston Ewing's
grandfather was a slave." I looked once more at the pleading. Where in all this
was Cairo? Where were Hattie and Preston? Where was I? Could I have
written it differently?
James Boyd White asks the same question:
Can we find ways to talk that will reflect more fully what we actually
know to be true of ourselves and our minds, of our languages and our
cultures? Can we find or create voices that are more fully our own,
speaking to audiences more fully recognized as the minds and people
they actually are? 66
I think so. We can write the pleading as a story, the story as an argument for
change.467
That's no small trick. That means writing while astride a canyon, one foot
on each side, over the great distance between the civil rights client and the
court, between "us" and "them," stretching ourselves between the languages
of the client, of other observers of reality, and of our profession:
I see the lawyer, then, as engaged in a set of linguistic and
literary activities, just as the poet or novelist is .... This kind of
work on law and literature is ... a bringing to consciousness of the
nature of our own intellectual and linguistic practices, both literary
and legal, with the hope of holding them in the mind at once in such
a way as to change our sense of both. 68
We stretch as well, between our hope that we can do this and our fear
that we cannot, our doubt that we will "sell out" our clients or sacrifice
ourselves, forgetting what is real and what is performance. " 9 Others have
464. Kelly, supra note 386, at 17.
465. I wasn't in Cairo when they closed the pool. But I did make the statement, and it is true that the
pool struck me as an apt metaphor for the town.
466. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6. at 12.
467. See id. at 256 (noting that pleading will take on the *'ethical and cultural meaning it performs as
a gesture of its own"). By including the story in a pleading, both pleading and story are changed.
468. Id. at 19.
469. GOFFMAN, supra note 12. at 216. we must avoid 'faking it.- Id. at 251 (discussing
misrepresentation).
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noted this straddling imperative. For example, Richard Sherwin says that we
must fight for our balance between "the desire for belief' offered by White and
"the fear of deception" confessed by the deconstructionists. 470 Sherwin
achieves the straddle by hoping, like White, to translate truly, while remaining
critical of the attempt, like the Crits. 47I This strikes me as a very lawyerly
approach; a good litigator advances his cause, while analyzing its weaknesses
and ramifications.
Yet the straddling imperative suggested by White poses greater risk
because White hopes that eventually we can cease to straddle and begin to
integrate, to put together in a complex whole, aspects of our culture,
or of the world, that seem to us disparate or unconnected, and in so
doing to integrate, to bring together in interactive life, aspects of our




White's characterization of lawyers as novelists and his admonition to
"hold in the mind at once" two conflicting voices conjure the ghost of one of
our greatest novelists, F Scott Fitzgerald. We need to remember Fitzgerald's
posture toward life, as expressed below, quoted a few pages ago-a posture
of losing out to despair.473 We must remember as well that, either despite or
because of this straddling posture, Fitzgerald did, indeed, "crack up. '474 Still,
the lawyer as novelist may emulate Fitzgerald's wiser posture toward life.
Fitzgerald's insight serves as wise counsel to the civil rights litigator who
would speak truth to power: "[Tihe test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability
to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the
ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are




470. Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87
MICH. L. REV. 543, 551 (1988). Sherwin observes that White naively overlooks the difficulty of power
relationships and the maintenance of the status quo in his call for democracy through translation. Id. at 558
n.40.
471. Id. at 597-98. Goffman similarly says that "[w]hile we can expect to find natural movement back .
and forth between cynicism and sincerity, still we must not rule out the kind of transitional point that can
be sustained on the strength of a little self-illusion." GOFFMAN, supra note 12. at 21.
472. WHITE, JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 12.
473. See supra text accompanying note 462. For further exposition on the balance between despair
and determination in civil rights, see generally BELL, supra note 376; Comel West, The Role of Law in
Progressive Politics, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1797 (1990).
474. K.G.W. CROSS, ScoTT FrrTZGERALD 92 (1964) (describing Fitzgerald's alcoholism, mental
depression, and physical collapse).
475. FITZGERALD, supra note 462. at 69.
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This action arises under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. and Un-ted
States Code, Title 42, Sections 1973 and 1983. This Court has
jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to United States Code.
Title 28, Section 1343. Venue is proper in this District pursuant
to United States Code, Title 28, Section 1391.
II
This proceeding challenges the constitutionality and leg8a:y
of conducting City Council elections in Cairo, ilirncis, on an
at-large basis as authorized by Chapter 24. Sections 4-3-2 and 4-
3-5 of the Illinois Revised Statutes and other provisions of
Illinois law. The at-large voting system employed in Cairo
requires city-wide elections of the five members of the City
Council and permits all elected City Council members to be
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residents of predominantly white areas of Cairo. The adoption and
use of the at-large voting system has resulted in the dilution of
voting strength of Black residents of Cairo and has precluded the
election of Black Cairo residents to the Cairo City Council. The
exclusion of Black residents from the City Council has caused
that body to be unresponsive to the needs of the Black community,
has caused Blacks to be excluded from appointive positions in
City government, and has furthered racial discrimination in the
community.
III
Plaintiffs request four specific forms of relief in this
action:
(A) Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to Title
28, Sections 2201 and 2202 of the United States Code declaring:
(1) that the at-large voting system employed in City Council
elections in Cairo, Illinois denies the right of Black residents
to vote in said elections contrary to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the proscription against
abridging voter's rights on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude of the Fifteenth Amendment, And Section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, and the prohibition
against practices or procedures that deny or abridge the right to
vote on account of race or color of Section 1973 of Title 42 of
the United States Code and (2) that Chapter 24, Section 4-3-2 and
4-3-5 of the Illinois Revised Statutes are unconstitutional as
applied to City Council elections in Cairo, Illinois.
(B) Second, plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction: (1)
restraining all Defendants, their agents, servants, employees,
successors and all other persons participating or acting in
concert with them, from enforcing the at-large election
provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
24, §§4-3-2 and 4-3-5, insofar as they authorize the present at-
large voting system for City Council in Cairo, Illinois, and (2)
1995] Language of Civil Rights Litigators 867
restraining all named Defendants, their agents, employees.
successors and all other persons participating or acting in
concert with them from conducting City Council elections in that
city under the present at-large voting system prescribed by said
statutes.
(C) Third, plaintiffs request that this Court retain
jurisdiction over this proceeding in order to approve a plan for
the establishment of a ward voting system for the election of
City Council members that will not minimize or cancel the voting
strength of Black residents of Cairo.
(D) Fourth, plaintiffs request that this Court order a new
City Council election pursuant to a ward voting system which
would not cancel the voting strength of Black residents of Cairo.
IV
(A) The named plaintiffs are: HATTIE KENDRICK, LUL-;R HOLLIS,
WILLELLA FLOWERS, WILLIAM BOOKER, MABLE HOLLIS. JANICE 1'HITFIELD,
and PRESTON EWING, JR. individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated.
(B) All plaintiffs are Blacks, citizens of the United States
and of the State of Illinois, and residents of Cairo. Illinois
registered to vote in Municipal Elections conducted in Cairo.
V
Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and.
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on
behalf of a class comprised of all Black citizens who are
residents of Cairo, Illinois, and who are or will be entitled to
vote in Cairo City Council Elections. The members of said class
are so numerous as to render their joinder in this action
impracticable; there are common questions of law and fact which
predominate the claims of the class members; the claims of the
named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class members;
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the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the
interests of other class members; and, the criteria of Rule
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are satisfied in
this action, wherefore final declaratory and injunctive relief
with respect to the class as a whole is appropriate. (The named
plaintiffs and the class which they represent are hereinafter
referred to as "Plaintiffs.")
VI
(A) The Defendants are: ALLEN MOSS, as Mayor of the City of
Cairo, Illinois; ANDY CLARKE, WILLIAM EGAN, CARL HORNBEAK and
WILLIAM S. WINTER, as City Commissioners of Cairo, Illinois;
MARTHA A. SMITH, as City Clerk of Cairo, Illinois; the CAIRO CITY
COUNCIL; and the CITY OF CAIRO, a Municipal Corporation.
(B) All defendants herein are sued in their official
capacities as hereafter indicated:
(1) The Mayor of Cairo and the four City Commissioners
constitute the City Council of Cairo, Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 24, §4-5-1 (1972). The City Council is authorized by Article
VII, Section 7 of the Illinois Constitution "to provide, by
referendum for their officers, manner of selection and terms of
office.- It is given all the rights, duties and powers specified
in Articles 4 and 9 of the Municipal Code of 1961, Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 24, §§4-5-2 (1972).
(2) The City Clerk of Cairo is appointed by the City Council
pursuant to Article 24, Section 4-5-4 of the Illinois Revised
Statutes and is charged with maintaining the official records of
the municipality. The City Comptroller, appointed by the City
Council in accordance with the same statutory authority, is
responsible for maintaining the fiscal records of the local
government.
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(3) The City of Cairo and the City Council. The City and its
Council have an official policy and practice of at-large
municipal elections by reason of the city having adopted the at-
large municipal form in 1913, having maintained the at-large form
since 1913, and having conducted and authorized, sanctioned, and
ratified the conducting of all eighteen municipal elections held
since 1913, pursuant to the at-large form.
Vii
Blacks have constituted a substantial segment of the
population of Cairo throughout the history of that community.
Blacks presently comprise approximately forty percent of the
6,277 inhabitants of Cairo.
VIII
For over 100 years, up to and including this date. Cairo.
Illinois has been a racially polarized community. (A copy of a
report on Cairo by the United States Commission on Civil Rights
is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as
Exhibit A.)
(A) Public agencies and officials have maintained racially
segregated public facilities throughout the history of Cairo:
(1) Cairo has a long-standing policy of support for
segregated schools. A dual school system was maintained until
1952. While some Blacks were admitted to formerly all-white
schools in 1952, the Black schools remained exclusively Black
until 1967. Prompted by intensified efforts to desegregate
Cairo's public educational facilities, white residents opened the
Camelot School in 1969. This privately financed institution has
an all-white student body and faculty and is accorded tax exempt
status by the Internal Revenue Service. Following the
matriculation of white students to Camelot School. Blacks have
comprised approximately seventy percent of the student body of
the Cairo public schools.
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(2) The Alexander County Housing Authority has maintained
segregated public housing projects since 1941. While eight public
housing projects presently are operated by the Housing Authority,
only a single housing complex for the elderly is integrated.
(3) Until well into the 1960's Black residents of Cairo were
required to sit in segregated sections of public meeting places
and buildings by officially sanctioned custom. This custom was
followed until 1963 with respect to seating in the county court
house. A similar policy was observed in public school teachers'
meetings until 1967.
(4) Blacks were customarily denied use of the National Guard
Armory well into the 1950's although the building was erected in
1931.
(5) Blacks were denied access to public library facilities
until the 1950's. Although Blacks were permitted to use a
separate library annex in the formerly all-Black high school,
they were not issued library cards by the public library until
1952.
(6) The largest city park in Cairo, St. Mary's Park, was
segregated until 1962, with one side of the park reserved for
whites, while the other was designated for Blacks.
(B) Public facilities owned by private individuals have been
historically operated on a racially segregated basis.
(1) Entertainment facilities in Cairo often have been closed
to avoid court ordered integration. The only public swimming pool
was closed in the mid-1960's.
(2) Until the mid-1950's, public restrooms and waiting areas
in the Cairo bus station were operated on a racially segregated
basis.
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(3) All hotels, motels and restaurants in Cairo were racially
segregated until 1962.
(C) Black residents of Cairo have systematically been the
subject of racial discrimination in employment.
(1) The overall unemployment rate for Alexander County was 9
percent in 1970; 6.5 percent for white males and 16.2 for Black
males.
(2) While the median income for a white family residing in
Alexander County in 1969 was $6,428. the median income for a
Black family was only $2,809.
(3) Three-quarters of the Black families of Alexander County
earned less than $3,000 in 1969, while only one-third of the
white families earned less than this amount.
(4) Black residents of Cairo who are employed are relegated
to low paying unskilled jobs.
(5) Craft unions in Cairo have discriminated and continue to
discriminate against Black residents by excluding them from
membership therein.
(D) Black residents of Cairo have been systematically
excluded from elective politics in the community.
(1) The political processes leading to the nomination and
election of partisan candidates for elective office have not been
open to Black residents of Cairo. Until the mid-1940"s. the
Democratic Party of Cairo, Illinois was strictly segregated while
a similar policy was observed by the Republican Party well into
the 1960's. No Black has ever attained a major leadership
position in either Party, although several Blacks have been
elected as Committeemen.
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(2) Only one Black, Jacob Amos, has ever been elected to
office in the Cairo city government. Elected as a city alderman
from the Fourth Ward in 1894, prior to the adoption of the at-
large voting system, Mr. Amos remained an alderman for one year.
(E) Black residents of Cairo have been systematically denied
appointment to and membership on various boards, departments and
agencies operating in Alexander County pursuant to state law. No
Black has ever been appointed to the Library Board, Building
Commission, Police Pension Board or the Airport Authority. Only
one Black has ever been a member of either the Land Commission or
Health Board, while the Welfare Committee, Plan Commission and
Zoning Board have only had three Black members throughout their
history.
(F) Although many of the public facilities in Cairo have been
integrated, the legacy of racial discrimination fostered by this
history of segregation remains a basic fabric of life in Cairo.
Ix
The City of Cairo in 1913 adopted the City Commission form of
government authorized by Chapter 24, Section 4-1-1 et seq. of the
Illinois Revised Statutes.
(A) Chapter 24, Section 4-3-1 of the Illinois Revised
Statutes mandates the election of a City Council comprised of a
mayor and four Commissioners.
(B) According to authority vested in the City Council
pursuant to Chapter 24, Section 4-5-2 of the Illinois Revised
Statutes, the Council and its members are given all the
"executive, administrative, and legislative" powers and duties
authorized by the Illinois constitution and statutes of the State
of Illinois.
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(C) Each member of the City Council is responsible for
supervising one of the following departments: (1) Department of
Public Affairs; (2) Department of Accounts and Finances: (3)
Department of Public Health and Safety; (4) Department of Streets
and Public Improvements; (5) Department of Public Property. Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 24, §4-5-3 (1972).
x
Acting under color of authority conferred upon them by
Chapter 24, Section 4-3-2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes and by
other laws of the State of Illinois, the named Defendants are
presently pursuing a plan, policy and practice requiring at-large
City Council Elections.
(A) Chapter 24, Section 4-3-2 of the Illinois Revised
Statutes provides that: '[t~he mayor and four commissioners of
the municipality shall be nominated and elected at large.'
(B) Chanter 24, Section 4-3-5 of the Illinois Revised
Statutes provides: "[a]ll candidates for nomination to be voted
at all general municipal elections at which a mayor and four
commissioners are to be elected . . . shall be nominated from the
municipality at large by a primary election . . .'
(C) The maintenance and use of this at-large vot:ng system in
Cairo, Illinois, which has a long-standing and pervasive policy
of racial discrimination, has: (1) discriminated invidiously
against Blacks by minimizing and cancelling-out the vot:ng
strength of Black voters in City Council Elections in
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and; (2) denied and abridged their right to vote
because of race, color or previous condition of servitude in
contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; and Section 1973 of Title 42 of the United State
Code, and; (3) deprived them of rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution in violation of Section 1983 of Title
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42 of the United States Code, and; (4) effectively excluded
Blacks from election to the City Council and from appointment to
positions" in local government.
XI
Prior to the adoption of the mandatory at-large voting
system, the City of Cairo had an aldermanic form of government in
which elections were conducted by ward.
XII
As a direct result of the legacy of racial discrimination and
the adoption and maintenance of the at-large voting system, no
Black has ever been elected to the City Council in the sixty
years of its existence during which no less than fifteen
elections were conducted for that purpose, and despite the fact
that Blacks have constituted a sizable portion of the population
of that Community.
XIII
Race is a constant and dominant factor in elections in Cairo,
Illinois, and Black voters are particularly disadvantaged in at-
large voting elections because(:]
(A) Voting patterns in county and municipal elections show
that whites do not vote for Black candidates and that where Black
candidates oppose white candidates, the whites consistently vote
for the white candidates.
(B) White candidates for local office in Cairo have supported
anti-integration policies and have employed racial campaign
tactics in seeking election to local office.
(C) Adopting a firm anti-Black editorial position, local news
media have supported and encouraged voting along racial lines.
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XIv
The adoption and use of the at-large voting system in Cairo
has discouraged Blacks from running for office in City Council
elections. The few Blacks who have run for office have invariably
lost due to the dilution of Black voting strength caused by the
at-large election system for choosing City Commissioners.
Xv
Faced with the pervasive racial polarization in Cairo. Black
candidates and voters have been unable to form effective
political coalitions with white candidates and voters.
XVI
Black residents of Cairo have been excluded from the
political process leading to the nomination and election of City
Council members.
(A) While City Council elections are nonpartisan, nomination
and election to the Commission has been customarily confined to
individuals who run on all-white slates of candidates.
(B) These slates are selected by groups of white residents of
Cairo, without any participation whatsoever by Black residents.
(C) Because Black residents of Cairo are excluded from the
groups which select these slates of candidates. Blacks are
excluded from running as members of these slates and thereby have
less opportunity than whites to participate in the political
processes and to elect City Council representatives of their
choice.
XVII
White councilmen in Cairo, Illinois, the City Council and its
subordinate bodies, are unresponsive to and unrepresentative of
Black residents and their interest.
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(A) Not only has no Black ever been elected at-large to the
City Council, but the whites elected to the City Council reside
in a single area of the community where very few Blacks reside.
(B) Certain members of the City Council are former members of
a white vigilante group denoted the White Hats and were
organizers of the United Citizens for Community Action, an
affiliate of the White Citizens Council of America. These groups
were expressly organized to further racial discrimination.
(C) The City Council in 1970 specifically refused to rezone a
former school site to permit construction of a shopping center by
Black entrepreneurs.
(D) The City Council has been unable to control sniper
shootings into Pyramid Courts, an all-Black public housing
project. The City Police Department has not responded to these
repeated acts of lawlessness and terrorism and has failed to
provide adequate police services in Black areas of Cairo.
(E) The City Council refused to establish a Community
Relations Board to improve relations between city police and
Black residents despite the fact that this program was to be
funded by a $75,000.00 grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement
Commission.
(F) The City Council has systematically excluded Blacks from
appointive positions in local government and has confined the few
Black public servants to lower level general services positions.
(G) The City Council has refused to cooperate with a bi-
racial housing corporation, financed by federal and state funds
to develop single-family dwelling units in Cairo. The City
Council has failed to pass an ordinance which would make City
lots available for construction of homes.
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XVIII
Not only have the City Council, its members and subordinate
bodies been unresponsive to the needs of the Black residents of
Cairo, but they have openly furthered racial discrimination and
the denial of Black civil rights in the community.
(A) The City Council openly opposed efforts of civil rights
workers to eliminate racial discrimination in employment among
the operators of Cairo downtown retail stores. To hamper and to
prevent protest demonstrations, the City Council passed an
ordinance in 1970 which was designed to eliminate picketing in
the downtown areas. Only a threat of a lawsuit in 1971 prevented
the continued enforcement of the patently unconstitutional
ordinance.
(B) To repress civil rights demonstrators attempting to
obtain employment equality, the Chief of Police, the Sheriff and
the Coroner of Alexander County, deputized former members of the
White Hats, a local white vigilante group. Unidentifiable memners
of this -auxiliary police force' wantonly clubbed and beat Black
demonstrators who were clearly engaged in constitutiondlly
protected activity.
(C) To prevent unfettered news coverage of the wanton police
brutality surrounding the demonstrations in 1970. the police
confiscated a local reporter's camera to remove the incriminating
documentation of their unlawful acts.
XIX
Black residents of Cairo, Illinois, share a community of
interest based upon race, poverty and the legacy of racial
discrimination. This legacy has forced upon Blacks an additional
community of interest derived from their common effort to achieve
equal rights under law including equal opportunity in education,
jobs and housing.
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xx
Blacks constitute a majority of the registered voters in
certain areas of Cairo and could elect representatives of their
choice from these areas if elections were conducted according to
a ward voting system which did not dilute Black voting strength.
xxI
The abolition of a ward system of election, and the adoption
and perpetuation of the present at-large system for electing City
Council members have resulted and will continue to result in
immediate and irreparable injury to plaintiffs herein, who have
no adequate remedy at law.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court:
(A) Enter a Declaratory Judgment:
(1) Declaring Illinois Revised Statute, chapter 24, Sections
4-3-2 and 4-3-5 unconstitutional as applied in Cairo, Illinois,
because said statutes have the effect of preventing Blacks from
being elected to the City Council in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth
Amendment proscription against denying or abridging voters'
rights on account of race, color or previous condition of
servitude, and Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States
Code, and
(2) Declaring the at-large form of municipal elections in
Cairo, Illinois to be a violation of Section 1973 of Title 42 of
the United States Code, as a practice and procedure that denies
and abridges the right to vote on account of race.
(B) Issue a permanent injunction:
(1) Restraining all named Defendants, their agents, servants,
employees and all other persons participating or acting in
concert with them from enforcing the provisions of said statue,
and from conducting City Council Elections in Cairo, Illinois,
under the present at-large voting system; and
(2) Requiring that a plan be established dividing Cairo,
Illinois, into wards and providing for the election of councilmen
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from such wards by vote of the electors residing therein in a
manner that does not dilute the voting strength of Black
residents of Cairo, Illinois;
(C) Retain jurisdiction of this proceeding to approve a plan
for the establishment of a ward voting system within Cairo.
Illinois, which does not have the effect of minimizing or
cancelling out the voting strength of Black residents of said
city and to rule accordingly.
(D) Order a new City Council election pursuant to a ward
voting system which would not cancel the voting strength of Black
residents of Cairo.
(E) Grant Plaintiffs their costs therein, including
reasonable attorneys' fees to the extent permitted by law.
(F) Grant Plaintiffs such further and additional relief as
said Court may deem equitable, just, and proper.

